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Worlds of Design: Gun vs. Sword
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<blockquote data-quote="John Dallman" data-source="post: 7802776" data-attributes="member: 6999616"><p>I got interested enough to buy and read Marshall's <strong><em>Men Against Fire</em></strong>. It's a horrible book to base any planning or game design on because it is so <em>muddled</em>. It presents itself as being based on extensive research with clear results, yet it does not describe those results with any clarity. It has patches of what seem like good sense, sometimes on the same page as utter nonsense. I suspect that many of the people who were supposed to have read it gave up after a couple of chapters, and just generalised the ideas from the first part of the book.</p><p></p><p>In those first few chapters, Marshall describes one scenario clearly. I think this is the only time he does so. It's worth describing.</p><p></p><p>A green infantry company is making an unsupported frontal attack on an opponent who is well dug in and concealed. The company advances some distance, then comes under effective fire. The men go to ground, as they must. And then nobody takes charge. Nobody starts calling orders or asking questions; the troops are not given orders, reminders or any encouragement. About 25% use their weapons.</p><p></p><p>Actually, that seems a fairly good performance, under the circumstances, by the men but a terrible one by the NCOs and officers. I seem to be working across a cultural familiarity gap here, because Marshall explicitly says it is not the job of squad leaders to get their men organised.</p><p></p><p>Since they should be near their men, and know them well, it seems to me (and it's traditional British doctrine) that the NCOs, who have some experience, have the primary job under these circumstances of getting the men organised, encouraging the ones who are new to this and scared, and telling the ones who haven't figured it out where to shoot. With that done, the squad leader needs to shout to his platoon commander, with word of losses and what's being done.</p><p></p><p>But Marshall reckons the squad NCO should not be doing any of this, but should be concentrating on using his personal weapon. If that's the case, why has he been given his leadership position?</p><p></p><p>Marshall stresses the job of the company commander in getting all of these things to happen, while also worrying about his flanks and rear communications. He's not a superman. He can't control all of his men individually. He needs to use the chain of command. Yet Marshall seems to ignore this.</p><p></p><p>Marshall makes a kind of sense as a reaction to a problem that the US Army was suffering during WWII. Because it had been expanded so quickly, it had a serious shortage of NCOs who were experienced. New infantry units thus could not use NCO-based organisation, because the NCOs of the time weren't capable of doing that job. The culture of the US Army stressed confidence and its own superiority. It reckoned before Operation Torch that its newly-raised units were superior to experienced German ones.</p><p></p><p>Under those circumstances, the actual performance of the Army required an explanation. Telling the high command that it was a result of human nature would have been far more acceptable than acknowledging it was an effect of over-rapid expansion.</p></blockquote><p></p>
[QUOTE="John Dallman, post: 7802776, member: 6999616"] I got interested enough to buy and read Marshall's [B][I]Men Against Fire[/I][/B]. It's a horrible book to base any planning or game design on because it is so [I]muddled[/I]. It presents itself as being based on extensive research with clear results, yet it does not describe those results with any clarity. It has patches of what seem like good sense, sometimes on the same page as utter nonsense. I suspect that many of the people who were supposed to have read it gave up after a couple of chapters, and just generalised the ideas from the first part of the book. In those first few chapters, Marshall describes one scenario clearly. I think this is the only time he does so. It's worth describing. A green infantry company is making an unsupported frontal attack on an opponent who is well dug in and concealed. The company advances some distance, then comes under effective fire. The men go to ground, as they must. And then nobody takes charge. Nobody starts calling orders or asking questions; the troops are not given orders, reminders or any encouragement. About 25% use their weapons. Actually, that seems a fairly good performance, under the circumstances, by the men but a terrible one by the NCOs and officers. I seem to be working across a cultural familiarity gap here, because Marshall explicitly says it is not the job of squad leaders to get their men organised. Since they should be near their men, and know them well, it seems to me (and it's traditional British doctrine) that the NCOs, who have some experience, have the primary job under these circumstances of getting the men organised, encouraging the ones who are new to this and scared, and telling the ones who haven't figured it out where to shoot. With that done, the squad leader needs to shout to his platoon commander, with word of losses and what's being done. But Marshall reckons the squad NCO should not be doing any of this, but should be concentrating on using his personal weapon. If that's the case, why has he been given his leadership position? Marshall stresses the job of the company commander in getting all of these things to happen, while also worrying about his flanks and rear communications. He's not a superman. He can't control all of his men individually. He needs to use the chain of command. Yet Marshall seems to ignore this. Marshall makes a kind of sense as a reaction to a problem that the US Army was suffering during WWII. Because it had been expanded so quickly, it had a serious shortage of NCOs who were experienced. New infantry units thus could not use NCO-based organisation, because the NCOs of the time weren't capable of doing that job. The culture of the US Army stressed confidence and its own superiority. It reckoned before Operation Torch that its newly-raised units were superior to experienced German ones. Under those circumstances, the actual performance of the Army required an explanation. Telling the high command that it was a result of human nature would have been far more acceptable than acknowledging it was an effect of over-rapid expansion. [/QUOTE]
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