Tolkien vs. Orwell: Who understood modern surveillance best (article)

This is an interesting bit of literary discussion, pondering how some elements of Lord of the Rings apply to issues in the modern day.

From http://www.slate.com/articles/news_..._who_understood_modern_surveillance_best.html

By David Rosen and Aaron Santesso

What can literary fiction teach us about recent revelations that the National Security Agency has aggressively been gathering massive amounts of data on American citizens? The novel one usually turns to, of course, is George Orwell’s Nineteen Eighty-Four, with its terrifying vision of the Thought Police. Even President Obama, in response to questions about the NSA, has been forced to deny that the government has engaged in “Big Brother” tactics. Orwell’s book, however, isn’t the most compelling or accurate literary prediction of modern surveillance. That award goes to a less obvious title: J.R.R Tolkien’s Lord of the Rings.

Tolkien’s most potent and intimidating image of centralized surveillance, the Eye of Sauron atop a tower, taking in the whole world, has resonated with those who are paranoid about government monitoring. But it’s Sauron’s vulnerability that has the most relevance for America today. Consider the basic premise of Tolkien’s trilogy: a small group of dedicated subversives willing to sacrifice their lives slips in under the surveillance system of a great power, blends in with an alien population, and delivers a devastating blow to the heart of its empire, leaving its security forces in disarray and its populace terrified. Even a tower or two crumbles to dust. Far from being covert, much of this operation is conducted in plain sight, with the great power aware of its enemies’ existence, if not their intent. Given its prescience about modern-day terrorism, Tolkien’s vision offers at least three lessons for present-day America.

1. All-Seeing Is Not All-Knowing

The most salient fact about Tolkien is not that he was a fantasist, but that he was Catholic: His Christian beliefs drove him out of realism and into a world of orcs, ents, and Dark Lords. That’s why The Lord of the Rings has been dismissed, as Edmund Wilson put it soon after the book’s publication in 1954, as “a children’s book which has some how got out of hand.” Yet the world he created allowed Tolkien to address problems that conventional realism had seemingly abandoned. The most important of them was the distinction between omnipotence and omniscience. In Orwell’s work (as well as that of other dystopian writers like Aldous Huxley and Yevgeny Zamyatin) those two terms are nearly synonymous: The Thought Police always know what Winston Smith is up to. But for a believer like Tolkien, only God can know everything. And in Sauron, Tolkien is able to imagine a figure of godlike power and seemingly infinite resources, but crippling interpretive fallibility.

Sauron’s main problem, in a nutshell, is a lack of empathy: He is unable to conceive of anyone possessing a set of values fundamentally different from his own. For Sauron, power—embodied by the one ring—is self-evidently a good in itself. Therefore anyone who possesses the ring will attempt to use it and thus fall into his clutches. The thought that someone might choose instead to destroy the ring (and possibly destroy himself in the process) never crosses Sauron’s mind. He suffers from a crippling case of “confirmation bias”—a fundamental problem for every intelligence agency. We see the things we want to see, which is a problem when one’s enemies have worldviews utterly different from one’s own.

2. The Enemy Controls the Plot

Tolkien’s second lesson for us: Surveillance is typically reactive. Intelligence professionals try to anticipate and counter the actions of their opponents; this leaves them on the defensive. For all our justifiable fears of the “watchers,” the advantage is often on the side of the watched. Every act of surveillance entails a struggle over meaning, narrative, and plot, with the infiltrator often creating the story in a way that exploits the surveillance mechanism’s weaknesses. In The Lord of the Rings, determined individuals (Frodo, Gandalf) with an adequate understanding of the enemy’s blind spots are able to rebel in plain sight.

This isn’t to say, however, that Tolkien was naive about the very real abuses of totalitarian power. Quite the opposite: He was every bit as repelled by the KGB and the Gestapo as Orwell or Arthur Koestler. In this respect, the most interesting sections of LOTR are the final chapter of Book IV and the first of Book VI. This is the sequence in which Frodo and Sam slip past “Homeland Security,” as it were, and evade the vast security apparatus on the borders of Mordor.

It is here that we get Tolkien’s canniest depiction of Mordor’s workaday employees: the orcs—Sauron’s TSA agents, to continue the metaphor. Here is a conversation Sam overhears between two of them about Frodo, who has been captured:

“What is it, d’you think? Elvish it looked to me, but undersized. What’s the danger in a thing like that?”

“Don’t know till we’ve had a look.”

“Oho! So they haven’t told you what to expect? They don’t tell us all they know, do they? Not by half. But they can make mistakes, even the Top Ones can.”

“Sh! ... They may, but they’ve got eyes and ears everywhere; some among my lot, as like as not. But there’s no doubt about it, they’re troubled about something. … Something nearly slipped.”

Isn’t this a more convincing depiction than Orwell’s hyperefficient Thought Police (or Zamyatin’s Guardians) of how power actually works in a surveillance state? Without in any way shorting the terror of living under the secret police, Tolkien captures the way that power mistrusts its own agents, and how it deprives them of information. He captures both the cynicism and paranoia of surveillance work—and also how, in this mix of suspicion, disgruntlement, and incompetence, things do slip through. The security apparatus, of Mordor or the United States, is only as strong as its weakest link, and weak links abound.

3. The Louder the Noise, the Fainter the Signal

As a common saying in the intelligence community would have it, processing raw intel is like drinking from a fire hose. Most dystopian authors cheat their way around this problem, ignoring huge swathes of the population to get the volume of information down to garden-hose levels. Huxley lops off “eight ninths” of the populace through eugenics. Orwell imagines the proles—85 percent of Oceania—to be politically neutered and not worth watching. By contrast, Sauron, like the NSA, has no such luxury. As Tolkien understands, nothing is harder to parse than visible anonymity. And that is the state Frodo and Sam remain in, so long as they don’t wear the ring.

How to recognize the treacherous or psychopathic needle in the haystack? As recent months have proved, it’s not so easy. Our surveillance state, in contrast to Orwell’s, has had its share of failures. A dangerous assumption underlies many contemporary debates about government surveillance: the assumption of interpretive competence. Without diminishing the seriousness of the recent NSA revelations, Tolkien is finally more convincing about why total surveillance often fails than Orwell and his endless progeny are in imagining its inevitable success. That’s at once some small comfort and reason for concern.
 

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Janx

Hero
Interesting article, but it comes a tad too close to the "no politics" rule for my tastes.

I'm a bit braver than that then. Though I recommend we stay away from who endorses/opposes the current NSA system.

Contrasting surveillance to Tolkien's All Seeing Eye is an interesting idea. it never struck me as seeing much of anything except people who where the rings.
 

jonesy

A Wicked Kendragon
it never struck me as seeing much of anything except people who where the rings.
Plus there's been a lot discussion over the years about whether the eye was a metaphor for some of Saurons powers, or an actual thing. The eye over Mordor is seen only once I think, and it's not exactly clear whether it's just a poetic allusion about a star that Frodo happens to spot at the time. And then there's a lot of visions, all connected to the ring bearer (Gollum and then Frodo, and maybe Bilbo too).
 


Janx

Hero
Plus there's been a lot discussion over the years about whether the eye was a metaphor for some of Saurons powers, or an actual thing. The eye over Mordor is seen only once I think, and it's not exactly clear whether it's just a poetic allusion about a star that Frodo happens to spot at the time. And then there's a lot of visions, all connected to the ring bearer (Gollum and then Frodo, and maybe Bilbo too).

Well, that's kind of like how Dork Tower points out how Gandalf doesn't really have any power when all his in-book action is mapped to the RPG the group is playing.

Speaking to the 3rd point of the article, the volume of data generated by humans is really high. High enough that banks only store your last 3 months on the server for the web-banking to show your transactions because performance is too slow otherwise. All your older data is replicated to slower/cheaper storage in case there's a need for it.

As such, it is improbable with current technology that the NSA can handle "everything" being shoved at it. It's too much data to receive, store or query through. Additionally, each source will use a different format. You can't just write a query to read phone records, you've got to write a query to read AT&T phone records. And then you'll find those idiots didn't follow their own standard and there will be bad data or incomplete fields. Once you get that mapping done, the specification will have changed, and you've still got 3 other vendors to resolve mapping on their data imports as well.

Whats more useful is for each business entity to be required to keep records of their own transactions. When a crime happens, a search warrant gets issued and the cops get access to any data where their criminal appears and any data down the tree from that. That's how you find out the Mad Bomber What Bombs At Midnight was talking to his Mr. Johnson last week, and find who Mr. Johnson was getting his orders from.

There are some technologies for data analysis on rapidly streaming feeds (ex. oil wells deliver a mountain of data every second) that triggers can be written to send alerts on. That kind of thing could potentially be used to "spot bad people doing bad things" if their behaviors were something you could detect in the feeds.

But that would require actually getting feeds from the appropriate businesses. There are some fat internet pipes in america, but to really do it "Person of Interest" style, would effectively mean the NSA would need a pipe as big as all the bandwidth in the world, so every server could send a replica of their data over to them, without impacting their day to day bandwidth.

In other implementations, there have been wiring closets with black boxes installed under NDA and forgotten about, walled off and rediscovered during a remodel or network traffic scan. Allegedly, some of those boxes were installed to scan traffic and send info back to a 3 letter organization. The discovery by network traffic monitoring is usually the most entertaining because these devices were using the companies' own pipe to relay their data, and somebody not in the know, but in authority finds them through routine due diligence checking of unexplained network utilization. Other than that, the technical advantage is the scope of the data monitoring is limited to within one company, and the output doesn't have to be "everything", only flagged data or alerts to come back with a real search of their data.
 

ggroy

First Post
Let calculate the probability that a positive hit from NSA's computer program, is actually indeed a badguy. (ie. P(badguy|+) ).

From Bayes' Theorem,

P(badguy|+) = P(+|badguy)*P(badguy)/[P(+|badguy)*P(badguy) + P(+|goodguy)*P(goodguy)]

To be charitable, let's assume that NSA's computer program is 99% effective.

ie. P(+|badguy) = 0.99

Let's also assume that 1 in a million people are badguys.

ie. P(badguy) = 1/1000000


Plugging in these numbers to Bayes' theorem, we get:

P(badguy|+) = 1/10102 = 0.0000989

So the probability that a positive hit by NSA's computer program is actually indeed a badguy (and not a false positive) is 1 in 10102. (ie. This is very poor performance).


Can the eye of Sauron do better than this?
 

jonesy

A Wicked Kendragon
Can the eye of Sauron do better than this?
Sure. No false positives. If the person wears a ring of power, Sauron detects it.

If no person wears a ring of power, then it's like looking at needles in a world of haystacks. But again, no false positives. Sauron doesn't accidentally detect someone as having the ring if they do not have one.
 

tomBitonti

Adventurer
So the probability that a positive hit by NSA's computer program is actually indeed a badguy (and not a false positive) is 1 in 10102. (ie. This is very poor performance).

So ... is this a good rate or a bad rate?

If every year there are 10,000 people investigated to stop one Boston (or 9/11) bomber, how does that turn out?

If every year there are 1,000,000 people investigated to stop 100 murders, what then?

Actually, the historic US murder rate is about 5.2 (4.7 - 5.7) per 100,000 people over the last 10 years. The high point since 1970 was 10.2 in 1980.

(Figures per http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/murder-rates-nationally-and-state. I haven't done *any* searches to tell if these are accurate, or what definition is used. Based on the source, I'd be cautious.)

That's about 50 per 1,000,000 people.

A question here is what does "investigate" mean: Causually check out, or turn their life upside down?

Anyways, this doesn't seem to be the right kind of topic for ENWorld.

TomB
 

ggroy

First Post
So ... is this a good rate or a bad rate?

If every year there are 10,000 people investigated to stop one Boston (or 9/11) bomber, how does that turn out?

This is a very bad rate.

The question is how exactly will the 10,000 people be further distinguished. Such as another computer program whittling down the list further, or actual teams of human analysts examining the data further by hand (or some combination).

If human analysts are examining the cases further, it will require a lot of manpower and resources to investigate 10,000 people. (ie. Stakeouts, following a suspect, gathering evidence, etc ...).
 

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