[MENTION=93631]Greg Benage[/MENTION] - you're right that I'm not a Gadamer guy! But like [MENTION=8461]Alzrius[/MENTION], you seem to be making assumptions about my philosophical views. I haven't indicated whether I am in the mainstream of analytic philosophy or not; I have made any comments about my own view. My point is that there is a mainstream view in the community of anaytic moral philosophers, that that view is one of the objectivity of moral truth, and that view isn't held in a simplistic or unreasoned manner. From your post, you seem to agree at least with the first bit of that, even if you think the reasons for that view are overly simplistic.
Also, in at least some of the Continental tradition, the scepticism about objective morality extends to scepticism about objective or "mind-independent" truth more generally, which means that the contrast that Alzrius regards as self-evident - between (say) physical and moral truth - will still not be accepted by them.
Do you believe that field of moral philosophy has changed/evolved over time?
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What factors affected this evolution process/change in the field?
Yes, the field has evolved over time. In that way it resembles every other intellectual field I can think of. What factors affect that evolution? The same sorts of factors as affect other fields - broader cutural trends, the emergence of new technical methods, plus fashions among what is, in many ways, a rather small community.
As a literary discipline, the patterns of evolution and development are probably more like those in history or (non-statistical) social science rather than mathematical sciences.
If it did, would the 'moral truth' , you speak of, not then also be seen to have evolved?
I'm not sure what it means for truth to evolve.
For instance, astronomy has obviously developed since Ptolemy's time, and since Keppler's time, an even since Einstein's time. Few people, though, would say that astronomical truth has evolved. Rather, they would say that astronomical learning has improved.
It's at least tempting to say that when many Greek and Roman thinkers thought that widespread slavery was consistent with flourishing societies, they were simply wrong about that fact. Which would mean that I woudn't describe the truth about "slaves by nature" has
evolved since Aristotle wrote his Politics. I would just say that Aristotle was wrong.
the issue with the number of fleas on a cat is not subjective; it is unknown.
It is also unknowable. And unverifiable. Which was the basis on which you asserted that moral truths are subjective - that there are no "objective criteria" for resolving moral disagreements.
We can ascertain a methodology by which we could determine the number of fleas on the cat (e.g. you count them)
What methodology would that be - time travel? How do you propose to count the number of fleas on a cat that has not been alive for thousands of years?
I should also point out that, for exactly this reason, what you describe as a "pretty weak argument" is put forward by Michael Dummett, in "Truth" and other essays in his collection
Truth and Other Enigmas, as part of a general attack on realist conceptions of the distant past. A J Ayer also advanced a version of the argument in
Language, Truth and Logic, although he later changed his mind on the point (the essay, "Statements About the Past", is published in his collection
Philosophical Essays). CS Peirce also advanced a version of the argument, although in this case I can't give you a citation (but you will find one in Ayer's discussion of the point in
The Origins of Pragmatism).
we recognize the lack of any objective moral criteria to determine whether X is good (as Person A said) or bad (as Person B said).
Who recognises that? Immanual Kant doesn't. JS Mill doesn't. Joseph Raz doesn't. Peter Singer doesn't. Michael Smith doesn't. Frank Jackson doesn't. I'm pretty sure that many non-academics don't, too. It's not as if a handful of philosophers are the only people in the world who think that morality is objective.
It's true that they don't agree on what the correct methodology is, but nor do historians all agree on the best methodology to work out what Cleopatra might have been thinking when she died (nor to work out whether or not she owned a cat, and if so whether or not it had fleas). Yet that doesn't entail that historical truth is subjective.
you don't seem to understand what begging the question means. It's an instance of including conclusion you're seeking in the premise that you're positing.
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noting the lack of any objective moral criteria does not beg the question against those who believe there are, because that necessarily points out that this is still a belief on their part.
You are asserting, without any argument, that "we note the lack of any objective moral criteria".
To note that X entails that X is true; a person can't note what is false. (In this respect "note" is like "perceive" and "know" and unlike "belief" or "assert".)
Hence, your argument begins from an unargued assertion that trivially entails the point which those who believe that morality is objective deny. And, of course, as I've pointed out, those people
don't agree that "we note that there are no objective criteria". At best, they note that there is no general consensus on what those criteria are. But they will point out that the same is true in psychology, sociology, history, some branches of natural science, etc.
If they're positing the existence of an objective moral criteria, then I presume that they have evidence to support that positive assertion.
I've pointed to the evidence - namely, that natural language practices around truth and falsehood predication, negation, contradiction, conjunction, etc do not differentiate betwee sentences stating moral claims and other sentences.
Here's more evidence - everyone, including most children older than 3 or 4, recognise that there is such a thing as giving reasons for an action, as providing a justification. That "I did it because I wanted to" isn't, on it's own, a good reason for doing something. Contrast, in this respect, "I did it because I wanted to, and
I wasn't hurting anyone else." That is the provision of a justification - namely, that the action was permissible because there was no countervailing reason against it (ie doing it didn't hurt anyone else).
If you read a libertarian like Hayek or Nozick, they do not argue that "because I wanted to" is a sufficient reason for action. It also must not infringe anyone's rights. That is, they recognise that permissible actions are constrained by the claims or entitlements of others.
This practice of being ready to give reasons is regarded by some people as constitutive of human beings. Whether or not that is so, it is certainly pretty ubiquitous. And it is another piece of evidence that those who believe in objective morality can point to. What are reasons, after all, than non-subjective considerations that tell in favour of or against a certain course of action?
a sample size of 1 is not good evidence of any sort of sampling, even leaving aside the basic understanding that claiming to speak on the behalf of others is an action that is understood to require verification
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Again, it's problematic to hold forth that you're speaking for most people.
I'm not "speaking on behalf of others". I'm telling you what people in a certain community, of which I am a member, typically think.
It's frankly bizarre to talk here about sampling - though I believe that David Chalmers has done some (I haven't seen the results). That's not the only way to work out what people think. I know, for instance, what the bulk of my colleagues think about our university administration because I talk to them about it. I know whether or not the kids in my daughter's class like Frozen because I pay attention to what they do and say. I learned that most people in my community will respond to an outstretched hand with a hand shake without sampling them. In all these cases, my knowledge isn't statistically-grounded, it's culturally grounded. Similarly, I learn what moral philosophers think because I talk to them at papers and conferences, read what they publish, read their comments on my material when they review it for publication, etc.
I can tell you that if you walk into the Philosophy Department at Oxford University and tell them that you want to write a thesis defending a relativistic account of morality, their ears will prick up! If you publish a paper setting out a non-objectivist account of moral utterance, Mark van Roojen will write a paper trying to tear it down in pretty short order!
If I couldn't give my research students advice on what opinions are widely accepted, what are controversial, etc, what sort of supervisor would I be? For instance, I wouldn't send a thesis defending a broadly Rawlsian conception of political justice to be examined by [MENTION=93631]Greg Benage[/MENTION]!