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<blockquote data-quote="Conaill" data-source="post: 2062220" data-attributes="member: 1264">Did you bother to read the example I linked to? <a href="http://www.ctl.ua.edu/math103/Voting/exvotfr.htm" target="_blank">Here it is again</a>. Exercise 3 illustrates violation of the Condorcet criterion, exercise 4 violotion of monotonicity. (Yes, what is called &quot;Plurality with Elimination&quot; here is indeed IRV, as you can verify <a href="http://www.ctl.ua.edu/math103/Voting/methodof.htm" target="_blank">here</a>.)Let me try again...If you omit ranking a candidate in standard IRV, that candidate will *never* get your vote no matter how many other candidates get eliminated. Let's say the ballot contains one great product, one real stinker, and three unknowns. If in any IRV round your favorite gets eliminated, your vote will actually go to the stinker! But it will never, ever go to one of the unknowns. That makes leaving a vote open is worse than ranking it as low as you possibly can. I would call that somewhat biased, wouldn't you?(In fact, the best way to vote *against* products would be to abstain from voting on them - talk about strategic voting!)I don't believe Umbran ever did ask such an overexaggerated question. But I do believe that under some circumstances it would be fair for a lesser known product with higher votes to beat a more widely known one with lower votes.If I remember correctly, one of the design criteria for last year's Ennies voting was that lesser known products would not automatically be voted down by &quot;don't know&quot; votes, and that the resulting diversity of winner was quite well received.Dextra, Morrus - would you be happy with a system where an abstention is equivalent to (or worse than) a down vote?</blockquote>

[QUOTE="Conaill, post: 2062220, member: 1264"] Did you bother to read the example I linked to? [url=http://www.ctl.ua.edu/math103/Voting/exvotfr.htm]Here it is again[/url]. Exercise 3 illustrates violation of the Condorcet criterion, exercise 4 violotion of monotonicity. (Yes, what is called "Plurality with Elimination" here is indeed IRV, as you can verify [url=http://www.ctl.ua.edu/math103/Voting/methodof.htm]here[/url].) Let me try again... If you omit ranking a candidate in standard IRV, that candidate will *never* get your vote no matter how many other candidates get eliminated. Let's say the ballot contains one great product, one real stinker, and three unknowns. If in any IRV round your favorite gets eliminated, your vote will actually go to the stinker! But it will never, ever go to one of the unknowns. That makes leaving a vote open is worse than ranking it as low as you possibly can. I would call that somewhat biased, wouldn't you? (In fact, the best way to vote *against* products would be to abstain from voting on them - talk about strategic voting!) I don't believe Umbran ever did ask such an overexaggerated question. But I do believe that under some circumstances it would be fair for a lesser known product with higher votes to beat a more widely known one with lower votes. If I remember correctly, one of the design criteria for last year's Ennies voting was that lesser known products would not automatically be voted down by "don't know" votes, and that the resulting diversity of winner was quite well received. Dextra, Morrus - would you be happy with a system where an abstention is equivalent to (or worse than) a down vote? [/QUOTE]

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