A discussion of metagame concepts in game design

[Ovinomancer]

At this point the moral philosopher in me just wants to crack both your heads together.

Ratskinner: "The greatest good to the greatest number" can't even tell you unambiguously how to slice a birthday cake.

Ovinomancer: Psychologists, marketers, and pollsters scientifically define and quantify subjective preferences every day.

To step a bit further than KB's post, there's a lot of problems in social research. Data collection is often biased by collection method, sample composition, sample size, sample time, and sample location. Often, since new collection is hard, data from different surveys is combined, which taints everything. But, even if we can get all the data to be perfectly collected, there are still issues. Primarily, how do you measure the data? If you didn't put in a Likert scale to begin with, you'll have to come up with some way to categorize and value-ize the data, which is again open to bias. In fact, bias in that step is unavoidable because the very nature of the effort is subjectively valuing data. If you did do a Likert scale, then you have ordinal* data, not ratiometric data. The difference between a 5 and a 10 on a Likert scale is undefined and it's certain that 10 is not twice 5. However, in either case, since numbers are now presented the assumption is that you can do math. You can't, the math doesn't mean anything. In the former case, you're doing math on proxied data that you proxied -- you're doing math on your subjective preferences, not the participants. In the latter, you can't ever do math with ordinal data.

An even worse sin in the social sciences is p-hacking. They'll take a huge data set and then start crunching though various recipe-book statistics (another yuck) until some wee p-value pops out and then report this result as true. But ANY large volume of data will ALWAYS spit out some wee p-value. Further, for the scientific method, this is, at best, step one - observation. You haven't even reached a hypothesis to test yet! But, quite often, this is where research is left. A p-hacked result is found and presented as true without any of the actual scientific process taking place.

The social sciences have major issues with how they do business right now (medicine has many of these issues as well). Fundamentally, though, they can't avoid many of these issues as they're trying to work with data that's inherently subjective to begin with. There's some good work, psychology has had some success for instance, but even there any approach is at best a 50/50 and most psychologists bring multiple approaches to find which works best on a given subject. That's because you can't just measure and model people's subjective beliefs and wants. You can't measure happiness. Setting aside you can't define it, no matter what definition you use people will have a subjective opinion of where they are in relation to that definition. Dressing things up in statistics does not science make.

*Ordinal scales do not have defined steps between numbers. And example is race finishes. If you have a race of 10 people, they runners will finish in ordinal order -- 1st through 10th. But, armed with that ordinal order, you cannot say anything about how fast they ran the race, only which was faster or slower than others. You can't say that the 1st place runner was 10x faster than then 10th place runner, but only that there were 8 other runners that were slower than 1st and faster than 10th. You can't average this data, nor can you do any statistics on it. Yet, in the case of ordinal data in social science research, stats are often run on ordinal data because once you have a number, people mistake it and assume math will work because you use numbers in math.

 

[pemerton]

Mathematics is the language of science so it's hard to go from science improving mathematics. This is like saying Shakespeare made the English language better rather than just using it really damn well.

This struck me as odd. After all, I'd regard it as patently obvious that Shakespeare did make the English language better. How many expressions that are now commonplace originated in his works?

And I'd be surprised if there's no area of mathematics that was not improved by its use in science - because improve in relation to maths can be taken in multiple ways I'm not sure if you would count this as an example, but the first example I thought of was the improvements in the theorisation of geometry and its foundations in the later nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, some of which was driven by developments in physics - eg Einstein's use of non-Euclidean geometry in the theory of relativity.

Given that this work started before Einstein's work obviously his physics was not the sole driver, but at a certain point it helped drive it.

 

[pemerton]

The claim that "good" is subjective preference is controversial.

Obviously many ordinary people disagree. I would say that the majority of contemporary English-speaking philosopher think that good is objectively defined, either in some Aristotle-type human interests fashion or some Kant-type mutuality of reason fashion. When you add in those who deny objectivity but aren't subjectivists either, becausae they are expressivists who think that "good" is not a referring term in the ordinary sense, then I think you get many more than just a majority of contemporary philosophers.

If you're an Aristotle-type, then you hold that to learn the good does require something like scientific study of humans and their nature.

If you're a Kant-type, then you hold that to learn the good - which there is a good chance you think is parasitic on the right, so let's instead say "moral truth" - requires some form of reasoning that, if not scientific, is certainly not just making stuff up.

And if you're an expressivist, then there is a certain sense in which you don't think that moral value is a thing in the universe, any more than we would think (say) that conjunction is a thing in the universe (as opposed to a linguistic/syntactic device for conjoining propositions).

 

[Ovinomancer]

This struck me as odd. After all, I'd regard it as patently obvious that Shakespeare did make the English language better. How many expressions that are now commonplace originated in his works?

And I'd be surprised if there's no area of mathematics that was not improved by its use in science - because improve in relation to maths can be taken in multiple ways I'm not sure if you would count this as an example, but the first example I thought of was the improvements in the theorisation of geometry and its foundations in the later nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, some of which was driven by developments in physics - eg Einstein's use of non-Euclidean geometry in the theory of relativity.

Given that this work started before Einstein's work obviously his physics was not the sole driver, but at a certain point it helped drive it.

Shakespeare didn't improve English, he created phrases and uses of it that have goid use. Much like a proof doesn't invent new math but instead allows a good use of math.

Einstien didn't allow tge invention of new math but instead pointed to areas of nath that had been neglected. Science diesn't make new math, it follows new math. We cannot observe math, cannot measure it -- it's not a subject for science.

 

[Ovinomancer]

The claim that "good" is subjective preference is controversial.

Obviously many ordinary people disagree. I would say that the majority of contemporary English-speaking philosopher think that good is objectively defined, either in some Aristotle-type human interests fashion or some Kant-type mutuality of reason fashion. When you add in those who deny objectivity but aren't subjectivists either, becausae they are expressivists who think that "good" is not a referring term in the ordinary sense, then I think you get many more than just a majority of contemporary philosophers.

If you're an Aristotle-type, then you hold that to learn the good does require something like scientific study of humans and their nature.

If you're a Kant-type, then you hold that to learn the good - which there is a good chance you think is parasitic on the right, so let's instead say "moral truth" - requires some form of reasoning that, if not scientific, is certainly not just making stuff up.

And if you're an expressivist, then there is a certain sense in which you don't think that moral value is a thing in the universe, any more than we would think (say) that conjunction is a thing in the universe (as opposed to a linguistic/syntactic device for conjoining propositions).

You say the majority of philosophers believe good is defined but then point out that there's strong disagreement in thise definitions. This pretty much supports my statement that you can't objectively define good.

 

[Ratskinner]

They aren't defunding research because they think science can answer social, ethical or political issues. They are defunding it because it goes against their moral issues. Science running contrary to a moral belief doesn't mean that science is answering that belief in a moral way. Science is useless for establishing morality or political issues.

In some cases (Stem Cell Research) I would agree with you. They have an objection to the methods and procedures that would be used. In others (Gun as Public Health, Global Warming) it is simply that the results would make their subjective moral/political positions less tenable in the face of objective evidence (or they fear that outcome.)

I agree that Science is not very good at establishing morality/political positions. That is because all such positions are subjective, and science helps determine objective things. However, humans tend to evaluate their moral and political positions based upon what they perceive as objective reality, science has repeatedly bumped up against this...often getting scientists burned at the stake or put under house arrest, etc.

 

[Maxperson]

In some cases (Stem Cell Research) I would agree with you. They have an objection to the methods and procedures that would be used. In others (Gun as Public Health, Global Warming) it is simply that the results would make their subjective moral/political positions less tenable in the face of objective evidence (or they fear that outcome.)

I agree that Science is not very good at establishing morality/political positions. That is because all such positions are subjective, and science helps determine objective things. However, humans tend to evaluate their moral and political positions based upon what they perceive as objective reality, science has repeatedly bumped up against this...often getting scientists burned at the stake or put under house arrest, etc.

The entirety of your posts supports what I said, though. Stem cell research doesn't care about morality or politics. Neither does research on global warming. Not sure what you mean by gun as public health. They bump against moral and political issues when people are morally opposed to science, or politically opposed to it as with global warming, but the science itself is neither moral nor political. I don't think anyone here is saying that science doesn't run afoul of people who are basing their positions on morals or politics. As you say, some scientists have been killed for it.

 

[Kobold Boots]

This struck me as odd. After all, I'd regard it as patently obvious that Shakespeare did make the English language better. How many expressions that are now commonplace originated in his works?

And I'd be surprised if there's no area of mathematics that was not improved by its use in science - because improve in relation to maths can be taken in multiple ways I'm not sure if you would count this as an example, but the first example I thought of was the improvements in the theorisation of geometry and its foundations in the later nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, some of which was driven by developments in physics - eg Einstein's use of non-Euclidean geometry in the theory of relativity.

Given that this work started before Einstein's work obviously his physics was not the sole driver, but at a certain point it helped drive it.

Also @Ovinomancer

Use of English in novel ways (application) contributes back to the language itself over time (theory/discipline).
Use of Math to solve a problem (application) contributes back the language itself over time (theory/new avenues to proof)

No tool exists in an absolute vacuum. However, some tools are more open to being changed than others. English changes daily based on millions of folks speaking, creating novel phrases and sharing them regionally and globally. Math changes less often, if only because the math available to the masses is pretty well defined and the scholars operating at the edges of current knowledge aren't as numerous as the total English speaking population.

So you're both right, but I'll take the stab at providing the lens for the win-win. That lens requires science to be taken out of the loop for math. Math begets Math just as English begets English.

Oranges do not beget apples; but you might learn that putting apples and oranges together improve orchard outcomes (profit)

KB

 

[pemerton]

Shakespeare didn't improve English, he created phrases and uses of it that have goid use.

What is a language, if not its stock in trade of phrases? A simple formal definition of a language is a vocabulary plus syntax - and in the case of English Shakespeare contributed to both!

a proof doesn't invent new math but instead allows a good use of math.

<snip>

Einstien didn't allow tge invention of new math but instead pointed to areas of nath that had been neglected. Science diesn't make new math, it follows new math. We cannot observe math, cannot measure it -- it's not a subject for science.

If you're a strong Platonist who thinks that there's no such thing as inventing new mathematica techniques, or improving upon then, then I guess you would treat is a trivial consequence that science can't improve maths.

But even a strong Platonist of that sort would admit that mathematical knowledge can be improved. Eg a proof might reveal something to be true which hitherto was not know to be true.

The claim that maths doesn't make new maths, it follows maths I find very dubious. Work on the calculus was intimately connected to the need for better mathematical techniques in scientific enquiry. Likewise work on the foundations of geometry, as I mentioned. Describing it in a fairly abstract way, one could point to both an "agenda setting" function of science in relation to mathematical endeavour, and also pointing to concrete problems in need of new techniques or new solutions.

Obviously not all mathematical development is driven by science. I'm disputing the claim that it never is. (And the fact that mathematics is not an observational science seems irrelevant to this point: painting isn't an observational science either, but one could hardly argue that the science of optics has never influenced - and at least arguably, on occasion, improved - painting.)

You say the majority of philosophers believe good is defined but then point out that there's strong disagreement in thise definitions. This pretty much supports my statement that you can't objectively define good.

Not really. Disagreement isnt necessarily evidence that something is not objective. Mediaeval geographers disagreed about what was on the south side of the equator - that doesn't mean that there was no objective fact of the matter.

It's arguable that there is no systematic and institutionalised method in philosophy for settling the question - though that was also true of those geographers, given that they were debating before scientific geography had really been invented.

But while that lack of method goes to the question of whether moral philosophy is a science, it doesn't show that there is no objective truth.

 

[Ovinomancer]

Also @Ovinomancer

Use of English in novel ways (application) contributes back to the language itself over time (theory/discipline).
Use of Math to solve a problem (application) contributes back the language itself over time (theory/new avenues to proof)

No tool exists in an absolute vacuum. However, some tools are more open to being changed than others. English changes daily based on millions of folks speaking, creating novel phrases and sharing them regionally and globally. Math changes less often, if only because the math available to the masses is pretty well defined and the scholars operating at the edges of current knowledge aren't as numerous as the total English speaking population.

So you're both right, but I'll take the stab at providing the lens for the win-win. That lens requires science to be taken out of the loop for math. Math begets Math just as English begets English.

Oranges do not beget apples; but you might learn that putting apples and oranges together improve orchard outcomes (profit)

KB

That was my point -- science speaks math, like Shakespeare spoke English. The medium is not the same as the art/science.