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<blockquote data-quote="clearstream" data-source="post: 9041583" data-attributes="member: 71699">Thank you for a thoughtful reply. It may seem odd, but imaginary facts, or facts that we can pretend we have knowledge of, are not epistemologically disreputable. Your observation is right that the authoring will give no regard to the dramatic needs of the PC. My second and third components of the &quot;simulationist principle&quot; account for what I think it would normally give regard to.So to embrace your point fully, I say that the basis for establishing and updating the imagined world facts is the point of distinction. So far I've phrased it in the form of an antithesis. The positive form would be something like that the basis for establishing and updating world facts gives only regard to my 2. and 3. from post #2029. That would then lack that there should be a choice made of some subset* of real world examples and theories that form the reference set. A complete statement of a &quot;simulationist principle&quot; would need that.Recalling an earlier definitionIt's now clarified that the &quot;pre-existing references&quot; will be the reference subset and not the imagined world facts based on them - those need not be pre-existing. That the second and third components of the simulationist principle (or something like them) should be the only basis for establishing and updating those imagined world facts forms the point of distinction.*I'd include intermediaries for real world examples and theories as candidates for such a subset. For instance the reference set could be everything in certain works of fiction. The intermediary may modify some examples and theories in certain ways, without rendering inapplicable those that are unmodified.</blockquote>

[QUOTE="clearstream, post: 9041583, member: 71699"] Thank you for a thoughtful reply. It may seem odd, but imaginary facts, or facts that we can pretend we have knowledge of, are not epistemologically disreputable. Your observation is right that the authoring will give no regard to the dramatic needs of the PC. My second and third components of the "simulationist principle" account for what I think it would normally give regard to. So to embrace your point fully, I say that the basis for establishing and updating the imagined world facts is the point of distinction. So far I've phrased it in the form of an antithesis. The positive form would be something like that the basis for establishing and updating world facts gives only regard to my 2. and 3. from post #2029. That would then lack that there should be a choice made of some subset* of real world examples and theories that form the reference set. A complete statement of a "simulationist principle" would need that. Recalling an earlier definition It's now clarified that the "pre-existing references" will be the reference subset and not the imagined world facts based on them - those need not be pre-existing. That the second and third components of the simulationist principle (or something like them) should be the only basis for establishing and updating those imagined world facts forms the point of distinction. *I'd include intermediaries for real world examples and theories as candidates for such a subset. For instance the reference set could be everything in certain works of fiction. The intermediary may modify some examples and theories in certain ways, without rendering inapplicable those that are unmodified. [/QUOTE]

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