ENnies discussion thread

Conaill said:
The standard IRV as you are proposing treats abstentions as bottom-of-the-barrel votes! Yes, it is as bad as that.

Yes, but "bottom of the barrel" votes are not as bad as you make them out to be. In an IRV system, this is not even considered until all your previous preferences have been eliminated. If none of the candidates you know and like are going to win, you probably don't have much more interest in the contest anyway.

And, as I noted, you don't have to make them bottom of the barrel if you don't want to. IRV gives the voter more options as to how they wish to express their desires.

Somewhat along the lines of what we were trying to achieve by looking at the mean score last year (whereas standard IRV looks at the sum of the first-choice votes each round).

If I recall correctly, trying to compare last year's mean with an IRV sum is apples and oranges. In a system that uses the value of the ranking, taking a mean makes sense. IRV ranking are only for what order to count your "yes" votes - each ballot at any time has a value of 1, and taking a mean would make no sense.

Of course, Approval Voting doesn't actually use ranking, so claiming that it "ranks" the unknowns together with all the good ones or all the bad ones is a little biased.

Not at all. Your AV does use a ranking system, but there are only two ranks instead of five or ten. And in your AV, each and every item must be ranked. In essence, each item must br ranked as "good" or "bad".

Yes, ranked voting captures more information, but IRV actually winds up throwing most of that information away anyway, since in any round it only takes the 1st-choice votes into account.

Unless you've gotten into a tie instance, this is mostly true. But only mostly. As you yourself have noted, exactly which you put first or second can make a differece - or else the issue you have with "compromise" candidates would not exist.

I'm not sure why you keep bringing up the compromise candidates. As fusangite has noted, if it isn't your first choice, you've no reason to vote at all for a compromise candidate in your AV system.

Which is why compromise candidates with few 1st choice votes are often dropped early on. Plus it is still open to strategic voting, meaning that it may be in your best interest to rank your favorite candidate lower than a more widely popular one.

That kind of strategy requires extensive knowledge of how the the voting is going to go, and an assumption that the other voters are not also trying to finesse the system. In IRV, attempting to finesse is, as a practical matter, rather likely to get your preferred candidate eliminated.

As for bias against poorly-known products: AV has a bias against poorly known products - they don't get voted for often, just like in IRV. Are you saying that we should use a voting process in which the number of votes you get doesn't count much?

In the Ennies, they've already gotten a huge leg up merely by getting past the judges. How much more help do you think they ought to have? Do we want it so a candidate that only one person knows is as likely to win as a top-selling product? That doesn't sound right at all.

- Harder to implement, allows the voter to state his preferences in more detailed way, optimal voting strategy may be different from your actual preference ranking, biased against poorly known candidates: standard IRV

I've been thinking about this "harder to implement" thing. It is true with a physical voting system that IRV is more difficult to implement, as the ballots have to be physically handled multiple times. But this is all-electronic voting, and while it takes time to explain the system, the algorithm for counting ballots is actually pretty darned simple.

The only extra diffiiculty that IRV really poses is this - you must keep an electronic copy of each ballot until voting is complete. AV allows you to toss out the ballots and keep a running tally. But the number of ballots in the Ennies is not high, and the amount of information per ballot is small, so I don't think there'd be major storage issues.

[Edit: I say "your AV" frequently here. That's simply to make it clear which AV system I'm talking about - the one Conaill specifically described - as opposed to any other schemes that might fall under the same general category.]
 
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Umbran,

It's a pleasure to finally be on your side in one of these intense ENWorld debates. It's nice to see your considerable intellect and knowledge employed to support rather than dismantle the position I'm advocating.
 

As a Discrete Math/Logic nerd, I am enjoying this thread greatly. Good stuff, and applicable to other topics as well. I've always been interested in alternate voting schemes, so I like seeing some interactive discussion on the topic. Cool topic, and thanks to Conaill, Umbran, fusangite, omokage, and anybody else who's name I missed. I like seeing some intelligent debate without things getting too heated.
 

I think we may be a little hypersensitive to the issue of rivalries. It's not like we have Gallup polls and as heated as some gaming debates get, it doesn't seem like bitter hatred between contenders is as passionate as it is in politics.
 

Umbran said:
I've been thinking about this "harder to implement" thing. It is true with a physical voting system that IRV is more difficult to implement, as the ballots have to be physically handled multiple times. But this is all-electronic voting, and while it takes time to explain the system, the algorithm for counting ballots is actually pretty darned simple.

The only extra diffiiculty that IRV really poses is this - you must keep an electronic copy of each ballot until voting is complete. AV allows you to toss out the ballots and keep a running tally. But the number of ballots in the Ennies is not high, and the amount of information per ballot is small, so I don't think there'd be major storage issues.

Actually, this would be very easy to setup. a couple of tables in a database, and a few queries to pull the needed information. I am not expert in SQL (just have a basic understanding of it), but even I can see how to set it up.

Round 1 - do a query pulling the first choice for each product in each category.
Round 2 - do a query which pulls the first choice votes for each product and totals them, except for poducts that are dropped. The second part of the query goes to them and pulling the second item from the row and adds it to the proper tallies..

Continue on until winner is decided...

Yes, it is actually a slight bit more complicated than that, but you get the general idea. Anybody who is decently versed in writing SQL can easily come up with the proper queries to get the information.

Combine this with some javascript do run comparisons, and to call further queries if there is a tie, and it could be set up so all that has to be done is to check an admin page to get the winners.
 

I have some real-world deadlines coming up, so let me try and be brief (heh! :))

1) Definition of Approval Voting: I'm using the term the way i have seen it used in the vast majority of online sources on electoral systems (have a look at Google... I have yet to find any *other* definition), several textbooks, and every mathematician with formal training in voting theory I've personally talked to.

2) I have no idea where fusangite gets the impression that Approval Voting is only espoused by a small sect of political advocates. It's been a widely used idea that has been around for over 30 years now. Sure, there are some grousp that are trying to get it adopted. The same can be said of the "Center for Voting and Democracy" fusangite refers to - which is an advocacy group for IRV run by independent presidential candidate John B. Anderson.

3) IRV suffers from some well-known theoretical flaws, such as:
- non-monotonicity: voting for your favorite can actually make him lose
- IRV may not pick the Condorcet winner (i.e. one that would win against every other candiate in one-on-on race)
see e.g. exercise 3 and 4 on this page (IRV is called "Plurality with Elimination" in this one)

4) IRV as described is severely biased against "don't know" votes, something I believe we were trying to avoid

5) Just a little quote from the Approval Voting Home Page:
The most solidly researched comparison that I've seen, which includes computer simulations based on models of voting behavior, is Making Multicandidate Elections More Democratic, by Samuel Merrill, Princeton University Press, 1988. It concludes that the most reliable systems for meeting the "Condorcet" and "maximum social utility" criteria are approval voting and the Instant Runoff Vote (also know as Preferential Voting) and traditional runoff methods. Among these three, approval voting ranks slightly higher and is much easier to implement. Other methods, such as the Borda Count and those based on the Condorcet tally itself, tend in practice to be vulnerable to "strategic voting". I.e., voters have incentive to vote insincerely (e.g. punish their favorite's chief rival with a last-place vote), and the resulting outcome matches the Condorcet criteria less than methods which don't reward voters for insincere votes.
 
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Here's another nice article on various voting methods, analyzing them with respect to a number of strict criteria (including a number that measure strategic voting):

Ossipoff's Standards & Criteria for Evaluating & Comparing Multi-Alternative Single-Winner Social Choice Methods

Check the Strategy Criteria page for the abberviations used below. For example, "FBC" stands for the "Favorite-Betrayal Criterion": By voting a less-liked candidate over his/her favorite, a voter should never gain an outcome that he/she likes better. (Approval Voting is the only system that meets this criterion.)
Approval:
The criteria in the Traditional Criteria article, except for Monotonicity, are intended only to apply to rank-methods. If they were applied to Approval, it would pass them.

Approval passes Monotonicity, and is the only method that meets FBC & SARC. It meets WDSC & UUCC.

IRV:
IRV fails all of the criteria listed in the Strategy Criteria article. In other words, it fails all of the criteria that I consider important, the ones that relate to the lesser-of-2-evils problem, and all but the weakest that relate meaningfully to majority rule. Specifically, it fails FBC, SARC, WDSC, SDSC, SrDSC, SFC, GSFC, BC, & UUCC.

Among the criteria defined in the Traditional Criteria article, IRV fails the Smith Criterion & the Condorcet Criterion, and Monotonicity. It meets Majority (which is met by everything but Borda), Condorcet Loser, Majority Loser, & Mutual Majority.
<argh! ... Must ... get .... back ... to ... work ...>
 
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Conaill said:
2) I have no idea where fusangite gets the impression that Approval Voting is only espoused by a small sect of political advocates. It's been a widely used idea that has been around for over 30 years now.
How many political jurisdictions in the world use approval voting? Compare that to the number that use proportional representation or majoritarian systems.
The same can be said of the "Center for Voting and Democracy" fusangite refers to - which is an advocacy group for IRV run by independent presidential candidate John B. Anderson.
Actually, it's an advocacy group for proportional representation. It just thinks that in instances where a single office is being filled, majoritarian systems are superior to plurality systems. Furthermore, I have no problem admitting that like every other voting system, people who support it in the political sphere are often people who believe they will benefit from its implementation.
3) IRV suffers from some well-known theoretical flaws, such as: - non-monotonicity: voting for your favorite can actually make him lose
Explain how please.
- IRV may not pick the Condorcet winner (i.e. one that would win against every other candiate in one-on-on race)
Your system only produces Condorcet victors when people indicate their preferences honestly without voting strategically. This isn't a psych experiment or a telephone opinion poll; people will vote strategically. I would be willing to bet that when people using your system vote strategically, approval voting is less likely to produce a Condorcet victor than majoritarian systems are. So while I acknowledge that under ideal conditions your system is more likely to produce a Condorcet victor, this is not really relevant in a contest wherein people will not be voting under those conditions.
(IRV is called "Plurality with Elimination" in this one)
This is simply not an accurate description.
4) IRV as described is severely biased against "don't know" votes, something I believe we were trying to avoid
You have stated this several times but you have yet to explain why. You also need to answer Umbran's question as to why a product about which the majority of voters know nothing should be allowed to beat a product the majority of voters know and use.
 

For those who like Apples to Apples comparisons.

Example 1.
Approval Voting method recommended by Connail

Book A) All Crunch, No Fluff (Y or N)
Book B) Humorous Content (Y or N)
Book C) Balanced Content (Y or N)
Book D) Obscure Title (Y or N)
Book E) All Fluff, No Crunch (Y or N)

You can vote for more than one


Each author votes only for themselves. (Stratigic voters)
Crunch fan votes for A & C
Fluff fan votes for E & C
“Reasonable & Prudent” Fan votes for A, B, C & E
(Never heard of “D”)
“The Fan who has read EVERYTHING” votes for B & D
(Likes to vote for the underdog)

A got 3 votes
B got 3 votes
C got 4 votes: Winner
D got 2 votes
E got 3 votes

In this case the “moderate” beat the “extremes” and the “Obscure Title” never had a chance



Example 2.
Instant Runoff Voting method recommended by Fusangite

Book A) All Crunch, No Fluff
Book B) Humorous Content
Book C) Balanced Content
Book D) Obscure Title
Book E) All Fluff, No Crunch

Please Rank between 1 (Best) and 5 (Worst)

(Strategic voters)
Author of A ranks it: 1A, 2D, 3B
Author of B ranks it: 1B, 2D, 3C
Author of C ranks it: 1C, 2D, 3B
Author of D ranks it: 1D, 2B, 3C
Author of E ranks it: 1E, 2D, 3B

(Regular voters)
Crunch fan ranks it: 1A, 2C, 3B, 4D, 5E
Fluff fan ranks it: 1E, 2C, 3B, 4D, 5A
“Reasonable & Prudent” Fan ranks it: 1C, 2B, 3A, 4E, 5D
(Never heard of “D”)
“The Fan who has read EVERYTHING” ranks it: 1D, 2B, 3E, 4A, 5C
(Likes to vote for the underdog)
Random Fan ranks it: 1E, 2C, 3B, 4A, 5D
(rolled a D10 divided by 2, 5 times)

First round: A2 votes, B1 vote, C2 votes, D2 votes, E3 votes
Second round: A2 votes, C2 votes, D3 votes, E3 votes
Third round: D6 votes, E4 votes

This time the “Obscure Title” beat the “extremes” because it was seen as less of a threat, and the "moderate" was knocked out in round 2.


These examples assume a “balanced” voting pool where the “extremes” cancel each other out. If you have twice as many “Crunch Fans” as “Fluff Fans” then things would come out differently.
 
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Dextra said:
Okay stats/votes guys, here's some more questions for you-

The two methods you've been discussing seem to be geared for choosing a single winner.
How do they compare for picking a first and second place?

Michael- can either be implemented using our current voting system? Could you program one of those methods? Or would we have to tally votes by hand?

If they can dream it up, I can program it.
 

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