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<blockquote data-quote="pemerton" data-source="post: 8444861" data-attributes="member: 42582">On the Wittgenstein quote: it's from the Tractatus. It's not a claim about the &quot;evolution&quot; of language. It's a claim in the logical theory of representation, and it rests on a premise - which Wittgenstein himself later rejected - that all language is representational.I'll sblock the rest of this:[spoiler]Part of Wittgenstein's theory is a contrast between saying - ie what a well-formed sentence achieves vis-a-vis the actual or possible state of affairs that it represents - and showing - ie (roughly) relations that the logical theory of representation entails (i) must exist, but (ii) can't be said.The metaphor for &quot;showing&quot; is the way a ruler is used to measure a distance - on pain of infinite regress there is no need for a third, mediating entity to establish the measurement. An example of something which (per Wittgenstein) shows itself and cannot be said is the representational relationship itself that obtains between a sentence and the state of affairs which constitutes its &quot;said&quot; content.The limit of my (cognisable) world can't be said, because that would require representing the limit, which in turn would require thinking both sides of the limit. Rather, the limit shows itself, as a consequence of the limits of my repertoire of representation (and the limits here are in-principle ones - eg even in principle I can't represent the representation relationship itself; and there are other things too that Wittgenstein thinks can't be said, not due to any contingent limit or ignorance but as a matter of logical principle, like ethics and theology).[/spoiler]What this contentious theory tells us about RPGing and discussions of RPGing, I leave to others to explain!</blockquote>

[QUOTE="pemerton, post: 8444861, member: 42582"] On the Wittgenstein quote: it's from the Tractatus. It's not a claim about the "evolution" of language. It's a claim in the logical theory of representation, and it rests on a premise - which Wittgenstein himself later rejected - that all language is representational. I'll sblock the rest of this: [spoiler]Part of Wittgenstein's theory is a contrast between [I]saying[/I] - ie what a well-formed sentence achieves vis-a-vis the actual or possible state of affairs that it represents - and [I]showing - [/I]ie (roughly) relations that the logical theory of representation entails (i) must exist, but (ii) can't be said. The metaphor for "showing" is the way a ruler is used to measure a distance - on pain of infinite regress there is no need for a third, mediating entity to establish the measurement. An example of something which (per Wittgenstein) shows itself and cannot be said is the representational relationship itself that obtains between a sentence and the state of affairs which constitutes its "said" content. The limit of my (cognisable) world can't be [I]said[/I], because that would require representing the limit, which in turn would require thinking both sides of the limit. Rather, the limit [I]shows[/I] itself, as a consequence of the limits of my repertoire of representation (and the limits here are in-principle ones - eg even in principle I can't represent the representation relationship itself; and there are other things too that Wittgenstein thinks can't be [I]said[/I], not due to any contingent limit or ignorance but as a matter of logical principle, like ethics and theology).[/spoiler] What this contentious theory tells us about RPGing and discussions of RPGing, I leave to others to explain! [/QUOTE]

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