Why do RPGs have rules?

[pemerton]

JI've heard folk offer the view that what TTRPG amounts to are special cases of freeform.

According to the blog, Baker denies this, because he contrast freeform with the use of mediating cues, and at least some RPGs deploy mediating cues in a systematic way. (Rolemaster, Burning Wheel, Apocalypse World and Classic Traveller are just a small number of the many examples that could be given.)

There are multiple valid takes on the deontic effect of the rule that players can roll dice to resist outcomes described by referee.

I don't know what you mean by a "deontic effect".

 

[clearstream]

I think property rights, rather than human rights, is a better model (if you wish to take a model from the legal domain).

I don't know what this means.

I mean, "You ought not to drive faster than 60kph on this street" is a deontic statement. But in standard jurisprudential analysis it is a rule, not a principle.

And I don't see what this has to do with Baker, who characterises the principles in which he is interested in terms of what elements of the fiction is a given participant entitled to exercise control over?

Not really. It doesn't look deontic at all. It looks like a hypothetical imperative.

Whether it is a sound hypothetical imperative is a further matter. For instance, if the rules of the game include principles, and the use of procedural cues, but not mediating cues, then following the rules will not produce the unwelcome and unexpected.

In which case?

"Mediating cues", as used by Baker, refers to the use of real world referents, like dice - which Baker, following Emily Care Boss, calls "cues" - to constrain or generate the fiction.

You, upthread at 2613, talked about a GM doing the same job as mediating cues. That would be, then doing the job of constraining the fiction - eg the GM says to the player, "You fall through the ceiling onto the floor, and take 3 harm. Tell us how, exactly, you're hurt" - or of generating the fiction - eg the GM says to the player, "You fall through the ceiling onto the floor, and you feel something in your left leg go crunch, and then there's pain all the way up that side of your body - take 3 harm".

This could be the GM acting in accordance with a principle; or could be the GM exercising authority granted by the use of procedural cues. From the examples I've offered, we can't tell which.

One reason to use mediating cues, instead of just conferring narrative authority on the GM by way of principle or the use of procedural cues, would be to try and introduce the unwelcome and unexpected.

I don't see what the point is of disputing my suggestion that FKR is a special case of principled and/or procedural freeform, and then saying that your dispute rests on departing from the terms in which I have framed my suggestion.

I mean, "In this game we find out whether or not you - as your PC - are too craven to act by rolling your craven dice and seeing if your high die is 1 to 3" could be said to be a principle. But clearly Baker, in calling that a mediating cue (on account of it being a bit of content established by reading off a dice roll), is intending to contrast it with what he means by "principle" in this context.

It feels like a good idea to start by being certain what is meant by "principles". Here is Baker's list from AW

Barf forth apocalyptica.​

Address yourself to the characters, not the players.​

Make your move, but misdirect.​

Make your move, but never speak its name.​

Look through crosshairs.​

Name everyone, make everyone human.​

Ask provocative questions and build on the answers.​

Respond with fuckery and intermittent rewards.​

Be a fan of the players’ characters.​

Think offscreen too.​

Sometimes, disclaim decision-making​

​

Here are some added by DW

Draw maps, leave blanks​

Embrace the fantastic​

Make a move that follows​

Think dangerous​

Begin and end with the fiction​

Against which can be contrasted

You can change people’s normal social system with principles. “Your right to say what your character does ends at my character’s skin. You can say your character punches mine, but I get to say how it affects my character.”​

Presupposing "property rights" is an accurate characterisation of the immediately above, to my reading the "principles" in AW go beyond that. One option is to suppose he considered and intended different sorts of principles to apply to freeform. That might be true, but the text is too scanty to go on. To me, it feels like there is work to do to say what "principles" really covers for TTRPG. Only then could one say whether an ultralight ruleset can/cannot incoporate principles that have the sort of consequences I am thinking of.

I'm interested in whether you agree with the above observations, or in any case in your thoughts around what "principles" are in TTRPG?

 

[clearstream]

I don't know what you mean by a "deontic effect".

I mean that I don't view the consequence of principles or rules in TTRPG to be inevitable, but rather to define and encourage behaviour in fulfilment of a sense of duty or obligation around rule-following.

When I observe how the content of game texts is conveyed into play, I see some rules that almost everyone follows, some that many follow but far from all, some that few follow, and some that it is unusual to ever see followed. And of course, I see rules that some folk follow one way, and others another.

I regard the following of rules in TTRPG to be probabilistic or predictive: the presence of the rule in the text (along with other text such as examples) predicts at some level of probability it's enactment in play. So when I write about mediating cues I use language such as "compel and constrain" to indicate that it is not the case that the rule guarantees the behaviour, or predicts with certainty the form the behaviour will take. Rather I see the rule as normative or deontic in effect.

I think you could see the principles of AW in the form of ideals toward which to strive. I see their presence in the game text as implying an obligation or duty to do so. Perhaps that is wrong, and one should suppose that there is no obligation but only an anticipated embracing of ideals. The way folk talk about social contracts and expectations around the table make me come down in favour of obligation.

If there is a better way to see this or term to use, I'll be happy to improve my understanding!

 

[pemerton]

I see rules that some folk follow one way, and others another.

If there is a rule that, in order to be followed in circumstance C, requires doing P; and a rule that in order to be followed, in the same circumstance C, requires doing Q which (among other things) is inconsistent with P, then it seems to follow that they're different rules.

Likewise: if there is a rule that, in order to be followed in circumstance C, requires doing P; and a rule that in order to be followed, in the same circumstance C, permits doing Q which (among other things) is inconsistent with P, then it also seems to follow that they're different rules.

The fact in both of the above cases that the two rules, when reduced to writing in English, might be stated using the same words doesn't seem to make them the same rule.

An example of the first, courtesy of Dworkin: the rule, stated in English, is Be respectful when you and another both come to a doorway at the same time, intending to pass through. Person A reads those words and adopts the rule: I, a man, must open the door and then yield to a woman who has arrived at the door with me. Person B reads those words and adopts the rule: I, a man, must treat a woman who arrives at the door at the same time as me no differently from how I would treat a man. A and B are following different rules, based on different norms of respect.

An example of the second: the rule, stated in English, is Drive at a reasonable speed. Person A reads those words and takes them to require driving no faster than 50 kph. Person B reads those words and takes them to permit driving at 60 kph. Again, A and B appear to be following different rules, based on different norms of reasonableness in driving.

On the other hand, if there is a rule that, in order to be followed in circumstance C, permits doing P; and a rule that in order to be followed, in the same circumstance C, permits doing Q which (among other things) is inconsistent with P, then the two rules may be the same one.

An example: the rule, stated in English, is Get your teacher a suitable gift at the end of the school year. A and B read those words, both form the view that any sort of non-intoxicating food or drink might be a reasonable gift, and so A gets the teacher a box of chocolates and B gets the teacher a nicely-shaped bottle of a boutique fruit juice. A and B have followed the rule in different ways, but have not followed different rules. The rule itself demands that the person following it choose from a range of acceptable options.

So when you talk about rules being followed different ways, I can't tell which sort of case you have in mind. Like, when I GM Torchbearer and when @Manbearcat GMs Torchbearer, we often have to follow a rule along the lines of Choose a consequence that will sting. It's well known that I tend to choose softer or more sentimental consequences than Manbearcat. We're both following the same rule, but the "flavour"/"tone"/"feel" of our games is different as a result of the different tendencies in our choices.

On the other hand, the 4e PHB (pre-errata) included a feat, Weapon Focus, which said "Choose a specific weapon group, such as spears or heavy blades. You gain a +1 feat bonus to damage rolls with your chosen weapon group." Many 4e tables interpreted this to permit adding the feat bonus to damage to an Implement attack power where a weapon of the chosen group was used as an implement. It seemed obvious to me that the feat only applied to Weapon attack powers: although no such limitation was expressly stated, the recurrent reference to weapon and especially the description of the effect referring to damage rolls with a weapon made it seem obvious to me that damage rolls with an implement [power, or that is a "weaplement"] were excluded.

So this was a case where I took the feat to require use of a Weapon attack power in order to get the bonus; while some others took it to permit use of an Implement attack power while receiving a bonus; and using an Implement attack power is inconsistent with using a Weapon attack power. Although in both cases we were applying a rule stated using the same English text, it seems to me that we were applying different rules. So this is not a case like the difference between @Manbearcat and me GMing Torchbearer.

Most discussions of RPG rules are not very sensitive to these different ways of analysing differences in the following of rules: the technical apparatus I am applying belongs to jurisprudence (and perhaps philosophy of language and of mathematics) rather than to the discourse typically found on message boards and blogs.

And as I said, I don't know what range of cases you have in mind in talking about differences in the following of rules.

I regard the following of rules in TTRPG to be probabilistic or predictive: the presence of the rule in the text (along with other text such as examples) predicts at some level of probability it's enactment in play. So when I write about mediating cues I use language such as "compel and constrain" to indicate that it is not the case that the rule guarantees the behaviour, or predicts with certainty the form the behaviour will take. Rather I see the rule as normative or deontic in effect.

The first sentence here seems to be an empirical conjecture about the relationship between certain artefacts - say, English texts purporting to set out rules for playing a game - and the behaviour of those who pick up those artefacts and put them to work. It's like saying that 90% of hammer uses will use them to hammer in nails, but 10% will use them to smash open coconuts. Etc.

I don't understand the second and third sentences. The rule is normative or the rule is deontic seem largely tautological, given that we're talking about rules for engaging in a social activity (ie game play) and "normative" means establishing, relating to, or deriving from a standard or norm, especially of behaviour (thanks Google) while "deontic" means relating to duty and obligation as ethical concepts (thanks again Google). So yes, the rules of a game establish standards of conduct, including duties, that apply within the context of playing the game.

Vincent Baker, who is a leader - in the context of RPG analysis - in identifying the social character of RPG play and the implications of this for understanding play and for RPG design, is well aware of these matters. He sums them up in the "lumpley principle". When talking about mediating cues Baker is not contrasting their use with (say) the law of gravity, which does not depend upon social cohesion or cooperation in order to take effect. He is contrasting the content of the rule: a rule involving mediating cues imposes, as part of its content, a duty to say something about the fiction within certain limits or that contains a certain sort of element; whereas what makes the use of cues a procedural use is that the cues allocate permissions to add to the fiction but do not tell the person who received the permission what it is that they have to say.

I think you could see the principles of AW in the form of ideals toward which to strive. I see their presence in the game text as implying an obligation or duty to do so. Perhaps that is wrong, and one should suppose that there is no obligation but only an anticipated embracing of ideals. The way folk talk about social contracts and expectations around the table make me come down in favour of obligation.

I don't see why it matters, or what is at stake.

I just described the role of mediating cues using the language of duty. I could redescribe it using the language of ideal and aspiration: a rule involving mediating cues, as part of its content, directs a designated participant to do their best to say something about the fiction within certain limits or that contains a certain sort of element.

The redescription is a bit weaker in the normative demand it imposes. In practice, it will take you to pretty much the same place. And you can see a compromise between the two ways of stating a rule in Open your brain to the psychic maelstrom - Baker states it in terms of duty on the MC, then says that if there's nothing interesting the MC can say that, and then tells the MC that he (Baker) hopes that they (the MC) never do so. In other words, the duty is stated with an out clause, and then the MC is told to do their best never to use the out clause. I don't think that we shed any further light on this rule of AW by agonising over whether its "true" characters is that of a duty, or an aspiration.

It feels like a good idea to start by being certain what is meant by "principles". Here is Baker's list from AW

Manifestly, these are not the sorts of principles that he is referring to in the quote on the blog. The principles given in the quote on the blog are principles for governing freeform RPGing, and they are principles that deal with who gets to say stuff about various elements of the shared fiction.

Presupposing "property rights" is an accurate characterisation of the immediately above, to my reading the "principles" in AW go beyond that. One option is to suppose he considered and intended different sorts of principles to apply to freeform. That might be true, but the text is too scanty to go on

I don't think it's too scanty at all. I think it's pretty obvious.

 

[pemerton]

Another comment:

The importance of drawing the contrast between the use of mediating cues, and the use of procedural cues, is not that it gets us to ponder the nature of obligation or constraint in RPGing. Procedural cues, when used, also impose obligations and constraints, namely, on who gets to speak and add content.

The significance of mediating cues is not that they oblige and constrain: it's that they oblige and constrain what can be said. Baker, by bringing them to our attention, is making a point which I also quote him making in the OP: RPG rules can do more than allocate authority to speak. They can constrain what we are allowed to say when we have authority to speak.

This is very commonly recognised in the context of combat rules. Generalising the point is crucial to seeing how RPGs can be more than just wargames + freeform.

 

[clearstream]

If there is a rule that, in order to be followed in circumstance C, requires doing P; and a rule that in order to be followed, in the same circumstance C, requires doing Q which (among other things) is inconsistent with P, then it seems to follow that they're different rules.

Likewise: if there is a rule that, in order to be followed in circumstance C, requires doing P; and a rule that in order to be followed, in the same circumstance C, permits doing Q which (among other things) is inconsistent with P, then it also seems to follow that they're different rules.

The fact in both of the above cases that the two rules, when reduced to writing in English, might be stated using the same words doesn't seem to make them the same rule.

An example of the first, courtesy of Dworkin: the rule, stated in English, is Be respectful when you and another both come to a doorway at the same time, intending to pass through. Person A reads those words and adopts the rule: I, a man, must open the door and then yield to a woman who has arrived at the door with me. Person B reads those words and adopts the rule: I, a man, must treat a woman who arrives at the door at the same time as me no differently from how I would treat a man. A and B are following different rules, based on different norms of respect.

An example of the second: the rule, stated in English, is Drive at a reasonable speed. Person A reads those words and takes them to require driving no faster than 50 kph. Person B reads those words and takes them to permit driving at 60 kph. Again, A and B appear to be following different rules, based on different norms of reasonableness in driving.

On the other hand, if there is a rule that, in order to be followed in circumstance C, permits doing P; and a rule that in order to be followed, in the same circumstance C, permits doing Q which (among other things) is inconsistent with P, then the two rules may be the same one.

An example: the rule, stated in English, is Get your teacher a suitable gift at the end of the school year. A and B read those words, both form the view that any sort of non-intoxicating food or drink might be a reasonable gift, and so A gets the teacher a box of chocolates and B gets the teacher a nicely-shaped bottle of a boutique fruit juice. A and B have followed the rule in different ways, but have not followed different rules. The rule itself demands that the person following it choose from a range of acceptable options.

So when you talk about rules being followed different ways, I can't tell which sort of case you have in mind. Like, when I GM Torchbearer and when @Manbearcat GMs Torchbearer, we often have to follow a rule along the lines of Choose a consequence that will sting. It's well known that I tend to choose softer or more sentimental consequences than Manbearcat. We're both following the same rule, but the "flavour"/"tone"/"feel" of our games is different as a result of the different tendencies in our choices.

On the other hand, the 4e PHB (pre-errata) included a feat, Weapon Focus, which said "Choose a specific weapon group, such as spears or heavy blades. You gain a +1 feat bonus to damage rolls with your chosen weapon group." Many 4e tables interpreted this to permit adding the feat bonus to damage to an Implement attack power where a weapon of the chosen group was used as an implement. It seemed obvious to me that the feat only applied to Weapon attack powers: although no such limitation was expressly stated, the recurrent reference to weapon and especially the description of the effect referring to damage rolls with a weapon made it seem obvious to me that damage rolls with an implement [power, or that is a "weaplement"] were excluded.

So this was a case where I took the feat to require use of a Weapon attack power in order to get the bonus; while some others took it to permit use of an Implement attack power while receiving a bonus; and using an Implement attack power is inconsistent with using a Weapon attack power. Although in both cases we were applying a rule stated using the same English text, it seems to me that we were applying different rules. So this is not a case like the difference between @Manbearcat and me GMing Torchbearer.

Most discussions of RPG rules are not very sensitive to these different ways of analysing differences in the following of rules: the technical apparatus I am applying belongs to jurisprudence (and perhaps philosophy of language and of mathematics) rather than to the discourse typically found on message boards and blogs.

And as I said, I don't know what range of cases you have in mind in talking about differences in the following of rules.

I had in mind a wide range of cases, such as those you've ably outlined above.

The first sentence here seems to be an empirical conjecture about the relationship between certain artefacts - say, English texts purporting to set out rules for playing a game - and the behaviour of those who pick up those artefacts and put them to work. It's like saying that 90% of hammer uses will use them to hammer in nails, but 10% will use them to smash open coconuts. Etc.

I don't understand the second and third sentences. The rule is normative or the rule is deontic seem largely tautological, given that we're talking about rules for engaging in a social activity (ie game play) and "normative" means establishing, relating to, or deriving from a standard or norm, especially of behaviour (thanks Google) while "deontic" means relating to duty and obligation as ethical concepts (thanks again Google). So yes, the rules of a game establish standards of conduct, including duties, that apply within the context of playing the game.

Vincent Baker, who is a leader - in the context of RPG analysis - in identifying the social character of RPG play and the implications of this for understanding play and for RPG design, is well aware of these matters. He sums them up in the "lumpley principle". When talking about mediating cues Baker is not contrasting their use with (say) the law of gravity, which does not depend upon social cohesion or cooperation in order to take effect. He is contrasting the content of the rule: a rule involving mediating cues imposes, as part of its content, a duty to say something about the fiction within certain limits or that contains a certain sort of element; whereas what makes the use of cues a procedural use is that the cues allocate permissions to add to the fiction but do not tell the person who received the permission what it is that they have to say.

I was asked what I meant by "deontic". I was not aiming to introduce anything new or exclude anything significant from the conversation.

I don't see why it matters, or what is at stake.

I just described the role of mediating cues using the language of duty. I could redescribe it using the language of ideal and aspiration: a rule involving mediating cues, as part of its content, directs a designated participant to do their best to say something about the fiction within certain limits or that contains a certain sort of element.

The redescription is a bit weaker in the normative demand it imposes. In practice, it will take you to pretty much the same place. And you can see a compromise between the two ways of stating a rule in Open your brain to the psychic maelstrom - Baker states it in terms of duty on the MC, then says that if there's nothing interesting the MC can say that, and then tells the MC that he (Baker) hopes that they (the MC) never do so. In other words, the duty is stated with an out clause, and then the MC is told to do their best never to use the out clause. I don't think that we shed any further light on this rule of AW by agonising over whether its "true" characters is that of a duty, or an aspiration.

I don't either. I mentioned it in case you did.

Manifestly, these are not the sorts of principles that he is referring to in the quote on the blog. The principles given in the quote on the blog are principles for governing freeform RPGing, and they are principles that deal with who gets to say stuff about various elements of the shared fiction.

I don't think it's too scanty at all. I think it's pretty obvious.

Rather than further argue this point, I'll introduce another element to the list - "principlesB". The "B" is for broader: it includes principles of the sort Baker implied with his example, and of the sort seen in AW. Per Baker, but now with my addition

Freeform = content only​

​

Non-freeform = created by adding mediating cues ("popularly, mechanics")​

​

Procedural freeform = content + procedural cues (principles and principlesB are optional)​

​

Principled freeform = content + principles or principlesB​

​

Per @pemerton

​

FKR = procedural freeform where procedural cues appoint a GM​

​

With the understanding that I am talking about principlesB - I said that

Another approach would be to lay out a few principles that govern the use of lightweight procedures. Probably the basic rule needed is a result that is going to be interpreted as compelling the unwanted and unwelcome. Not simple failure or resource depeletion, but something about the tone of what you must add to your fiction. None of this would rely on defining any content.​

Cthulhu Dark has the sort of basic rule suggested, assuming that being obliged to roleplay "fear" is unwelcome. Due to the inclusion of mediating cues, Cthulhu Dark isn't freeform or FKR. Rather it fits another category of TTRPG - that of ultralight rules - that counts freeform games among its members.

Continuing then to exclude mediating cues from the definition of freeform, can the unwelcome and unwanted nevertheless be compelled via principles found within the set principlesB()? Examples of the contents of that set are seen in game texts such as AW and DW.

In the part I quoted (of my own words) I note an intuition that "procedures" would be needed. I'm most concerned here to see if principles alone can do the work. It may turn out that it can be achieved only in "procedural freeform" and not "principled freeform"... perhaps it only works if you appoint someone to do it?

 

[AbdulAlhazred]

I am not picturing that GM creates narrative for players. I am picturing that GM does the same job mediating cues do, which is to compel and constrain the nature of the narrative that players create.

I think @pemerton has already pretty well popped this balloon, but just to reiterate, it is weak sauce when you expect the GM to simply state, based on principles, unwelcome things. As discussed, you want mediating cues for that, like dice.

 

[AbdulAlhazred]

It feels like a good idea to start by being certain what is meant by "principles". Here is Baker's list from AW

Barf forth apocalyptica.​

Address yourself to the characters, not the players.​

Make your move, but misdirect.​

Make your move, but never speak its name.​

Look through crosshairs.​

Name everyone, make everyone human.​

Ask provocative questions and build on the answers.​

Respond with fuckery and intermittent rewards.​

Be a fan of the players’ characters.​

Think offscreen too.​

Sometimes, disclaim decision-making​

​

Here are some added by DW

Draw maps, leave blanks​

Embrace the fantastic​

Make a move that follows​

Think dangerous​

Begin and end with the fiction​

Against which can be contrasted

You can change people’s normal social system with principles. “Your right to say what your character does ends at my character’s skin. You can say your character punches mine, but I get to say how it affects my character.”​

Presupposing "property rights" is an accurate characterisation of the immediately above, to my reading the "principles" in AW go beyond that. One option is to suppose he considered and intended different sorts of principles to apply to freeform. That might be true, but the text is too scanty to go on. To me, it feels like there is work to do to say what "principles" really covers for TTRPG. Only then could one say whether an ultralight ruleset can/cannot incoporate principles that have the sort of consequences I am thinking of.

I'm interested in whether you agree with the above observations, or in any case in your thoughts around what "principles" are in TTRPG?

There is no definite list! Every game is unique. No one list is inherently more correct than others, nor is there some 'core set' as far as I can determine which is required to define an RPG, unless we also include "it's a game" and "people role play characters in it" which actually is really vague and doesn't feel like principles to me.

As for 'ultralight', I don't know what that means. RPGs have varying amounts of rules. You could make some arbitrary line and say "if the text is shorter than this, it is 'ultralight'" if you wish... I think you had better ask Vince or someone about what principles he claims for his freeform play. I think it's definitional that they're not written down, and thus may not be subject to being cataloged, though the quotes in that blog do appear to mention some things that I would include if I made a list.

However, I think the AW and DW principles lists are at least illustrative of the kinds of things that count, at least in a certain type of play.

 

[clearstream]

The importance of drawing the contrast between the use of mediating cues, and the use of procedural cues, is not that it gets us to ponder the nature of obligation or constraint in RPGing. Procedural cues, when used, also impose obligations and constraints, namely, on who gets to speak and add content.

I took your responses to indicate that you'd seen my meaning, but on reflection - maybe not? What I am thinking about is the force with which a principle or rule has consequences on play. Designers employ a variety of strategies to achieve that, for example in AW Baker takes particular care to exemplify his meaning and emphasise how and that he wants a rule to be followed. In the past I've referred to that as strong or high deontic effect - the imposition of a strong obligation or sense of duty - a high likelihood the rule will predict the behaviour.

The significance of mediating cues is not that they oblige and constrain: it's that they oblige and constrain what can be said. Baker, by bringing them to our attention, is making a point which I also quote him making in the OP: RPG rules can do more than allocate authority to speak. They can constrain what we are allowed to say when we have authority to speak.

The significance of the mechanics is that they oblige and constrain what can be said. I don't see what the argument is with that. Picture a mechanic that did not oblige and constrain: it would surely not matter what it said. It's relevant to consider the force with which different forms of rule have consequences for play, especially for freeform which depends upon subtle largely unwritten rules. (So here I reject any notion that freeform is rule-less even if the rules are unwritten, for reasons that should be obvious based on what I've previously said about rules in this and other threads.)

EDIT Normative-force is probably a better term. It matters to freeform because various norms are in force in play, and what is written or agreed (procedures, principles) emphasises or modifies those. I am questioning not solely whether we could construct the appropriate principles, but even supposing we did, whether their normative-force is sufficient/insufficient to compel players to say the unwelcome?

 

[clearstream]

I think @pemerton has already pretty well popped this balloon, but just to reiterate, it is weak sauce when you expect the GM to simply state, based on principles, unwelcome things. As discussed, you want mediating cues for that, like dice.

These comments aren't responsive to what I have written. I do not expect the GM to state unwelcome things, based on principles or otherwise.

I expect the GM to procure that players say unwelcome things. Recollect that I have positioned GM among the lusory-means. In that capacity, features of play aren't rightly characterised as welcome or unwelcome to GM: such a characterisation only makes sense from the perspective of players. My claim is double-barrelled

i. There can be principles that force the unwelcome and unwanted to be said in play. (They can be constructed, and will have the necessary normative force.)​

​

ii. They must be given their normative-force through some participant such as GM; necessitating the play to be at least procedural-freeform. I'm not strongly committed to that being GM as such, or some other arrangement.​

As to the sorts of objection I'd anticipate, that would matter. You could deny that GM can be part of lusory-means. You could argue that even as part of lusory-means, GM lacks the normative-force to make players say the unwelcome. You could be skeptical about the prospects of constructing the appropriate principles (although other of your comments seem to rule that out.) You could point out that Baker demands the unwelcome and unwanted to be from the perspective of everyone at the table, meaning I can't neatly tuck GM into lusory-means. (This interacts with my arguments in ways that I don't recollect Baker investigating. And connects with conversation elsewhere about whether GM must be counted in any sense as among the players. I can't recall anything in broader game studies expressly addressing whether TTRPG GMs are or are not to be engaged in play in the autotelic way that players are. To draw a brief analogy - to what extent do we expect FIFA Laws that can at times force results unwelcome to the footballer to be unwelcome to the referee? Usually, we assume referee to be neutral as to such outcomes. It is then open to say that GM is not quite like a referee, which I believe I conceded in another thread at some point. I would probably respond by proposing GM's are not necessarily all of one ilk.)

Another argument I am entertaining is to say that what characterises freeform is that players are not forced to say anything in particular. Thus, such principles as have the effect - whether via GM or not - of compelling players to say unwelcome things, remove the play from counting as freeform. If so, I'd split FKR along the same lines - i.e. into freeform-FKR (procedural freeform) and non-freeform-FKR (principled in the way that forces players to say the unwelcome and unwanted.)

Technically, I am leaning on an assumption that freeform play follows norms. You can read examples of the sorts of expectations I'm talking about, or if you play much freeform you'll know exactly what I mean. Reifying or putting in place a norm as a principle is thus a smaller step than it might appear. To some extent, this goes against Baker's idea that freeform must exclude mediating cues: I'm implying that they're present, just not written. See also my edit to my post just above.