Here is the core of the opinion (from the Syllabus):
Held: Because the claims are drawn to a patent-ineligible abstract idea, they are not patent eligible under §101. Pp. 5-17.
(a)
The Court has long held that §101, which defines the subject matter eligible for patent protection, contains an implicit exception for '[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas.' -- Association for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U. S. ___, ___. In applying the §101 exception, this Court must distinguishpatents that claim the buildin[g] block’ -- of human ingenuity, which are ineligible for patent protection, from those that integrate Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 566 U. S. ___, ___, thereby transform[ing]-- them into a patent-eligible invention, id., at ___. Pp. 5-6.
(b)
Using this framework, the Court must first determine whether the claims at issue are directed to a patent-ineligible concept. 566
U.S., at ___. If so, the Court then asks whether the claim’s elements, considered both individually and as an ordered combination,-- “transform the nature of the claim-- into a patent-eligible application. Id., at ___. Pp. 7-17.
(1)
The claims at issue are directed to a patent-ineligible concept: the abstract idea of intermediated settlement. Under the longstanding rule that [a]n idea of itself is not patentable,’ --
[Case references omitted]
Thus, intermediated settlement, like hedging, is an abstract idea-- beyond §101’s scope. Pp. 7-10.
(2)
Turning to the second step of Mayo’s framework: The method claims, which merely require generic computer implementation, fail to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention. Pp. 10-16.
(i)
Simply appending conventional steps, specified at a high level of generality,-- to a method already well known in the art-- is not enough-- to supply the inventive concept’ -- needed to make this transformation. Mayo, supra, at ___, ___. The introduction of a computer into the claims does not alter the analysis. Neither stating an abstract idea while adding the words apply it,’ -- Mayo, supra, at ___, nor limiting the use of an abstract idea to a particular technological environment,’ -- Bilski, supra, at 610-611, is enough for patent eligibility. Stating an abstract idea while adding the words apply it witha computer-- simply combines those two steps, with the same deficientresult. Wholly generic computer implementation is not generally the sort of additional featur[e] that provides any practical assurance that the process is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolizethe [abstract idea] itself. Mayo, supra, at ___. Pp. 11-14.
(ii)
Here, the representative method claim does no more than simply instruct the practitioner to implement the abstract idea of intermediated settlement on a generic computer. Taking the claim elements separately, the function performed by the computer at each step creating and maintaining shadow accounts, obtaining data,adjusting account balances, and issuing automated instructions is [p]urely conventional. ’ Mayo, 566 U. S., at ___. Considered as an ordered combination, these computer components ad[d] nothing . . . that is not already present when the steps are considered separately. Id., at ___. Viewed as a whole, these method claims simply recitethe concept of intermediated settlement as performed by a generic computer. They do not, for example, purport to improve the functioning of the computer itself or effect an improvement in any other technology or technical field. An instruction to apply the abstract idea ofintermediated settlement using some unspecified, generic computer is not enough to transform the abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention. Id., at ___. Pp. 14-16.
(3)
Because petitioner’s system and media claims add nothing of substance to the underlying abstract idea, they too are patent ineligible under §101.
Thx!
TomB
