Reading Group--Caesar's Legion

[mmadsen]

I love the contrast between how the raw recruits reacted and how the hardened veterans took things into their own hands:

There were just under 200 experienced legionaries...on the other ship, men...with seventeen years' hard service under their belts. Rather than surrender, they forced the ship's master to run their vessel onto the shore, and in the morning landed. The Spanish legionaries fought their way through a Pompeian cavalry detachment sent to capture them, then marched three miles along the coast and joined Mark Antony.

How can you not think, "Rock on!"?

 

[Rashak Mani]

Moral of the Story: Don't surrender. Always fight ? Nice image of their fighting their way back.

Soldiers with 17 years of service !? If they started at a tender 18, they would be 35 year-olds fighting it out.

 

[mmadsen]

Moral of the Story: Don't surrender. Always fight?

Except that we have plenty of counter-examples where surrender paid off. I'm really surprised a Roman general would execute "enemy" Roman soldiers who surrendered like that.

 

[mmadsen]

Chapter X -- A Taste of Defeat (continued)

Caesar was now able to reunite with his faithful friend Mark Antony. Combining their legions, Caesar now had an army of twenty-six thousand men.

There's that Roman scale again. One of the two armies in a Roman civil war has 26,000 men.

But even if he'd had more troops to draw on back in Italy, he could have kissed them good-bye, because now Pompey's eldest son, Gnaeus, brought the Roman fleet normally based in Egypt ranging along the Adriatic coast in a devestating raid. At one coastal town after another, young Pompey captured or burned Antony's transports as they rode at anchor. Overnight, Caesar lost his capacity for resupply from Italy and was cut off in Albania.

Is Caesar about to get "A Taste of Defeat"?

 

[Maldur]

26000 men and more back in Italy.

Ceasars dependancy of fast maneuvering is obvious. Because the sea is contolled by the enemy he has only a small portion of his army where he needs them. Its a strange oversight to forget to form a navy in the mediteranian.

 

[mmadsen]

Its a strange oversight to forget to form a navy...

Good point. I assume it's difficult and expensive to build ships and train sailors. The Romans have an established process for recruiting soldiers. They'd need to throw together an ad hoc process for building a navy.

 

[mmadsen]

Chapter X -- A Taste of Defeat (continued)

Meanwhile, Caesar followed Pompey back up toward Durres, then tramped off through the hills to the east. Pompey let him go, thinking he was going in search of wheat. Then it dawned on him what Caesar was up to. Rapidly he broke camp and marched his army north along the coast.

You want to know what Caesar's up to, don't you?

Within a day, his worst fears were realized. By forced march, Caesar has used hill paths to work his way north of Pompey's position through the mountainous terrain. Marching up the road from Apollonia, Pompey came up on Caesar's army digging in along the coast south of Durres. Now, to reach his food and ammunition stored at Durres, Pompey would have to go through Caesar's army.

Great story of Caesar's cunning, and yet another example of how brilliant maneuvers are often about cutting off supply, and not necessarily about crushing the enemy in glorious combat.

 

[mmadsen]

Funny I noticed the difference with modern warfare....
Romans seems very worried about defense and minimizing casualties.

That's a difference? I can't imagine a military more concerned with minimizing casualties than the modern US military. After defeating Iraq with just dozens of allied casualties, we expect to win without getting hurt. This, of course, troubles our generals, but the American people expect to win wars without spilling American blood.

 

[mmadsen]

I find it particularly interesting to see the essential concepts of modern warfare present right there in Caesar's headquarters!

As Rashak Mani points out, we should see similarities and differences. In each war, the generals have to learn how to use all that "timeless" military wisdom this time, with this generation's technology.

Obviously, legions of riflemen three lines deep closing ranks to charge the enemy doesn't necessarily make sense.

"Blitzkrieg"--The use of combined operations; cavalry, infantry, support troops, even siege weapons and artillery, all working together to keep moving, and keep destroying the enemy.

But any mixed force meets those criteria for Blitzkrieg. Many of Caesar's operations did rely on "maneuver warfare", but many others involved prolonged sieges -- not very blitz. In fact, we could compare many of his operations to WWI trench warfare, the opposite of Blitzkrieg.

 

[Rashak Mani]

I wouldnt exactly compare with WWI which is hard to compare to anything outside the modern era... but the emphasis on mobility isnt in the way we see it today.

Imagine modern Marines having to dig a fort every day ? The Romans certainly seem to value the use of transport ships in some strategms... but overall they seem very worried, against barbarians at least, about fortifications and defensive posture.

Could I dare say Strategic Mobility was their concern ?