My understanding from the lawyers are that property rights are quite a bit different. Indeed there are many specific laws around property that don’t apply to other circumstances. Eviction laws are just one such example. One other important thing I note in your hypothetical situation is that there is extremely minimal if any harm occurring to the licensees or sublicensees, but that probably matters less to whether it's revokable and more around whether the licenser can incur damages from the revocation.
I teach property law. I'm fairly familiar with the principles at play in my example.
Consider the following structure of OGL v 1.0/1.0a licences: WotC licenses the SRD to X; X produces a work under terms of that licence; Y uses the OGC in X's work to produce their own work under the same licence terms.
As I said in the post you are quoting, and in my reply to
@S'mon not too far upthread, I find it basically inconceivable that there could be a scenario in which WotC has a unilateral right of revocation against X, and yet not against Y. Or to put it another way, I utterly fail to see how X could be liable to revocation at will,
and yet have a power to sub-license Y which makes Y immune from WotC's power of revocation.
Do you have an argument that my intuition here is wrong?
My layman's understanding of U.S. law on this subject is
1. If a license specifies the grounds on which it can be terminated/revoked, then once accepted it normally cannot be terminated/revoked on any other grounds.
2. If a license specifies a duration, then it's normally not terminatable/revocable to those that have accepted it.
3. The licenser can himself can withdraw the offer of the license at any time.
4. However, if he has explicitly licensed out the ability to sublicense offers then he cannot withdraw that ability at anytime as going so would break the license agreement he has with his direct licensee.
You are approaching contract interpretation as if the words of the contract can be analysed in an algorithmic fashion. That is not how common law contractual interpretation works.
@S'mon quoted a salient case upthread, which made the point that the meaning of the words has to be interpreted in light of the overall context. I made a post upthread (#594) which elaborates a bit on this point.
Section 13 is labeled Termination. Thus, it is expressly concerned with all forms of termination.
Where does it say it is expressly concerned with all forms of termination? It doesn't. You're drawing an implication.
Here's a sufficient demonstration of the point: I could grant a gratuitous licence to you to copy and distribute my works in which I hold the copyright, stating as a condition that you must attributed them to me when you do so. And I could include as a term of the licence, under the heading "Termination", that the licence is terminated automatically if you fail to comply with the attribution requirement. But that licence terms would not deal with all forms of termination, because in the scenario I've just described I would enjoy the power to revoke the licence at will (it being a gratuitous licence).
The OGL v 1.0/1.0a is not a gratuitous licence. It is a licence granted by way of contract. That means it has to be interpreted as a contract. Which can't be done in the mechanical fashion you are suggesting.
It just so happens to be that a breach is the only available means of termination within this license.
This is an implication that you are drawing. Nowhere does the OGL v 1.0/1.0a expressly state that breach is the only means of termination. My post #594 says more about this.
Doesn't have to. If I make a contract that I'll give you 100 dollars in exchange for never speaking to me again, but am silent on whether I'll also give you my dog, that doesn't mean you have an argument in the contract that you also should have my dog.
This is a terrible argument. And runs directly against your point. What the OGL v 1.0a is silent on is
whether or not section 13 is an exhaustive statement of the possible bases for termination. So on its face, your attempt to argue that section 13
is exhaustive is no better than someone's attempt to argue that your never speaking contract is also a promise to convey title to your dog.
The actual argument that there is no other basis for termination rests on detailed consideration of the terms of the contract and whether they support an implication that section 13 is exclusive, together with general principles of contract and licensing law that both determine when one party may have the right to bring this sort of contract to an end, and that will assist in the construction of this particular contract.