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Message: <blockquote data-quote="Al" data-source="post: 1555880" data-attributes="member: 2486">Two quick points against Quasqueton, Takyris and the 'smiters':1. The Concept of distinction between action and motivation As I have already outlined, one can be evil without performing acts normally defined as 'evil', if the motivation for those acts is sufficiently 'evil'.  I cited the example of three executioners- one driven by a love of justice, the second by duty and the third by a perverted desire to chop people's heads off.  The same action produces three different alignments- good, neutral and evil.  Yet to argue that the evil headsman ought be smited is somewhat nonsensical, since he has in no way harmed society or innocents any more than the others.Paladins punish actions, not alignments.2. The notion of proportionate punishment The professor-jerk outlined by Elder_Basilisk has been denounced by Quasqueton as evil, therefore the logical extension of that argument is that if such a professor was met in the wilderness he ought be summarily executed.  And if he should have reached level 11 through his publication of numerous works (say, on an optimal way to fund charities, which has saved thousands of lives, which he has published for his own aggrandisement and pride but nevertheless performed a societally good deed), then he'd radiate moderate evil.  Under the takyris/Quasqueton line, he's dead.  Is this fair or proportionate, just because he's a power-crazy jerk in the classroom?  I think not.  Given a choice between summary death for minor misdemeanours or mercy, I'd opt for the latter.  Perhaps rough him up a bit at most, tell him to rethink his ways, but execution- hardly.Paladins punish proportionately.Both of these have solid groundings in the core rules and BoED respectively.  The core rules acknowledge a dichotomy between action and intention in that they are more lenient on the paladin who inadvertantly breaks his code than one who deliberates does so.  Given that the acknowledgement of a segregation between action and intention exists, it is perfectly logical to assume that evil people exist who have never performed Evil deeds.  Secondly, BoED states quite categorically under the sections about prisoners and mercy the appropriate way to deal with surrendering opponents.  That Quasqueton (IIRC) should advocate smiting a surrendering/non-combatant opponent is in direct opposition to this.  To argue that Good doesn't just destroy all evildoers in an arbitrary judgement is not to argue that Good is stupid (as Quasqueton contends), but, rather, to assert that Good is Good.</blockquote>

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