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Message: <blockquote data-quote="clearstream" data-source="post: 8622885" data-attributes="member: 71699">I am not seeking to find a match for causation. Rather I'm searching for a word that speaks to compatibility between the experiences of an imagined inhabitant and the game model and rules. That inhabitant's ability (at least in principle) to know how things are in their cosmos, which is the reference we desire represented by our game system.When I write "perfect simulation" the sense I intend is that of a precisely complete and correct mapping between simulation and reference. Here you use "perfect" in the sense of ideal, and I agree with your example of that. A perfect simulation (in my sense) would not be ideal as a game, but a motive for considering it is to understand what a simulationist game need not be.Reading once more your words above "does not necessarily correspond to any reasoning their PC would be undertaking in the fiction", I feel we're both grasping the intuition pump that I want to write into my proposed definition. We see that we can consider a mechanic in light of what an imagined inhabitant could know (or as you put it, reason about) and notice any shortfalls between mechanic and what would be ideally simulationist. If it seems that our imagined inhabitant could not reason in a way compatible with the rule, then something's up. That's very much why I value incorporating something about this into my proposed definition. Can you think of a better worded alternative?Based on conversations we've had elsewhere, I feel we may need to accept a divergence of intuitions here. I am saying that a simulationist mechanic will be one in which the fiction (clouds) is made by the system (boxes) to correlate with the reference (cosmos). If a player can picture that their character can have an experience (bake bread, say) and expectations (it will be sustaining) then if the system fails to make that so it is not a simulationist (in that respect, anyway.) The system has an authoritative voice in fictional positioning.I don't see a necessary conflict between knowing how things are in the imagined cosmos after the process, or as it unfolds. No one's really pinned down why that matters, other than tautologically. I also don't see any universally accepted measure for quantity of process steps and information.No, my thoughts follow more the GEN disagreements with Edwards. "Ron Edward's points are actually bottom level techniques that support top level desires (or decisions in GDS)." I found that Right to Dream contained some enlightening discussion, albeit I found myself questioning the unexamined conflation of simulationism (a set of techniques) and immersionism (a desire). I prefer GENs choice of Explorative. I'm also strongly influenced by Gleichman's criticisms of GNS definitions of Gamist.</blockquote>

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