Reply to thread

Message

<blockquote data-quote="clearstream" data-source="post: 9231503" data-attributes="member: 71699">My line of thought is that if &quot;knowledge&quot;, &quot;to know&quot;, or &quot;knowing&quot; is an undefeated relationship between truth and belief, then we have to be both sure of that relationship ([USER=6795602]@FrogReaver[/USER]'s case, possibly) and sure that it will go on being undefeated. But norms and mechanisms of play can act against any guarantee that the relationship will remain undefeated.Players would I suppose need to possess an unchallengeable right of assertion, so that A asserts that p entails p. This can be got around simply by ensuring that p does not become entrained in intent (or removing its entrainement.) Suppose in the example, participants have committed to not defeating the relationship between truth and belief: that forces it's removal.Player: &quot;You never held controlling shares in Miltech Industries... they were left to Rose!&quot; Raises
Supervillain: &quot;Ha, you'll never prove it. You don't have the Will.&quot; Sees and raises
Player: &quot;Oh yeah? How about...&quot; - describes throwing open the safe that's here in the Matriarch's office - &quot;right here?!&quot; Sees and raises
Supervillain: Chuckles &quot;You might want to read her new Will!!&quot; - GM can't describe the safe as empty, so describes it containing two Wills instead Sees and raises (reversal)
Player: &quot;What the....!?&quot; Can't match the reversal so Supervillain keeps their shares unless player escalates...I think this isn't a debate about knowledge, but one about right of assertion. In previous conversations I've argued that imaginary facts are simply those pieces of fiction asserted by whoever has the right to do so. I'm suggesting that's at play here, rather than what I would call strictly speaking knowledge. The ongoing development of our shared fiction seems to me to make the latter doubtful.Is committing to the Will's presence in the safe equal to committing to it mattering (decisively) to the resolution? I think no, not when the resolution itself is going to decide whose intent prevails.</blockquote>

[QUOTE="clearstream, post: 9231503, member: 71699"] My line of thought is that if "knowledge", "to know", or "knowing" is an undefeated relationship between truth and belief, then we have to be both sure of that relationship ([USER=6795602]@FrogReaver[/USER]'s case, possibly) and sure that it will go on being undefeated. But norms and mechanisms of play can act against any guarantee that the relationship will remain undefeated. Players would I suppose need to possess an unchallengeable right of assertion, so that [I]A asserts that p [/I]entails[I] p[/I]. This can be got around simply by ensuring that [I]p[/I] does not become entrained in intent (or removing its entrainement.) Suppose in the example, participants have committed to not defeating the relationship between truth and belief: that forces it's removal. [INDENT]Player: "You never held controlling shares in Miltech Industries... they were left to Rose!" Raises[/INDENT] [INDENT]Supervillain: "Ha, you'll never prove it. You don't have the Will." Sees and raises[/INDENT] [INDENT]Player: "Oh yeah? How about..." - [I]describes throwing open the safe that's here in the Matriarch's office[/I] - "right here?!" Sees and raises[/INDENT] [INDENT]Supervillain: Chuckles "You might want to read [I]her new Will!![/I]" - [I]GM can't describe the safe as empty, so describes it containing two Wills instead [/I]Sees and raises (reversal)[/INDENT] [INDENT]Player: "What the....!?" Can't match the reversal so Supervillain keeps their shares unless player escalates...[/INDENT] I think this isn't a debate about knowledge, but one about right of assertion. In previous conversations I've argued that imaginary facts are simply those pieces of fiction asserted by whoever has the right to do so. I'm suggesting that's at play here, rather than what I would call strictly speaking knowledge. The ongoing development of our shared fiction seems to me to make the latter doubtful. Is committing to the Will's presence in the safe equal to committing to it mattering (decisively) to the resolution? I think no, not when the resolution itself is going to decide whose intent prevails. [/QUOTE]

Verification