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Message: <blockquote data-quote="Alzrius" data-source="post: 6415382" data-attributes="member: 8461">That's not necessarily the case; just because it could doesn't mean that it will.I don't need to pick one of those up to disagree with you - citing outside works without quoting how they supposedly support your argument is just an appeal to authority.This example is based on the presumption that saying "because I wanted to" is not justification unto itself, which clearly isn't the case. You can examine an action insofar as judging the morality (or lack thereof) of the action itself, but that's a separate question. Saying that the action requires justification for why it was undertaken at all is a faulty premise, since it sets up a "burden of necessity" for doing anything. That's leaving aside the practical consideration of the futility of asking these questions (of others) at all, since you can't examine the veracity of their responses with any objective criteria; people can and do lie about their motivations.By recognizing that each person's moral framework is different, and that any examination of the morality of an action - which is not the same thing as an examination of justification - will be specific to each person, and each person alone.That only seems like a big cost because some people find the implications of moral relativism therein to be offensive; I find it far worse to say that any changes to cultural moral values are somehow more worthwhile than values that were previously held because the new values are somehow objectively more true.I disagree, insofar as I'm saying that the implication of "it is not easy" is actually a cover for the sentiment of "this is uncomfortable," since it implies a moral relativism that most people don't care for.It's actually a rejection of the assertion that was being stated previously. Those who hold that an objective moral truth exist are the ones who need to support that stance, since they're making a positive affirmation. The default presumption is that something isn't true until you prove that it is, rather than being that something is true until you prove that is not.None of that is evidence of the objectivity of moral truth, per se. Simply put, these are a combination of the popularity of certain ideas and the personal exultation which some people hold them in. Saying that X idea will reliably (though not perfectly) lead from war to peace does not state anything about that idea being a reflection of an objective moral truth. It's just that that idea is a popular one, and so it's presumed to be profound, and that therefore it must be something greater. The conclusion does not follow the assertions.I disagree (see below).To which I hold that there is no metric by which that can be measured, and that attempting to do so is simply passing personal judgment over another person's life, rather than holding them up against any objective moral value.That would be better as we would understand it, but there's no criteria for saying that that's empirically the case. Just because you can procure a consensus about something doesn't unto itself suggest anything about its objective nature. (That's leaving aside the idea that some philosophies hold that suffering in this life means greater things in the next one, and so such bonded labor is therefore more fulfilling on an objectively moral scale, at least under that belief. The idea of "finding greater meaning in a life that's normally regarded as 'less worthy'" is one that's been the subject of many stories, plays, and other tales.)This is largely splitting hairs, since it's still your own values being projected onto a state of objectivity. Again, popularity and personal exultation are not enough to say that a given morality is therefore empirical.See above. It's not that they're denying that claim per se, but rather than they're pointing out that the point your making does not meet the criteria for being called objective.Except that view presumes that the moral nature is already an established fact that's being challenged, which is the case for the age of the Earth but is not the case for the moral nature of the life that someone lives. The two, in other words, do not occupy the same state in terms of how they're being debated, because the objective nature of morality has not yet been established in the first place.</blockquote>

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