Reply to thread

Message: <blockquote data-quote="pemerton" data-source="post: 6412691" data-attributes="member: 42582">I can't see how this is anything but wordplay (not by you as a poster, but in the state of affairs that you are trying to convey).Kierkegaard calls the idea of virtue into question, by pointing out that nearly everyone's conception of virtue overlaps more-or-less with what they learned as a child. That is to say, he gives a reason to think that our intuitions about virtue don't actually track any meaningful moral phenomena; a reason to think that convictions about virtue aren't really any more salient than convictions about whether "no" or "nyet" is the best word to communicate denial.In a completely different way, Hobbes (and his contemporary followers who publish under the labels of "social choice" or "public choice") calls virtue into question, by attempting to show that all action is ultimately self-interested - that the so-called virtuous are simply pursing their particular form of pleasure in doing good things. (Ie they exhibit a type of "moral vanity".)There are probably other ways, too, of calling virtue into question, although these two (with their many variants) are the most familiar to me.But I don't see how virtue is called into question by the fact that, under certain circumstances, others might label different things virtuous. What does it matter, from the point of view of me as a person making a decision, that others might evaluate my action differently? I already knew that, as soon as I noticed that the world is not characterised by moral agreement. You say "there is never any guarantee of virtuous intent". But what you are actually describing is that "there is never any guarantee that others will label your action virtuous". And this is a banal truism, and is a banal truism even in the absence of PS's "belief = truth" metaphysics.This is why I don't feel that those metaphysics actually add any moral complexity, nor introduce any knew "shades of grey" - unless one was using an alignment system which meant that there was a guarantee that others would label your action virtuous, because the alignment mechanics had removed all moral doubt.It is this proviso which led me, upthread, to post something to which you objected, namey, that the PS "belief = truth metaphysics seems to me to be "a type of reification of a mechanic - alignment - which, if you want a sophisticated game that puts pressure on values and commitments, I think you're just better off without." If you were already playing a game which made room for moral doubt - either because it didn't invovle GM adjudication and enforcement of alignment, or because it didn't involve alignment at all - then I don't see that any moral complexity is added by saying "As well as deciding what is the right thing to do, you also have the option of changing the world so that everyone has to conced your choice gets to be labelled good."</blockquote>

Verification