Do castles make sense in a world of dragons & spells?

[Ariosto]

Even 30 level 0 men-at-arms are a severe threat to a lone M-U 5.

Not if the mage has protection from normal missiles. In the absence of that, four hits should suffice on average. In AD&D 1st ed., let us say:

base 50% vs. AC 10
light crossbow +15% vs. AC 10, 15" (fireball range) is -25% for long range = 40%
heavy crossbow +20% vs AC 10, -10% for medium range = 60%
average is back to 50%
heavy crossbow, but m-u is detected while invisible -20% = 40% (light = 20%)

So, a volley from 10 or 20 is on average deadly (14 points of damage vs. 12.5 hit points) to the invisible mage.

See Dungeon Masters Guide pp. 103-104 regarding "hiring non-player characters to cast spells or use devices". Note that risk is mentioned as likely to increase fees fivefold or more, if not outright refused.

A basic assumption of that game -- expressed in the sections on henchmen and hirelings as well -- is that characters possessing class levels and capable of advancement due to experience points are extraordinary, independent and ambitious.

In other words, when 6th-level 'magicians' and 'myrmidons' take the field, it is not as mere "rank and file". Such figures are at the least allies of the principals, with their own interests in mind.

 

[Ariosto]

That's the whole point of fortifications: to tripwire a superior invading force, until reinforcements can be brought up.

Just don't assume that the Ardennes is "impassable"!

 

[Rykion]

Military tactics are often driven by economics. An armored mounted knight makes sense only if the cost of training, equiping and maintaing the knight in the field is less than the cost of training, equiping and maintaining an equivalent force with a different composition. If an armored knight is easily countered by a much less expensive unit, say peasant with a crossbow, then force composition will necessarily shift toward a larger force composed of less expensive units.

I agree with most of your points, but knights existed in the numbers they did because of politics and social conditions over economics or battlefield effectiveness. Medieval nobles spent their nations' resources equipping themselves because they had the power to, and wanted to have the best gear. Look at museums to see ornate suits of armor that cost a fortune and were all about bling over mere functionality. Most nobles probably didn't really consider the fact it would save money and be more effective to train a professional army of peasants. Even if they did, they would likely fear a trained and armed army of peasants might find it easy to usurp political power.

Heavy cavalry certainly had its place, but it wouldn't have been nearly as prevalent in an army primarily based on economics, military tactics, and battlefield effectiveness.

 

[Celebrim]

I agree with most of your points, but knights existed in the numbers they did because of politics and social conditions over economics or battlefield effectiveness. Medieval nobles spent their nations' resources equipping themselves because they had the power to, and wanted to have the best gear.

Maybe, but I think you need to step backwards from that argument for a second and ask how the society reached that point. If heavy cavalry was ineffective on the battlefield, then the politics and social conditions wouldn't have evolved to that point. There is some interplay, I agree, and I've simplified things to suggest that it is a simple matter of economics creating the military tactics, politics, and social conditions, but I think that reversing that and saying that its tactics, politics, and social conditions that create the military economics is no better and very likely a worse description. Heavy cavalry was a legitimate technological response to the military situation Western Europe (and to a lesser extent Eastern Europe) found itself in after the collapse of the Roman Empire. Heavy cavalry created the feudal situation at least as much, and in my opinion probably much more than the feudal situation created heavy cavalry. Battles like Crecy and Agincourt indicate that those military and political models did outlive their usefulness, but that's true of pretty much every military model in history. Given the wealth to do so, everyone always tries to 'fight the last war'.

Look at museums to see ornate suits of armor that cost a fortune and were all about bling over mere functionality.

Yes, but by the time that such ornate armor was being produced, the role heavy cavalry had already shrunk. In fact, by the time that you see fully articulated field plate, you are also seeing masses of discplined heavy infantry (pikes and muskets) being the primary mass of the army. And even then, the 'bling' you disdain served a part maybe even the most important part of the military function of the armor. Late period heavy plate served the role of maintaining command and control by preserving the life of the commander while he was in direct control of the engagement. Only while wearing battle plate and being mounted on a horse, could the field commander successfully fulfill a leader function and direct the battle. The 'bling', while to a large extent serving a primarily political and personal function, also served the legitimate military function of visually distinguishing the commander as the commander. Even today, we still have official 'bling' designed to serve in this capacity.

Heavy cavalry certainly had its place, but it wouldn't have been nearly as prevalent in an army primarily based on economics, military tactics, and battlefield effectiveness.

Given the constraints of the middle ages - point defense versus raiding parties, low population density, poor centralized planning, little preexisting infrastructure (at least for Northern Europe) - I'm not sure that is the case. I think it was an effective response to a military situation where the primary threats were essentially bandits (including other knights, but certainly including Vikings), and were there were few or no foes fielding displined heavy infantry. The only foe that it dealt with poorly was the Monguls, and there the problem wasn't with its effectiveness in close combat (where it tended to be quite effective when it could achieve it), but with the fact that no sufficient means of command and control had been developed owing to the general success of the mass charge. The Mongols beat the Europeans handily owing primarily to superior command and control., not to the inherent ineffectiveness of heavy cavalry (which was still kicking butt at least as late as the Seige of Vienna in 1683).

 

[Rykion]

Maybe, but I think you need to step backwards from that argument for a second and ask how the society reached that point. If heavy cavalry was ineffective on the battlefield, then the politics and social conditions wouldn't have evolved to that point. There is some interplay, I agree, and I've simplified things to suggest that it is a simple matter of economics creating the military tactics, politics, and social conditions, but I think that reversing that and saying that its tactics, politics, and social conditions that create the military economics is no better and very likely a worse description. Heavy cavalry was a legitimate technological response to the military situation Western Europe (and to a lesser extent Eastern Europe) found itself in after the collapse of the Roman Empire. Heavy cavalry created the feudal situation at least as much, and in my opinion probably much more than the feudal situation created heavy cavalry. Battles like Crecy and Agincourt indicate that those military and political models did outlive their usefulness, but that's true of pretty much every military model in history. Given the wealth to do so, everyone always tries to 'fight the last war'.

I would say economics, social conditions, tactics, and politics all play important parts in what military units and defenses are used. Heavy cavalry filled the void left by the professional armies after the fall of the Roman Empire, but it existed largely because those in power maintained the absence of other forms of professional troops. There was a large economic factor in this, but it was the fact that resources were concentrated in the hands of a relative few who weren't very interested in sharing their wealth or power. The harsh conditions of serfdom kept the vast majority of people's time devoted to subsistence farming and little else. This in turn kept the noble dominated military status quo. The Hundred Years War included a lot of weapon inovations, but it also included in many ways the beginning of the rebirth of professional troops other than cavalry.

Yes, but by the time that such ornate armor was being produced, the role heavy cavalry had already shrunk. In fact, by the time that you see fully articulated field plate, you are also seeing masses of discplined heavy infantry (pikes and muskets) being the primary mass of the army. And even then, the 'bling' you disdain served a part maybe even the most important part of the military function of the armor. Late period heavy plate served the role of maintaining command and control by preserving the life of the commander while he was in direct control of the engagement. Only while wearing battle plate and being mounted on a horse, could the field commander successfully fulfill a leader function and direct the battle. The 'bling', while to a large extent serving a primarily political and personal function, also served the legitimate military function of visually distinguishing the commander as the commander. Even today, we still have official 'bling' designed to serve in this capacity.

Flags and heraldry served the same purpose at a fraction of the cost of the bling. Fully articulated plate is fine, but it doesn't need enough gold and fine work to buy a small town, or equip and train a dozen soldiers.

Given the constraints of the middle ages - point defense versus raiding parties, low population density, poor centralized planning, little preexisting infrastructure (at least for Northern Europe) - I'm not sure that is the case. I think it was an effective response to a military situation where the primary threats were essentially bandits (including other knights, but certainly including Vikings), and were there were few or no foes fielding displined heavy infantry. The only foe that it dealt with poorly was the Monguls, and there the problem wasn't with its effectiveness in close combat (where it tended to be quite effective when it could achieve it), but with the fact that no sufficient means of command and control had been developed owing to the general success of the mass charge. The Mongols beat the Europeans handily owing primarily to superior command and control., not to the inherent ineffectiveness of heavy cavalry (which was still kicking butt at least as late as the Seige of Vienna in 1683).

The Vikings seemed to do pretty well for themselves. By the time knights showed up to help the locals the Vikings were usually on their boats and on their way to the next raid. A town would have been much better off with a well trained and at least somewhat equipped militia. As I said, heavy cavalry has a place in an army, but it wasn't the dominate unit of Europe in the Middle Ages because it was cost effective.

 

[Celebrim]

I would say economics, social conditions, tactics, and politics all play important parts in what military units and defenses are used. Heavy cavalry filled the void left by the professional armies after the fall of the Roman Empire, but it existed largely because those in power maintained the absence of other forms of professional troops. There was a large economic factor in this, but it was the fact that resources were concentrated in the hands of a relative few who weren't very interested in sharing their wealth or power. The harsh conditions of serfdom kept the vast majority of people's time devoted to subsistence farming and little else. This in turn kept the noble dominated military status quo. The Hundred Years War included a lot of weapon inovations, but it also included in many ways the beginning of the rebirth of professional troops other than cavalry.

I feel you have pretty much everything backwards. For example, the fact that the majority of people's time was devoted to subsistence farming maintained the harsh conditions of serfdom. As crop yields increased due to improved agricultural technology (deeper plowing, crop rotation, fallow fields, manure fertilization, more diverse crops, grain fed horses supplanting oxen as the primary till animals, improvements to yoke technology, watermills, etc.), peasants were able leverage this increased economic success into increasing political freedom, and in turn increased crop surpluses allowed nobles to began hiring large mercenary forces without fear of depleting the essential manpower needed for agricultural production. Without the technical means of making Northern Europe support large populations, there was no way to make large professional armies cost effective.

And the heavy cavalry existed because in the wake of the collapse of Rome, it was the most effective military force in the area. The heavy cavalry created the Counts and Dukes and Barons. The Counts and Dukes didn't become powerful in the absence of heavy cavalry, and then create it afterwards to maintain that power. Military success led naturally to political power. It was those tribes which were able to field heavy cavalry which conquered their neighbors and established hegemony over the region. That led to the feudal heirarchy. The feudal heirachy did not lead to heavy cavalry. Collapse of the power of professional heavy cavalry because of technological changes in turn led to the nation state, because the aristocratic heavy cavalry could no lorger demand the same political authority. Had the castle and heavy cavalry not been eclipsed technologically, they likely wouldn't have been eclipsed politically and socially either and the outcome of the Hundred Years war would have been decidedly in favor of the continuance of the fuedal system rather than against it.

The Vikings seemed to do pretty well for themselves. By the time knights showed up to help the locals the Vikings were usually on their boats and on their way to the next raid. A town would have been much better off with a well trained and at least somewhat equipped militia.

And again, by the time that population density increased in Northern Europe to the point that it had real urbanization, not only did it have militias but the Vikings were no longer the threat that they once were. When the point is protecting a loosely collected village of 80-200 subsistance farmers from a raid by 20-30 lightly armed and armored individuals, its not at all clear to me that a handful of locally maintained armored knights converging on the point of attack isn't the cost effective solution.

As I said, heavy cavalry has a place in an army, but it wasn't the dominate unit of Europe in the Middle Ages because it was cost effective.

I still disagree.

However, not only are we now well off topic, but we are trending into a purely political discussion.

 

[S'mon]

Not if the mage has protection from normal missiles. In the absence of that, four hits should suffice on average. In AD&D 1st ed., let us say:

I was thinking of 30 men in a fortress, with the M-U attempting to breach it and kill them. A mid-level AD&D Fighter could kill them easily, and an M-U could defeat them easily in open terrain, but M-Us are/were very vulnerable in close quarters.

 

[S'mon]

The Vikings seemed to do pretty well for themselves. By the time knights showed up to help the locals the Vikings were usually on their boats and on their way to the next raid. A town would have been much better off with a well trained and at least somewhat equipped militia.

During the high period of the Vikings there weren't much in the way of towns in most of northern Europe, and settlements certainly did have local militia - but they were not effective vs Viking warriors. To stop them stealing your pigs - first you had to outnumber the Vikings at least 5:1, then you had to corner them, and then they'd kill or maim several of you for every one of them you killed. It usually wasn't worth it - the cost was too high to kill raiders who'd be gone soon anyway.

Mobile heavy cavalry by contrast could expect to engage and defeat Viking infantry on their own terms, if they could catch them in time.

 

[DreadPirateMurphy]

There has been a lot of conversation about the impact of magic on offensive and defensive tactics as related to fortification. I think the real question is the impact on strategy.

How do you take a fortification (be it a pallisade, castle, bunker, or underground lair)? Preference would be 1) treachery, 2) isolate and starve them out, and finally 3) frontal assault. Let us tackle these in reverse order.

Frontal assaults against prepared fortifications are almost always costly and risky affairs. Let us assume that there are counters for anything that is not a new, game-changing magic (like, say, machine guns, submarines, or rifled barrels were briefly in the real world). The only time magic would be overwhelming is if it was unexpected. If you can't defend against a known attack, then why built a fortress at all?

Where magic really comes into play, though, is that it would seem to neutralize isolating and starving a garrison. If you can magically create or teleport supplies, then you're basically immune to starvation. Common disease is also not a problem. Heck, with a magical portal, you can even regularly rotate out defensive troops to keep your garrison fresh and ready! Obviously, reinforcing the garrison is also a possibility.

This makes treachery by far the most attractive way to take a fortification. This suggests that magic that ensures loyalty will be very powerful -- things like Zones of Truth or a Mark of Justice triggered by treacherous acts. Something like the Oath Rod from the Wheel of Time series by Jordan would be seen as almost a necessity.

 

[I'm A Banana]

Do castles make sense in a world of dragons & spells?

As much sense as the dragons & spells make in the first place, I guess.