3d6 is a rational data set. It's distribution is very useful in many things. But, to the case at hand, someone that has an 18 intelligence is exactly 1 higher than someone that has a 17 intelligence. They are 1/18 more smart. This statement is factually correct. As is someone with an 18 intelligence is exactly six times smarter than someone with a 3 intelligence.
I don't think that your statement is "factually correct" at all! I've never read anything in a D&D rulebook that states or even implies that the 3d6 spread of ability scores is measuring the quantity of some property, of which the minimum possible amount is 3 units and the maximum 18. Gygax plots out a bell-curve shape in his DMG, which suggests what I've always assumed: that 3d6 establishes a ranking based around likelihoods (or frequency within the population: I think the game assumes that likelihoods and frequencies are the same thing, and if anything is at stake in that assumption as far as D&D is concerned I'm missing it at the moment).
In other words, all we can say in comparing 18 INT to 17 INT is that it is a greater amount of intelligence, and is found in only 1 in 216 people, as opposed to 3 in 216 for 17.
If you map a 3 on 3d6 to a 50 IQ and a 18 on 3d6 to a 150 IQ, you are saying that 150 IQ is six times smarter than 50 IQ because 18 is six times larger than 3. This is clearly impossible
In AD&D, 3 STR "maps onto" a carrying capacity of 115 lb. For 18 STR (ignoring %) that capacity is 225 lb. Should we say that the person with 18 STR is twice as strong as, six times a strong as, or ?? times as strong as the 3 STR character? I don't think the game answers, or has ever purported to anwer, this question. Ability score points establish position in a ranking, with associated capabilities in both mechanics and fiction, but don't establish the quantity of some determinable property that can then be put into a ratio with some other quantity of that same property.
3d6, being rational, DOES apply concrete meaning to the numbers. 18 is three times 3, period. But for intelligence, we'd never actually say that.
Do you mean "18 is three times
6, period"?
In any event, as I've said I don't think that the 3d6 roll applies the sort of concrete meaning that you suggest. It is just a device for establishing where one character stands in the ranking relative to others, and of allocating positions in those rankings on the basis of likelihoods/frequencies.
It's still an appeal to authority even if the person has relevant authority if the form of the argument is that they are correct because of their authority. You're correct that it's not automatically fallacious -- a bad argument isn't necessarily a wrong one and informal fallacies only speak to bad arguments (formal ones are the ones automatically wrong) -- but the general way to tell if a fallacy is in place is if the fallacy appears in place of an argument. "I'm a doctor, so you're wrong" is an appeal to authority, even if the argument is correct. . In that case, it's still a A2A, it's just not a fallacious one
When I was overseas recently, my daughter was diagnosed with and treated for malaria. A rapid malaria test was taken, and the result was negative. Nevertheless, the treating doctor said that she should be treated for malaria, on the basis that he had both training and experience that led him to believe that the rapid test is prone to delivering false negatives. (The reason for this is that it is an antigen test, and in the early stages of onset - especially for a child from a non-immune population - the number of antigens may be quite low.)
The argument presented by the doctor was, roughly, this:
I am a doctor experienced in diagnosing and treating malaria cases. Although the test has come back negative, I still think it is highly likely that your daughter has malaria and should be treated for it. I accepted the argument, my daughter was treated, and she recovered. (She was also treated with antibiotics in response to a further clinical diagnosis parallel to the malaria one - it therefore remains a medical mystery whether she had one or both conditions and hence whether it was the antibiotics, the anti-malarial drugs or both that cured her.)
There is no fallacy in the doctor's reasoning: he has expertise, and his opinion was grounded in that expertise. Being a rational person who wanted his seriously ill daughter to get better, I took his advice.
In pragmatic contradiction with the previous paragraph, and against my better judgment, I've had a look at the Wikipedia page on
argument from authority. It opens by saying that "The argument from authority . . . can be fallacious, such as when an authority is cited on a topic outside their area of expertise or when the authority cited is not a true expert.
Fallacious examples of using the appeal include any appeal to authority used in the context of deductive reasoning, when the cited authority is stating a contentious or controversial position, if they are speaking about issues unrelated to their expertise or if they are not a true expert at all."
The argument made by the treating doctor was not made in the context of deductive reasoning - it was about medical diagnosis, not logical or mathematical proof - nor was it a statement of a contentious position (though in such cases one might still do better to listen to the experts than to amateurs) and I had (and continue to have) no reason to doubt the doctor's expertise.
My remarks about the permissible usage of the word "irrational" likewise were not made in the context of deductive reasoning - questions of usage are empirical questions, not matters of logical or mathematical proof - nor was I stating a particularly contentious position (to the best of my knowledge there is no raging controversy around usage of
irrational). If [MENTION=23751]Maxperson[/MENTION] believes that, in fact, I do not have expertise in relation to usage of the term among academics with an interest in the matter, than that is his prerogative. On this one I'm fairly confident in my own familiarity, though. I've used the word "irrational" in various conversations with colleagues to describe non-akratic behaviour that is at odds with the reasons that govern the situation, and have generally not caused confusion or encountered resistance on account of such usage.
Wikipedia then goes on to discuss Locke, which is no surprise, because the classical empiricists have extremely strict standards for epistemic warrant, and testimony will often fail to meet those standards. (Russell has a good and accessible discussion of this in his
Problems of Philosophy - he characterises testimony as giving rise to
probable opinion rather than knowledge in the strict sense.) But in my experience ENworld doesn't operate with a standard for warrant at the level the classical empiricists demand.
Wikipedia then gives the general form of the argument from authority, and the conditions in which it is fallacious:
The argument from authority can take several forms. A legitimate argument from authority can take the general form:
X holds that A is true.
X is an authority on the subject.
The consensus of authorities agrees with X.
There is a presumption that A is true.
The argument is fallacious if one or more of the premises are false, or if it is claimed that the conclusion must be true on the basis of authority, rather than only probably true.
This is pretty uninteresting: it tells us nothing but that if authorities on a subject affirm something about a subject,
that generates a reason to believe X (or, what can be treated as much the same,
that counts as evidence that X is probably true); and that inferences of such a sort are not deductively valid. Both those things are obvious: its inherent in the definition of
epistemic authority that pronouncements by the authority are more probably true; and obviously there is no deductively valid inference from
A said that X to
X.
I think that's enough Wikipedia. The main thing that it tells us is what was already obvious: testimony, including expert opinion, can be a good source of information, but only if the person knows what s/he is talking about. I'm confident that, when it comes to the usage of "irrational", I know what I'm talking about. QED.
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