Perhaps there is a logician on this forum who can corroborate, but I think your agenda is untenable.
If you're telling a pure narrative in which whatever you say is true, there is zero "disassociation" because there are no mechanics. However, you can could also say that there is 100% disassociation, because there are no mechanics to be disassociated from...
I'm enough of a logician to answer that.
The Alexandrian claim is mechanic X is disassociative
inherently. (He doesn't say it that plainly, but unless you back away to something more tenable, as Jameson has, then that's what the essay demands.) He then goes on to set some parameters for that.
Pemerton, following the parameters thus established, has claimed that at his table, mechanic X was used with no disassociation. Therefore, the mechanic is not
inherently disassociative. He has not claimed, in this part of his argument, that no one using the mechanic could ever honestly report disassociation.
That is, because the Alexandrian has made a strong claim, all that is necessary to dispute parts of it is to provide counter examples. Since that is manifestly true, a great deal of the sturm and drang surrounding counter examples is teasing out exactly what happens.
There is thus the side issue of how much reported evidence from participants to take at face value. This is highly embedded into the dispute from the get go, because it is fairly clear that the Alexandrian and some of his "evangelists" could not permit counter evidence to be presented without disputing the reports. This distinguishes them from some of the more thoughtful discussion that has often occurred in this topic. But since our discussion comes after a lot of sturm and drang, good faith has to be repeatedly affirmed.
Given all that, then, there is separate but more difficult argument about whether there is any meaningful concept occurring to attach the label "disassociated" to, outside of other related terms, such as metagaming and abstraction. And if so, what is its nature and scope? Pemerton, Wrecan, I, and others have intuited that there is not--because no one advocating that there is has yet shown us a scope or nature for the term that we agree falls outside of those other related terms.
But it is granted up front that the latter claim is mainly negative. We intuit that there is no such scope, because all such evidence presented for it thus far--by people presumably trying their best--fails to persuade us. As such, it is a much weaker claim than Pemerton's first claim. I don't think Big Foot exists. If you produce him tomorrow, my thinking is shot. If I don't think something like Kevlar can be produced--a few years ago, I got a nasty surprise. Such are all negative claims.
The first claim is a lot more threatening to the "theory", in part because once it is established, people start talking more reasonably around the second one. There is a sense in which we can't even talk seriously with the OP or Jameson or you until all that underbrush is cleared out. You'll note that BotE works really hard to make sure that the underbrush keeps growing.
