Menu
News
All News
Dungeons & Dragons
Level Up: Advanced 5th Edition
Pathfinder
Starfinder
Warhammer
2d20 System
Year Zero Engine
Industry News
Reviews
Dragon Reflections
Columns
Weekly Digests
Weekly News Digest
Freebies, Sales & Bundles
RPG Print News
RPG Crowdfunding News
Game Content
ENterplanetary DimENsions
Mythological Figures
Opinion
Worlds of Design
Peregrine's Next
RPG Evolution
Other Columns
From the Freelancing Frontline
Monster ENcyclopedia
WotC/TSR Alumni Look Back
4 Hours w/RSD (Ryan Dancey)
The Road to 3E (Jonathan Tweet)
Greenwood's Realms (Ed Greenwood)
Drawmij's TSR (Jim Ward)
Community
Forums & Topics
Forum List
Latest Posts
Forum list
*Dungeons & Dragons
Level Up: Advanced 5th Edition
D&D Older Editions
*TTRPGs General
*Pathfinder & Starfinder
EN Publishing
*Geek Talk & Media
Search forums
Chat/Discord
Resources
Wiki
Pages
Latest activity
Media
New media
New comments
Search media
Downloads
Latest reviews
Search resources
EN Publishing
Store
EN5ider
Adventures in ZEITGEIST
Awfully Cheerful Engine
What's OLD is NEW
Judge Dredd & The Worlds Of 2000AD
War of the Burning Sky
Level Up: Advanced 5E
Events & Releases
Upcoming Events
Private Events
Featured Events
Socials!
Twitch
YouTube
Facebook (EN Publishing)
Facebook (EN World)
Twitter
Instagram
TikTok
Podcast
Features
Top 5 RPGs Compiled Charts 2004-Present
Adventure Game Industry Market Research Summary (RPGs) V1.0
Ryan Dancey: Acquiring TSR
Q&A With Gary Gygax
D&D Rules FAQs
TSR, WotC, & Paizo: A Comparative History
D&D Pronunciation Guide
Million Dollar TTRPG Kickstarters
Tabletop RPG Podcast Hall of Fame
Eric Noah's Unofficial D&D 3rd Edition News
D&D in the Mainstream
D&D & RPG History
About Morrus
Log in
Register
What's new
Search
Search
Search titles only
By:
Forums & Topics
Forum List
Latest Posts
Forum list
*Dungeons & Dragons
Level Up: Advanced 5th Edition
D&D Older Editions
*TTRPGs General
*Pathfinder & Starfinder
EN Publishing
*Geek Talk & Media
Search forums
Chat/Discord
Menu
Log in
Register
Install the app
Install
Community
General Tabletop Discussion
*Dungeons & Dragons
The Multiverse is back....
JavaScript is disabled. For a better experience, please enable JavaScript in your browser before proceeding.
You are using an out of date browser. It may not display this or other websites correctly.
You should upgrade or use an
alternative browser
.
Reply to thread
Message
<blockquote data-quote="Alzrius" data-source="post: 6416781" data-attributes="member: 8461"><p>The last sentence here does not follow after the first. The fact that we have a community does not necessitate that our moral notions are not inherently subjective to the individual. The connections we have via community are not hard-and-fast commandments that we are inextricably tied to, at least insofar as our moral notions go. Rather, they can be likened to suggestions, which can be utilized or discarded or otherwise altered at will. In other words, their exactly as influential as we allow them to be, and thus subjective.</p><p></p><p></p><p></p><p>It doesn't matter if there's a vacuum or not. We are indeed free to pick our views of good or bad; the fact that there are a multiplicity of other such views out there, including popular ones throughout a given culture, has little bearing on that - that we can still freely pick what we find to be good or bad exemplifies the subjective nature of morality, even if most everyone around you happens to pick the same thing.</p><p></p><p></p><p></p><p>All of the things you listed there have no force - they're voluntary assumptions that we can recognize or discard at will. Hence, this is not at all moral truth; or at least, it's not an objective moral truth.</p><p></p><p></p><p></p><p>I think that you're making a good point here, but I'm not entirely sure that the middle ground you're positing is one that could be useful in resolving this particular debate. The quality of state of objectivity is typically defined as being binary - it's either an objective existence, or it's not. Saying that something is, in essence, widely regarded as an objective truth due to what can be characterized as massive community pressure on its own members, seems to fall under the notion of still being subjective.</p><p></p><p></p><p></p><p>It's important to remember that the the position of the subjectivity of morality is not one that necessarily requires an assertion, due to its self-evident nature. It's inherently recognized that people have personal opinions about things, and that these opinions are inherently going to vary from one person to the next. Even the moral objectivists recognize that - they simply posit that there is an objective morality beyond that; that's the actual assertion, and as such requires evidence to affirm.</p><p></p><p></p><p></p><p>You seem to be under the impression that because the methodology can't be actively utilized, it's therefore invalid. As I've previously stated, however, this is not the case - both people would agree that there's a valid method for determining the number of fleas on a cat, that being "counting them." They simply can't put that methodology into effect in this particular example, even though both agree that it would be an objective determinant if they could. By contrast, there is no such methodology for the determination of an objective moral truth, regardless of the particular circumstances of application. Hence, the example you posted is not at all comparable to the one I posted.</p><p></p><p></p><p></p><p>You were doing so well with not making vague, uncited references to the works of others in your last post, too. I'll simply reiterate that if you're not giving a direct quote, and not backing that up with a citation, then you're not actually providing evidence to support a given point when engaging in a debate. But then again, I've pointed that out many times now.</p><p></p><p></p><p></p><p>See above. Name-dropping does not make your point so.</p><p></p><p></p><p></p><p>This doesn't apply to this particular point, since no one is asserting a subjective nature regarding historical truth. In essence, attempting to define an objective moral truth by saying that it has the same epistemic existence as an aspect of the physical world (e.g. the past) is an attempt that fails to live up to the burden of proof issue. Within the limits of empiricism, we can determine that a past exists, and as such we can determine a methodology for interacting with it. This has never been the case for a supposed objectively moral truth.</p><p></p><p></p><p></p><p>You're misunderstanding the nature of that statement here - to note the lack of any objective moral criteria is to examine the proofs of the positive assertion of the existence of an objective moral criteria that others have made, and in having done so, found them to not stand up to scrutiny insofar as providing evidence of an existence beyond being purely subjective. To critique the arguments of others is different from making an assertion of your own.</p><p></p><p></p><p></p><p>As per the above, my argument begins from the position that something that is held to be objective requires evidence to prove that that is so. Likewise, those people who don't agree that "there are no objective criteria" must therefore produce some, which can then be examined and critiqued. The very fact that there is no consensus severely undercuts any claims that such assertions can withstand scrutiny, since one of the characteristics of an objective existence is that it can be demonstrated with at least circumstantial evidence to exist despite not being believed in. This speaks to the methodology of determination, rather than results; hence the difference between what can be physically observed, versus a metaphysical belief.</p><p></p><p></p><p></p><p>And I've examined that evidence, and demonstrated how it fails to live up to the assertions it's held to make. Specifically, that natural language merely reflects the truth and falsehood beliefs of the ones using it, and that this merely demonstrates a conflation between (what's held to be) physical facts with metaphysical beliefs, which does not make those beliefs become imbued with the asserted factual nature of a spoken physical instance. Hence why saying "Germany lost World War II <em>and</em> this was good" fails to demonstrate any morally objective truth to the fact that it was good that Germany lost the war.</p><p></p><p></p><p></p><p>Notice the difference between the first and second sentences, here. The first is essentially a restatement of cause-and-effect relationships. The second sentence, however, tries to slip in a level of justification not found in the first sentence; suddenly it's not enough to have a reason, but now a <em>good</em> reason is required. The goalposts have been moved.</p><p></p><p></p><p></p><p>This is the result of said moved goalposts - it's predicated on the <em>goodness</em> of the reason, rather than having a reason at all. This is where this argument falls apart, because now it's working under the implication that such a justification requires meeting an ill-defined moral justification, instead of simply examining the cause behind an effect.</p><p></p><p></p><p></p><p>This is a belief; I'm not sure if you're trying to say otherwise here, and as such I don't see how this advances a claim that there can be a methodology for determination of an objective morality that withstands scrutiny.</p><p></p><p></p><p></p><p>Again, this evidence does not survive being examined to see if moves beyond the boundaries of being a personal belief. Just because something is regarded by some people does not mean that it's an objective truth that demonstrates even the most circumstantial evidence of being true when it's not believed in. Being "pretty ubiquitous" - which is to say, popular - is not the same state as being objectively so. There are many cases where people don't give their reasons, and where, when they do, others don't regard those reasons as being good (e.g. sufficient justification) even though the person giving them would hold that they are. Hence, this fails to move beyond the subjective.</p><p></p><p></p><p></p><p>There's nothing to say that they're non-subjective. Indeed, reasons are another word for beliefs, which are recognized as being inherently subjective.</p><p></p><p></p><p></p><p>That's claiming to represent the beliefs of others.</p><p></p><p></p><p></p><p>Those are all a far cry from saying that you're able to adeptly summarize the viewpoints of the majority of all English-language philosophers.</p><p></p><p></p><p></p><p>Except that by your own admission, this is not true; these are grounded in personal experiences with the people in question - you've directly observed these results from interacting with the people in question.</p><p></p><p></p><p></p><p>Whereas here - unless you're making the claim that you've met and read the works of 51% or more of English-language philosophers - you're making the jump from material you've personally ascertained to deciding that what you've experienced yourself is representative of a much larger group. That's a tricky claim to make with regards to attitudes and beliefs, since these have such a wide variety among people.</p><p></p><p></p><p></p><p>You're moving from the general to the specific, here. Dealing with a small group of specific people, or even one specific individual, is very different from saying that you represent more than half of every English-language philosopher.</p><p></p><p></p><p></p><p>See above. The larger the group whose opinions you claim to represent, the more it's incumbent on you to demonstrate that you're able to be so certain that all of those people are being accurately represented by you.</p></blockquote><p></p>
[QUOTE="Alzrius, post: 6416781, member: 8461"] The last sentence here does not follow after the first. The fact that we have a community does not necessitate that our moral notions are not inherently subjective to the individual. The connections we have via community are not hard-and-fast commandments that we are inextricably tied to, at least insofar as our moral notions go. Rather, they can be likened to suggestions, which can be utilized or discarded or otherwise altered at will. In other words, their exactly as influential as we allow them to be, and thus subjective. It doesn't matter if there's a vacuum or not. We are indeed free to pick our views of good or bad; the fact that there are a multiplicity of other such views out there, including popular ones throughout a given culture, has little bearing on that - that we can still freely pick what we find to be good or bad exemplifies the subjective nature of morality, even if most everyone around you happens to pick the same thing. All of the things you listed there have no force - they're voluntary assumptions that we can recognize or discard at will. Hence, this is not at all moral truth; or at least, it's not an objective moral truth. I think that you're making a good point here, but I'm not entirely sure that the middle ground you're positing is one that could be useful in resolving this particular debate. The quality of state of objectivity is typically defined as being binary - it's either an objective existence, or it's not. Saying that something is, in essence, widely regarded as an objective truth due to what can be characterized as massive community pressure on its own members, seems to fall under the notion of still being subjective. It's important to remember that the the position of the subjectivity of morality is not one that necessarily requires an assertion, due to its self-evident nature. It's inherently recognized that people have personal opinions about things, and that these opinions are inherently going to vary from one person to the next. Even the moral objectivists recognize that - they simply posit that there is an objective morality beyond that; that's the actual assertion, and as such requires evidence to affirm. You seem to be under the impression that because the methodology can't be actively utilized, it's therefore invalid. As I've previously stated, however, this is not the case - both people would agree that there's a valid method for determining the number of fleas on a cat, that being "counting them." They simply can't put that methodology into effect in this particular example, even though both agree that it would be an objective determinant if they could. By contrast, there is no such methodology for the determination of an objective moral truth, regardless of the particular circumstances of application. Hence, the example you posted is not at all comparable to the one I posted. You were doing so well with not making vague, uncited references to the works of others in your last post, too. I'll simply reiterate that if you're not giving a direct quote, and not backing that up with a citation, then you're not actually providing evidence to support a given point when engaging in a debate. But then again, I've pointed that out many times now. See above. Name-dropping does not make your point so. This doesn't apply to this particular point, since no one is asserting a subjective nature regarding historical truth. In essence, attempting to define an objective moral truth by saying that it has the same epistemic existence as an aspect of the physical world (e.g. the past) is an attempt that fails to live up to the burden of proof issue. Within the limits of empiricism, we can determine that a past exists, and as such we can determine a methodology for interacting with it. This has never been the case for a supposed objectively moral truth. You're misunderstanding the nature of that statement here - to note the lack of any objective moral criteria is to examine the proofs of the positive assertion of the existence of an objective moral criteria that others have made, and in having done so, found them to not stand up to scrutiny insofar as providing evidence of an existence beyond being purely subjective. To critique the arguments of others is different from making an assertion of your own. As per the above, my argument begins from the position that something that is held to be objective requires evidence to prove that that is so. Likewise, those people who don't agree that "there are no objective criteria" must therefore produce some, which can then be examined and critiqued. The very fact that there is no consensus severely undercuts any claims that such assertions can withstand scrutiny, since one of the characteristics of an objective existence is that it can be demonstrated with at least circumstantial evidence to exist despite not being believed in. This speaks to the methodology of determination, rather than results; hence the difference between what can be physically observed, versus a metaphysical belief. And I've examined that evidence, and demonstrated how it fails to live up to the assertions it's held to make. Specifically, that natural language merely reflects the truth and falsehood beliefs of the ones using it, and that this merely demonstrates a conflation between (what's held to be) physical facts with metaphysical beliefs, which does not make those beliefs become imbued with the asserted factual nature of a spoken physical instance. Hence why saying "Germany lost World War II [i]and[/i] this was good" fails to demonstrate any morally objective truth to the fact that it was good that Germany lost the war. Notice the difference between the first and second sentences, here. The first is essentially a restatement of cause-and-effect relationships. The second sentence, however, tries to slip in a level of justification not found in the first sentence; suddenly it's not enough to have a reason, but now a [i]good[/i] reason is required. The goalposts have been moved. This is the result of said moved goalposts - it's predicated on the [i]goodness[/i] of the reason, rather than having a reason at all. This is where this argument falls apart, because now it's working under the implication that such a justification requires meeting an ill-defined moral justification, instead of simply examining the cause behind an effect. This is a belief; I'm not sure if you're trying to say otherwise here, and as such I don't see how this advances a claim that there can be a methodology for determination of an objective morality that withstands scrutiny. Again, this evidence does not survive being examined to see if moves beyond the boundaries of being a personal belief. Just because something is regarded by some people does not mean that it's an objective truth that demonstrates even the most circumstantial evidence of being true when it's not believed in. Being "pretty ubiquitous" - which is to say, popular - is not the same state as being objectively so. There are many cases where people don't give their reasons, and where, when they do, others don't regard those reasons as being good (e.g. sufficient justification) even though the person giving them would hold that they are. Hence, this fails to move beyond the subjective. There's nothing to say that they're non-subjective. Indeed, reasons are another word for beliefs, which are recognized as being inherently subjective. That's claiming to represent the beliefs of others. Those are all a far cry from saying that you're able to adeptly summarize the viewpoints of the majority of all English-language philosophers. Except that by your own admission, this is not true; these are grounded in personal experiences with the people in question - you've directly observed these results from interacting with the people in question. Whereas here - unless you're making the claim that you've met and read the works of 51% or more of English-language philosophers - you're making the jump from material you've personally ascertained to deciding that what you've experienced yourself is representative of a much larger group. That's a tricky claim to make with regards to attitudes and beliefs, since these have such a wide variety among people. You're moving from the general to the specific, here. Dealing with a small group of specific people, or even one specific individual, is very different from saying that you represent more than half of every English-language philosopher. See above. The larger the group whose opinions you claim to represent, the more it's incumbent on you to demonstrate that you're able to be so certain that all of those people are being accurately represented by you. [/QUOTE]
Insert quotes…
Verification
Post reply
Community
General Tabletop Discussion
*Dungeons & Dragons
The Multiverse is back....
Top