He seems to be thinking of principles in terms of human rights. How your rights intersect with mine.
I think property rights, rather than human rights, is a better model (if you wish to take a model from the legal domain).
Principles can and often are thought of in broader deontic terms. Something one ought to do.
I don't know what this means.
I mean, "You ought not to drive faster than 60kph on this street" is a deontic statement. But in standard jurisprudential analysis it is a rule, not a principle.
And I don't see what this has to do with Baker, who characterises the principles in which he is interested in terms of
what elements of the fiction is a given participant entitled to exercise control over?
"If I want to experience the unwelcome and unwanted, I ought to follow the rules." That looks very much like a principle.
Not really. It doesn't look deontic at all. It looks like a hypothetical imperative.
Whether it is a
sound hypothetical imperative is a further matter. For instance, if the rules of the game include principles, and the use of procedural cues, but not mediating cues, then following the rules will not produce the unwelcome and unexpected.
pemerton said:
Mediating cues tell some or other participant(s) what to say. They are content-specifying. So to do the job done by mediating cues is to wield narrative power.
So you would say that a mediating cue is doing the same job in that case as a GM?
In which case?
"Mediating cues", as used by Baker, refers to the use of real world referents, like
dice - which Baker, following Emily Care Boss, calls "cues" - to constrain or generate the fiction.
You, upthread at 2613, talked about a GM doing the same job as mediating cues. That would be, then doing the job of constraining the fiction - eg the GM says to the player, "You fall through the ceiling onto the floor, and take 3 harm. Tell us how, exactly, you're hurt" - or of generating the fiction - eg the GM says to the player, "You fall through the ceiling onto the floor, and you feel something in your left leg go
crunch, and then there's pain all the way up that side of your body - take 3 harm".
This could be the GM acting in accordance with a principle; or could be the GM exercising authority granted by the use of procedural cues. From the examples I've offered, we can't tell which.
One reason to use mediating cues, instead of just conferring narrative authority on the GM by way of principle or the use of procedural cues, would be to try and introduce the unwelcome and unexpected.
The available text in that blogpost is for me too limited to draw strong conclusions. One has to construct a complete definition of principles from an extremely limited set of examples. Here, I take you to be accepting the limits and working within them. By contrast, I do not accept those same limits because I experience principles being defined and applied to roleplaying in a greater diversity of ways. I'm not even convinced one can conclude from that text the limits of what Baker expects principles to encompass.
I don't see what the point is of disputing my suggestion that FKR is a special case of principled and/or procedural freeform, and then saying that your dispute rests on departing from the terms in which I have framed my suggestion.
I mean, "In this game we find out whether or not you - as your PC - are too craven to act by rolling your
craven dice and seeing if your high die is 1 to 3" could be said to be a principle. But clearly Baker, in calling that a mediating cue (on account of it being a bit of content established by reading off a dice roll), is intending to contrast it with what
he means by "principle" in this context.