Pemerton - your prose is brilliant! Such a knack for clarity. You teach at a university somewhere?
Thanks! I'm an academic lawyer and philosopher in an Australian university law school.
I think you see that this discussion is pointless, but you seem to be enjoying yourself.
Is the K for "Kenobi"? Your feelings are guiding you well!
From my point of view, the discussion began when [MENTION=2067]Kamikaze Midget[/MENTION] and some others asked me to elaborate on why I find PS's relativism problematic. My answer was, and remains, that Planescape doesn't offer the sorts of resources that seem necessary to make relativism (or some other sort of anti-objectivism) viable, and so gets stuck in what I have been calling the "hypocrisy problem": that even so-called "good" PCs are no different from anyone else, because so-called "morally-motivated" action is in fact just another power play.
The sorts of resources I have in mind are both technical resources and (speaking loosely) evaluative/political resources.
The technical resources that I think are needed are ones that can account for practices of truth-and-falsehood predication, for practices of reason-giving, etc. The only theory I know of that gets within cooee of this is Barker's (
Analysis (2000), fuller citation upthread).
The evaluative/political resources that I'm thinking of can be found in different places, depending on the direction one wants to go in: the theory of compossible desires found in Bertrand Russell's political essays; the theory of sincere self-cultivation found in Nietzsche and his followers; somewhat similar ideas found in the existentialists; etc.
I think Planesacpe's lack in these respects rests on its ongoing reliance on the alignment framework. This leads to outcomes that, from a technical point of view, make little or no sense: eg you ask a demon why it did something, and instead of saying "Because I wanted to" and denying the need for any more elaborate reason, it says "Because I'm committed to evil!" (and twirls its moustache?). The treatment of evil as a substantive value on a par with good leads to all sorts of technical weirdness. In some posts between 50 and 100 upthread I set out my take on Gygax's alignment scheme, and I think he (mostly) avoided this issue, because while not entirely consistent/coherent in his presentation, there is a reading of his PHB and DMG in which evil really is simply an indifference to good. It's the reification of an affective state (indiffrence to the good) into an object of commitment (evil as a value) that causes technical weirdness.
The lack of evaluative/political resources I feel comes from a failure to recognise that saying "You have to rely on your own sense of good and bad" isn't synonymous with "Good and bad are whatever you think they are". The latter, which Planescapes seems to embrace, leads to the hypocrisy problem. The former, in various forms, can lead to approaches like those of Russell or the existentialists or others. (I also see Hobbes as as a theorist of compromise within a framework the presupposes the absence of objective answers to questions of moral justification.)
The above has probably spoiled your opinion of my prose!, but is how I see the discussion from my point of view.
So, Rawls in Sigil. Rawls sits down a bunch of Angels and Devils and so forth and explains to them that to act ethically, they must act according to rules which they all would consent to, if they did not know which member of the planar multiverse they were going to be
<snip>
I agree that Rawls could make a good case that he has a truly objective standard against which to judge their code of rules, although it may not be strictly knowable:
<snip>
So we have an objective standard for establish rules all the planars would agree on. We can imagine the Angels and Demons even agreeing on the rule set as they don't know what perspective will be theirs once the rules are in place.
However, can he give the Demons any reason why, having agreed to the rules, they should follow them?
Do you know the debate on internal vs external reasons? Bernard Williams and others take the view that for R to be a reason for person X, R has to somehow hook onto X's actual motivational states. That is to say, they hold that all genuine reasons are
internal. Those who believe in external reasons take the opposite view, that R can be a reason for X even if, from X's internal point of view, R does not have any purchase. These externalists about reason are happy to say "So much the worse for X, that s/he is failing to grasp those reasons that are good reasons for him/her".
As I read the later Rawls, he tries to show that anyone committed to genuine social life in conditions of pluralism has an internal reason to uphold the rules. Those who lack that commitment he calls the
unreasonable, and he thinks they pose a problem for social order but not really a problem for justice, because the have dealt themselves out of the game through their unwillingness to take the requirements of social life seriously (eg they don't distinguish between justification and mere power play).
I think demons in Sigil would be among the unreasonable. They don't care about social life, many of them don't even care if they themselves die as a result of conflict and strife, and so they have no
internal reason to follow the rules.
I think this is consistent with what Gygax says about "evil" in his PBH and DMG. "Purpose is the determinant" ie the evil are characterised by a lack of any commitment to values as a constraint on action. They simply act on their desires without regard for the effect on others, and in the case of the CE often without regard even to the effect on themselves.
What I can't really see is how this fits into the Planescape "belief makes truth" framework. The unreasonableness of the demons - ie their lack of interest in engaging with the necessary conditions of meaningful social life - looks like an objective matter of fact. Hence, on this picture, their evilness seems to be a matter of fact too.
To introduce the relativism you seem to have to take a meta-step: that the belief that the difference between the reasonable and the unreasonable is itself a mere belief, and that there is no objective significance to the distinction between those prepared to take the demands of genuine sociality seriously, and those who are not.
Now such a claim may be true (if rather radical!), but within the classic D&D framework I think it is most naturally labelled chaotic neutral or chaotic evil. Which means it fails as a meta-principle after all - it is a substantive outlook within the alignment system. Which is why I find the Planescape relativist cosmology not very coherent, any more than the more traditional D&D cosmology that treats evil as a value. (I think that [MENTION=6780330]Parmandur[/MENTION] is thinking along similar lines.)
I don't think I've presumed. If I were to presume, based on what you've written in the thread <snip conjecture>
Are you happy for me to send you a PM?
[MENTION=177]Umbran[/MENTION], I've cross-posted again. I think my post is about trying to make sense of Planescape and alignment, but accept that that is subject to moderation.