Is there anything really wrong with the idea of an evil Paladin?

[Geoff Watson]

Amen brother!

Ashram, from Records of Lodoss War exemplifies what it means to be a LE Paladin. He champions that might makes right, and that the powerful should rule all with an iron fist. Honorable too, a good bad-guy as some NPC villains are described in DM advice columns.

Ashram may be a good example of a LE villian, but he is no Anti-Paladin. He's a Fighter.
What divine powers does he have? What spells did he cast? etc...

Geoff.

 

[S'mon]

I agree that selfishness or overwhelming self-interest is an unsuitable trait for a 'champion' archetype, whatever their alignment.

IMC, Anti-Paladins are Chaotic-Evil Champions of Chaos, they somewhat resemble the protagonists Nemesis the Warlock & Deadlock the ABC Warrior from the 2000AD comics stories.
They serve the King of Demons, and abstract Chaos in a wider sense, finding fulfillment through inflicting maximum Chaos and suffering upon their Lawful opponents.

They do not embody pure selfishness - Neutral Evil is the alignment of pure selfishness.

Nor are they honorable black knights - Lawful Evil is suitable for that archetype. Having said that, LE types are a lot more likely to surrender, CE to fight to the death.

BTW I'd think that Darth Vader is as as much a champion of a cause as Luke Skywalker, you could model a lawful-evil paladin on Vader.

 

[Wayside]

For that matter, I don't think that morality has any authority if stripped of its religious sanction myself.

That's a good point. By the same token, do morals have any authority if their religious sanction is in doubt? In a fantasy world, where gods are merely superterrestrial men, more or less, and not gods in any metaphysical sense, can there be an absolute morality that isn't, as you say later, Kantian--that is, a morality that isn't derived purely from logic (though in Kant's case by a man desperately wanting to vindicate his Christian leaning)?

I'm not convinced that your example demonstrates what you want it to demonstrate. If Tertullian, a religious man has standards of good and evil and Diogenes, who is not religious, acts only according to what logic dictates, it doesn't make logic evil if Diogenes acts wickedly.

Well, essentially I would think that it does. If Diogenes acts wickedly proceeding by logic, then according to Tertullian's religion logic would be wrong; but logic cannot be wrong, there can only be wrong logic. Abstracted away from action, there was a time when science and ligic were, in a way, viewed as evil. The image of Galileo muttering "Eppur si muove" as he walks away from the Inquisition, having just been forced to renounce his theory, comes to mind.

Part of the problem of the example is that logic doesn't really dictate anything without premises. Diogenes doesn't know whether it's logical to act like a good Roman and worship the emperor or whether it's logical to risk death by refusing to do so unless he first decides a few things:
1. Is this life all there is?
2. How valuable is this life?
3. Is there anything wrong with worshipping the emperor?
So, Diogenes may act according to the dictates of logic by worshipping the emperor. Tertullian may think it evil but that doesn't mean he devalues logic. It means that Tertullian and Diogenes may disagree on premise 1, 2 or 3. (Probably 1 and 3).

Attemps at answering all of these questions can be made with logic. The Epicureans did it, the Stoics did it, the Cynics (like Diogenes) did it; today Bernard Williams and Richard Wollheim do it. It's a part of philosophizing. The flaw comes in that none of these people can take every fact into account, and also there is the problem of epistemology. Yes, you have to start from some assumption, even using logic, but this is true of every intellectual undertaking, from believing that you exist to, well, to anything.

And suppose Diogenes agrees with Tertullian that there is something wrong with worshipping the emperor but thinks it's logical to do so anyway because he thinks that this life is valuable enough to justify it. That doesn't mean he's valuing something that Tertullian thinks is evil. It means that, if Tertullian is right, he is exaggerating the value of this present life.

Come now, surely you have heard the story of Alexander's visit to Corinth? We know that Diogenes would not have worshipped the emperor; but, for the sake of argument, how wouldn't that make Diogenes evil? If Tertullian thinks it is wrong to worship the emperor, then he thinks Diogenes is wrong to do it. Now, whether you want to take the step and say he thinks Diogenes is evil to do it is up to you. Certainly, this would be in all likelihood such a minor infraction of Tertullian's morality that he would not think of Diogenes as evil. But, if it were something else, like killing a man, say Tertullian, by order of the emperor, simply to avoid being put to death himself, certainly Tertullian would think Diogenes an evil man to do it?

I suppose that there could be someone who thought logic to be evil but I don't think you could build any kind of coherent ethic that classified logic as evil. And I can't think of anything objectively evil that could be valued for itself. (Although I suppose if you created a Gnostic fantasy world where matter and physical pleasure were really objectively evil it would be possible).

Funny you should bring up the Essenes. I've just been working on a Gnostic cult for Demon: The Fallen. It makes sense to me since the gnostics regard(ed) Pistis Sophia's emanation of Yaldabaoth as the evil that imprisoned them in flesh. A few thousand years later Lucifer and the fallen are their comrades, and their enemy is God himself.

Anyhow, I don't quite get your point about nothing objectively evil being valuable for itself. What about murder? Wouldn't a serial killer be valuing what he does for what it is, when what he does happens to be (according to pretty much everybody) evil? I don't know that you live in the states, but recently there was a lengthy interview on HBO with The Ice Man, a hitman who killed hundreds of people for fun and professionally while being married and raising children. It's a pretty creepy thing to see because this guy is completely unaffected by anything at this point.

I could imagine this as well. But I don't think such a character would be the opposite of a paladin. He desires power or revenge rather than evil.

No, I don't think he would be the opposite of a Paladin, that's true. But say you lose a loved one to some deranged psychopath, someone so far gone that they'll probably just be committed to an institution for the rest of their lives; or they'll get however many decades of appeals before they get fried. Now, if you go out and get a gun and mow this guy down in court, isn't that almost the opposite of being a Paladin? The Paladin upholds the law, the law that you just took into your own hands, or circumvented--however you want to think about it.

In the same way, say the Goodguy King is responsible for your loved one's death, so you go strike up a bargain with the Lich King, and now everything good is your foe. Now, this is definitely blackgaurd territory, not antipaladin, but the original question was 'can someone think of themselves as evil and be Paladin-like?'--and I, at least, think the answer is 'yes.' Someone can be perfectly aware that what they are doing is wrong and do it anyway. You can be honorable and just and all that, and still want to kill the Goodguy King, which, however wrong you know it is, you have a burning need to do.

I suppose that's where it comes down to the question of whether morality really is subjective or whether it's possible to be wrong on moral questions. If I'm running the game, the Nazi paladin is just plain wrong. He may think he's a paladin but he isn't. (Maybe he's a blackguard). Even so, he's not an antipaladin. At the risk of making light of a serious subject, the evil Nazi who think he's a paladin wouldn't have inflict with touch or smite good abilities. He'd have smite Jew/Gypsie/Slav/Cripple/Orphan and Heal Aryan abilities.

That makes total sense to me, and in D&D, with its grades of alignment, I think that is how most people would rule it. I don't use alignments though, which couples well with not using the Paladin as a core class, since smite evil would be fairly useless without that guage.

Well, I'll grant you that you bring up a common caricature of fantasy games and one that's probably true in some cases. In most cases (judging by my experience and the story hours I've read), however, adventurers are invading the caves and dens of aggressive genocidal creatures intent on destroying or enslaving civilization.

That's true, it is a caricature. I've never actually seen a game like this, but I assume, from many people's stories on this board, that it is all too common. Still, if some mindless--or even mindful--creature is harassing the local folk, would hunting it down and killing it always be the good thing to do? Well, don't answer that, since we aren't discussing specific moral views. Let's put it this way: since the dominant moral (and social) compass in D&D is basically Western, and part of that is a stance against animal cruelty and, in many places, the death penalty, wouldn't it make more sense for adventuring parties to carefully move the savage animal to some part of its natural habitat far away from people, or to try to reform the misguided Kobolds? Certainly there are cases where fullscale warfare is the day's special, but a lot of adventures seem to me unnecessarily brutal

Unfortunately I don't really have time to read story hours, but they definitely sound interesting. I think, though, that people who go the trouble of writing their campaigns up are automatically 1000% more likely to be running a more interesting and thoughtful game than the average group of friends, who just play for a little fun now and then, not to tackle serious issues or be overly realistic.

Well, really polytheism does seem to mess with the foundations of morality--particularly D&D style Polytheism where you generally have equal numbers of good and evil gods. In such a world, you certainly can't base morality off the dictates of God (do you mean Nerull or Pelor? And why prefer one to the other?) Nor can one even use their edicts as evidence for the rightness of acts or principles. [snip]

You'd need a Kantian or Utilitarian ethic for such a world (although Aristotelian/Thomistic would do if you could come up with a reasonable argument for a good telos) and then you'd still lack an answer to the "OK, so that's right and this is wrong; why should I care? What's going to happen to me if I choose wrong?" rejoinder.

Right. Both are logical approaches to morality (though Kant works hard to derive a logical basis for Christian morality, to the point of being absurd in some cases, not lying to the axe murderer being the most famous). I'm afraid I don't remember Aristotle's ethics being remotely similar to Aquinas', though it would seem to me that in Aquinas' case the telos would be God. For Aristotle I think it would be The Good, but again that would be relying on assumptions of what The Good is, i.e. The Good is what is best, what is best is what is most right, etc. It's an epistemological ouroboros you can't really get clear of.

On the other hand, I think that far from providing a basis for evil paladins, such a world would vitiate the basis for even Lawful Good paladins. After all, if you don't have an ideal Good to pursue, you can't pursue it. And that's the essence of what a D&D paladin is about.

Absolutely true. This is why I am against the Paladin as a core class too, which begs the question, what did I even have in mind posting to this thread in the first place? And the answer is.. I have no idea.. in my best Eddie Izzard voice.

I suspect that says more about beer and pretzels gaming (I shouldn't knock it, it's fun sometimes) and DMs who encourage it than it does about the possibility of good or evil paladins though. (Come to think of it, I think that's the essence of the difficulty with MMORPGs as Role Playing Games--the inability to insert moral significance into the actions of characters; then again maybe I haven't played enough to know).

No, I'd say you're spot on. I've seen a lot of MMORPG's, none of which involved any roles being played.

I don't think you even need to divorce paladins from specific notions of good and law for paladins to fight each other. A moral code that requires loyalty to anything other than self (nation, people, cause, what have you) will inevitably have paladins face each other on the battlefield.

But, like you said before, that moral imperative would be low in the ranks of moral imperatives in your world. And anyway, if the two nations were sufficiently Good (and were Good an absolute) that both fielded Paladins, I don't think any disputes between them would ever come to blows, with the exception maybe of border skirmishes between villagers. There wouldn't be any conflict involving armies though.

A tragic universe would do that too. The nature of tragedy is that moral claims sometimes conflict and that may not negate either of the claims. Antigone ought to bury her brother. But she ought to obey the law and allow a traitor to lie unburied. Creon needs to enforce the penalties of rebellion. But he should bury his relatives too. Both can even be perfect (but one has a stronger duty to family and the other has a stronger duty to the state) and still the play occurs as Sophocles wrote it. (Which raises some interesting but completely irrelevant (to this discussion) questions: is forgiveness an essential part or a moral universe? And is it possible to be morally perfect, given one moral flaw anywhere?)

Well, the nature of Aristotle's definition of tragedy (i.e. Greek tragedy) is like that anyway . There is no conflict here if there is a hierarchy of moral imperatives. Antigone should simply do whichever ranks higher, and the same goes for Creon. Of course that hierarchy doesn't exist in Greek Tragedy: Does Orestes avenge his father, though it means killing his mother? Just to be relevant, say the Paladin's mother kills his father. If anyone else had killed his father, he would cut him down and that would be it. But.. his mother? Or say it was an uncle: is Hamlet something of an anti-paladin?

 

[The Sigil]

I could intellectualize my responses, but for the sake of making them accessible to the majority of readers, I will endeavor not to...

That's a good point. By the same token, do morals have any authority if their religious sanction is in doubt? In a fantasy world, where gods are merely superterrestrial men, more or less, and not gods in any metaphysical sense, can there be an absolute morality that isn't, as you say later, Kantian--that is, a morality that isn't derived purely from logic (though in Kant's case by a man desperately wanting to vindicate his Christian leaning)?

"Can there be an absolute morality... that isn't derived purely from logic?"

Yes.

In fact, my understanding of the "default" D&D universe - and this is echoed in the Book of Vile Darkness - is that "good" and "evil" and "law" and "chaos" are NOT merely concepts derived from philosophizing. They are actual metaphysical powers, if you will. Thus, the default assumption in the D&D universe is that good, evil, law, and chaos exist and define things independent of any perception and independent of logic.

Well, essentially I would think that it does. If Diogenes acts wickedly proceeding by logic, then according to Tertullian's religion logic would be wrong; but logic cannot be wrong, there can only be wrong logic. Abstracted away from action, there was a time when science and ligic were, in a way, viewed as evil. The image of Galileo muttering "Eppur si muove" as he walks away from the Inquisition, having just been forced to renounce his theory, comes to mind.

Now you're twisting things. I am a religious person. I believe in logic as a useful tool, but not, as you seem to, to be the ultimate authority in the universe... because logic must proceed forth from a set of assumptions - it is these assumptions - or more correctly, that which gives rise to correct assumptions - that is the ultimate authority in the universe. Call that which gives rise to correct assumptions God or "nature" or "truth" or what have you - but in any case, as logic is built upon the foundation of assumptions, it is the assumptions that are the ultimate authority, not the logic itself. I therefore believe that following bare, naked logic can lead people to do things that I believe are evil. Does that mean I think logic is evil? No. It means I think that someone who follows bare, naked logic and is thereby led to evil is merely proceeding forth from a faulty set of assumptions.

Attemps at answering all of these questions can be made with logic. The Epicureans did it, the Stoics did it, the Cynics (like Diogenes) did it; today Bernard Williams and Richard Wollheim do it. It's a part of philosophizing. The flaw comes in that none of these people can take every fact into account, and also there is the problem of epistemology. Yes, you have to start from some assumption, even using logic, but this is true of every intellectual undertaking, from believing that you exist to, well, to anything.

Herein you admit yourself that you have to start from some assumption. Again, what is the "source" of that assumption? Most philosophers will tell you they are in search of the "truth" - i.e., the correct set of starting assumptions (because with that correct set, correct conclusions and interpretations of everything may be derived). The fact that philosophers can't agree on the correct set of starting assumptions (or we wouldn't be bothering with philosophical argument) tells me that they haven't found the "right set" yet - so their assumptions, including "logic is supreme over religious assumptions" are as suspect as anyone else's.

Come now, surely you have heard the story of Alexander's visit to Corinth? We know that Diogenes would not have worshipped the emperor; but, for the sake of argument, how wouldn't that make Diogenes evil? If Tertullian thinks it is wrong to worship the emperor, then he thinks Diogenes is wrong to do it. Now, whether you want to take the step and say he thinks Diogenes is evil to do it is up to you. Certainly, this would be in all likelihood such a minor infraction of Tertullian's morality that he would not think of Diogenes as evil. But, if it were something else, like killing a man, say Tertullian, by order of the emperor, simply to avoid being put to death himself, certainly Tertullian would think Diogenes an evil man to do it?

I'm not familiar with the story in question, so I can't meaningfully approach this one.

No, I don't think he would be the opposite of a Paladin, that's true. But say you lose a loved one to some deranged psychopath, someone so far gone that they'll probably just be committed to an institution for the rest of their lives; or they'll get however many decades of appeals before they get fried. Now, if you go out and get a gun and mow this guy down in court, isn't that almost the opposite of being a Paladin? The Paladin upholds the law, the law that you just took into your own hands, or circumvented--however you want to think about it.

Paladins walk the hard line between justice and mercy - more specifically, their ideals of justice and mercy. The paladin upholds the law - but WHOSE law? If the laws of the land are unjust, is a paladin required to uphold them? I would say, "no." A paladin is beholden to the standard his deity sets for justice (law) and mercy (goodness) in such a case.

"Justice" might dictate that death is mandated - an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth. "Mercy" might dictate that death is not mandated - this man does not have full control of is actions or full ability to comprehend good and evil. It is this fight that every paladin must fight every day... when do I let justice prevail at the expense of mercy and vice versa.

In the specific case above, I would tend to say that the above example is NOT the example of an anti-paladin... it could be the example of a paladin (justly) punishing a criminal who is being "let off" by (unjust) laws... i.e., the laws of the land have failed to live up to the standard of law he feels is acceptable.

A lot of folks seem to fall into the trap of, "the paladin is just a deputy of the local law enforcement with some extra divine powers." The paladin is the deputy not of local law enforcement, but of deity - which in his mind ought to trump local law enforcement (unless one of the tenets of his deity is "uphold the laws of the land you are in" or something akin).

In the same way, say the Goodguy King is responsible for your loved one's death, so you go strike up a bargain with the Lich King, and now everything good is your foe. Now, this is definitely blackgaurd territory, not antipaladin, but the original question was 'can someone think of themselves as evil and be Paladin-like?'--and I, at least, think the answer is 'yes.' Someone can be perfectly aware that what they are doing is wrong and do it anyway. You can be honorable and just and all that, and still want to kill the Goodguy King, which, however wrong you know it is, you have a burning need to do.

You defuse your own argument with the phrase "however wrong you know it is, you have a burning need to do [so]." The character in question is not serving a "higher power" (as a paladin has dedicated himself to), he is merely gratifying his own needs. That he knows it is wrong (as you expressly opined) and winds up doing it anyway shows selfishness, not honor. You can't be honorable and just and then do something you know is "wrong" - that isn't honorable and/or just by definition! This seems like an exceedingly poor argument for someone with such extensive knowledge of logic as you have demonstrated.

He might be TEMPTED to do so - all characters are tempted to things not in line with their morality... but if you know something is unjust/dishonorable and SUCCUMB to the temptation, you cannot logically define yourself as just/honorable.

That makes total sense to me, and in D&D, with its grades of alignment, I think that is how most people would rule it. I don't use alignments though, which couples well with not using the Paladin as a core class, since smite evil would be fairly useless without that guage.

Again, it makes no sense to me.

Premise 1: I am honorable/just.
Premise 2: If one is honorable/just, one does not commit dishonorable/unjust acts.
Premise 3: I commit dishonorable/unjust acts.

Premise 2 can be changed from the general to the specific case rather simply: If I am honorable/just, I do not commit dishonorable/unjust acts.

By Modus Tollens, Premise 3 and Premise 2 lead us to:
If I am honorable/just, I do not commit dishonorable/unjust acts.
I commit dishonorable/unjust acts.
Conclusion:
I am not honorable/just.

But our conclusion conflicts with Premise 1: I am honorable/just.

As any practicioner of logic will tell you, you have conflicting premises and can therefore prove anything... making your premises worthless.

To me, your example holds no water because of a logical analysis of it.

That's true, it is a caricature. I've never actually seen a game like this, but I assume, from many people's stories on this board, that it is all too common. Still, if some mindless--or even mindful--creature is harassing the local folk, would hunting it down and killing it always be the good thing to do? Well, don't answer that, since we aren't discussing specific moral views. Let's put it this way: since the dominant moral (and social) compass in D&D is basically Western, and part of that is a stance against animal cruelty and, in many places, the death penalty, wouldn't it make more sense for adventuring parties to carefully move the savage animal to some part of its natural habitat far away from people, or to try to reform the misguided Kobolds? Certainly there are cases where fullscale warfare is the day's special, but a lot of adventures seem to me unnecessarily brutal

Correct me if I'm wrong, but my understanding of the prevailing attitude in modern society is akin to:

1.) A dangerous creature is harassing the locals - e.g., a mountain lion showing up in someone's back yard - remove the creature to another habitat without violence if possible.

2.) A dangerous creature harms the locals - e.g., a mountain lion showing up in someone's back yard and mauling/killing that person's dog/cat/child/spouse - the creature has in fact harmed something and is considered dangerous/life-threatening and is killed in self defense.

While I myself think that this is perhaps somewhat inconsistent, as the difference between the two may be only opportunity to kill/maul, it illustrates an important point.

The prevailing attitude in Western Society is to judge you based on two things:

1.) What you are capable of doing.
2.) What you have actually done.

We are more lenient if you are capable of doing something and have not actually done it. Perhaps that's because "in the doing" of an act, you prove to us that you will do it, where as in the first instance, we have only a suspicion that you might - but we cannot be sure.

Absolutely true. This is why I am against the Paladin as a core class too, which begs the question, what did I even have in mind posting to this thread in the first place? And the answer is.. I have no idea.. in my best Eddie Izzard voice.

LOL - and I didn't intend to turn this into a logic discussion and yet I have done so as well.

Well, the nature of Aristotle's definition of tragedy (i.e. Greek tragedy) is like that anyway . There is no conflict here if there is a hierarchy of moral imperatives. Antigone should simply do whichever ranks higher, and the same goes for Creon. Of course that hierarchy doesn't exist in Greek Tragedy: Does Orestes avenge his father, though it means killing his mother? Just to be relevant, say the Paladin's mother kills his father. If anyone else had killed his father, he would cut him down and that would be it. But.. his mother? Or say it was an uncle: is Hamlet something of an anti-paladin?

You have just put the crux of the problem any paladin would have out there... how do they determine the hierarchy of moral imperatives? Logic has a nasty tendency to fail here, as you wind up with conflicting premises... which is why the paladin needs absolute morality and a deity to rank them for him instead of logic. After all, if "the word of deity" ranks them, and your number one logical premise is, "my deity is correct," the problem is solved. Perhaps not satisfying for modern western thinkers, who like to believe their minds can be the ultimate authority, but for a religious person who has as a premise, "my mind is not capable of handling everything - no human's can," it's a nice security blanket. "Easy/cheap way out?" Perhaps. But no less valid - after all, how can we empirically prove whose assumptions are faulty?

--The Sigil

 

[Joseph Elric Smith]

it is your game and if you feel the need to have a evil paladin or anti paladin, that is fine.
I myself when I run a campaign with evil character tend to also have the party be non human, so it is not so much an issue..
Ken
imitation is the sincerest form of flattery

 

[Lord Pendragon]

Nice post, Sigil. Thanks for keeping it in terms we non-philosophy majors can understand.

 

[Elder-Basilisk]

I can only manage a partial response at the moment--Sigil has some good things to say too though.

That's a good point. By the same token, do morals have any authority if their religious sanction is in doubt? In a fantasy world, where gods are merely superterrestrial men, more or less, and not gods in any metaphysical sense, can there be an absolute morality that isn't, as you say later, Kantian--that is, a morality that isn't derived purely from logic (though in Kant's case by a man desperately wanting to vindicate his Christian leaning)?

An absolute morality is perhaps further than I'd be willing to go. I think you could make a case for an objective morality on an impartial observer theory like Hume appears to espouse. That would require Hume to be right about human nature (and the sympathetic impulse) though and it would be undermined by the existence of other forms of rational life (orcs, goblins, troglodytes, etc). For that matter, it's not exactly clear how the presence of inherently (even if it were only an inherent predisposition) good races (elves and dwarves) or inherently evil races would effect Kantian a priori derivations of morality. Would it be obvious that it's wrong to use other persons as a means rather than an end in a world with races of Djinni, Efreet, orcs, Archons, and devils? (Real world religious metaphysical systems do sometimes include some of these things but usually in a distinctly different way than the default D&D cosmology seems to assume).

In general, I think it becomes harder to justify non-divine morality, the more you change the world--just as it becomes harder to justify divinely anchored theories of morality the more you change God. But that shouldn't really surprise anyone. If morality is subjective then changing the situation obviously changes it. And if morality is objective, why should it be disconnected from the web of other objective facts? It should hardly be considered surprising that any real-world system of objective morality doesn't plausibly fit into a world that is dramatically dissimilar in morally significant ways.

Come now, surely you have heard the story of Alexander's visit to Corinth?

The title rings a bell but the story escapes me. . . .

We know that Diogenes would not have worshipped the emperor; but, for the sake of argument, how wouldn't that make Diogenes evil? If Tertullian thinks it is wrong to worship the emperor, then he thinks Diogenes is wrong to do it. Now, whether you want to take the step and say he thinks Diogenes is evil to do it is up to you. Certainly, this would be in all likelihood such a minor infraction of Tertullian's morality that he would not think of Diogenes as evil. But, if it were something else, like killing a man, say Tertullian, by order of the emperor, simply to avoid being put to death himself, certainly Tertullian would think Diogenes an evil man to do it?

Tertullian's moral evaluation of Diogenes isn't what's in question though. The question is whether Diogenes values something that is evil for its own sake or whether Diogenes' misvaluation of something that is good has led him into evil.

Altering your example somewhat, if we suppose Diogenes murders a dozen innocents because the emperor threatened to kill him otherwise, he is an evil man. And his following of logic led him into that evil. But that doesn't mean Diogenes is engaged in a disinterested pursuit of evil. As it happens, he is actually engaged in the pursuit of something that is, prima facia, good: his own life. Tertullian doesn't need to say that valuing one's own life is evil in order to say that Diogenes has done evil and is, in fact, evil. He just needs to say that Diogenes prizes his own life too highly and that led Diogenes into evil.

Anyhow, I don't quite get your point about nothing objectively evil being valuable for itself. What about murder? Wouldn't a serial killer be valuing what he does for what it is, when what he does happens to be (according to pretty much everybody) evil?

But as far as I know, the serial killer doesn't actually value murder for itself. See below for the continuation

I don't know that you live in the states, but recently there was a lengthy interview on HBO with The Ice Man, a hitman who killed hundreds of people for fun and professionally while being married and raising children. It's a pretty creepy thing to see because this guy is completely unaffected by anything at this point.

That does sound like it'd be creepy to see. However, even your description of it doesn't make it sound like he valued evil as an abstract principle. According to your description, he murdered for two reasons: Fun and Money.

Now I don't think that either fun or money are inherently evil. I like fun and I like having fun and would say the same for money (although money is really a proxy for other things that I can get with it). As I see it, the Ice Man has a perverted idea of fun. Thus the particular kind of fun he values (presumably, the pleasure of killing people) is evil. However, he only values it because of its connection to something that is good (in this case, pleasure or fun).

Unfortunately I don't really have time to read story hours, but they definitely sound interesting. I think, though, that people who go the trouble of writing their campaigns up are automatically 1000% more likely to be running a more interesting and thoughtful game than the average group of friends, who just play for a little fun now and then, not to tackle serious issues or be overly realistic.

That's true. However, I think Contact's story hour is a reasonable case study for the average group of friends' game because the particular version of interest and thoughtfulness that his story hours explore are the conventions of the fantasy role playing genre (particularly his Champions of the Risen Goddess story hour). The characters, especially Taran act like the archetypical beer and pretzels "heroes" and embody their ethos. In one of the recent installments, for instance, Taran captures a bugbear and interrogates him on the recent happenings in the city of the Spider Queen. The conversation turns to professional matters and Taran makes a comment to the effect that "it's not right. You kill someone and you expect to be able to take their treasure. It's the natural order of things. . ." The bugbear commiserates. The conversation finishes with Taran asking "Do you have any treasure?"

 

[Wayside]

RE: The Sigil

This may look funny because I typed it all out in word for fear of the boards eating it. EDIT: It was too ugly and convoluted without proper quoting so I went and fixed it all. mleh.

Originally posted by The Sigil

I could intellectualize my responses, but for the sake of making them accessible to the majority of readers, I will endeavor not to...

Actually, I don’t think either myself or Elder-Basilisk has brought up anything a quick search on google couldn’t clarify.

Originally posted by The Sigil

"Can there be an absolute morality... that isn't derived purely from logic?"

Yes.

In fact, my understanding of the "default" D&D universe - and this is echoed in the Book of Vile Darkness - is that "good" and "evil" and "law" and "chaos" are NOT merely concepts derived from philosophizing. They are actual metaphysical powers, if you will. Thus, the default assumption in the D&D universe is that good, evil, law, and chaos exist and define things independent of any perception and independent of logic.

Ok, now remember you said that. Nevermind that your answer skirts the issue of moral authority, as there is no real resolution to this issue anyway. For D&D the authority is that the core books say so, which to me means there is no moral authority at all; but which, to many people, stands as an authority inviolable.

Originally posted by The Sigil

Now you're twisting things. I am a religious person. I believe in logic as a useful tool, but not, as you seem to, to be the ultimate authority in the universe... because logic must proceed forth from a set of assumptions - it is these assumptions - or more correctly, that which gives rise to correct assumptions - that is the ultimate authority in the universe. Call that which gives rise to correct assumptions God or "nature" or "truth" or what have you - but in any case, as logic is built upon the foundation of assumptions, it is the assumptions that are the ultimate authority, not the logic itself. I therefore believe that following bare, naked logic can lead people to do things that I believe are evil. Does that mean I think logic is evil? No. It means I think that someone who follows bare, naked logic and is thereby led to evil is merely proceeding forth from a faulty set of assumptions.

Well first, please don’t mistake the argument for my personal beliefs. Personal beliefs have no business on this board, and believe me mine would get a thread closed down in about 2 seconds, so I just won’t go there. Now, I understand what you mean about assumptions, but this isn’t entirely true, since pure logic is mathematical and arguably requires no assumptions. Extreme proponents of strong epistemological views would say otherwise, but there aren’t any here right now.

Your point that logic itself would not be evil is fine. It’s a small semantic point though, meaning it only refutes the way I phrased the issue, not the issue itself. Elder-Basilisk’s point was that evil is not valuable in itself, to which I responded sure it is, but only in a moral relativist (or secretly absolute) system, where Diogenes can follow the dictates of logic and think himself good, while Tertullian looks on in disgust at what he perceives (or knows) to be Diongenes’ evil actions. In your D&D world with it’s Book of Vile Darkness and all that, Elder-Basilisk’s argument is a good one, and no amount of moral psychologizing is going to dissuade him from holding that position because the argument comes down to ‘which theoretical view do I hold?’ We just have differing views on whether evil is conceivably valuable in itself, in a moral system where good and evil are facts about the world.

In the relativist system, the Vatican can believe itself in service of the greatest good by burning Aristotle’s books and forcing Galileo to recant his physics, while allowing Vergil to read because of the Messianic Ode. This is a church that, for all intents and purposes, spurns the use of logic whenever it leads to conclusions which conflict with its religious views, making even pure logic sometimes evil. Athens did something similar by putting Socrates to death, and if Aristotle hadn’t fled they would have, in his words, sinned twice against philosophy.

Originally posted by The Sigil

Herein you admit yourself that you have to start from some assumption. Again, what is the "source" of that assumption? Most philosophers will tell you they are in search of the "truth" - i.e., the correct set of starting assumptions (because with that correct set, correct conclusions and interpretations of everything may be derived). The fact that philosophers can't agree on the correct set of starting assumptions (or we wouldn't be bothering with philosophical argument) tells me that they haven't found the "right set" yet - so their assumptions, including "logic is supreme over religious assumptions" are as suspect as anyone else's.

This is a fairly lay argument, but I won’t touch it because I think you are trying to defend religion to me, though I am not attacking it. Let’s just say that philosophers do not so much seek assumptions, though they often rely on them, as, like physicists, they attempt to interpret what the-way-the-world-is means. Part of the reason for the decline in ethical and metaphysical philosophy over the past century is an increasing awareness among philosophers that logic has difficulty dealing with this area because of the nature of the radical assumptions we make on an everyday basis.

Originally posted by The Sigil

I'm not familiar with the story in question, so I can't meaningfully approach this one.

Well, briefly, since Elder-Basilisk doesn’t recall it offhand either: Alexander comes to Corinth, and all the people come out to greet and congratulate him except the great philosopher Diogenes. When Alexander learns that Diogenes has not come to pay him respect (knowing who Diogenes is), he seeks him out and finds him sitting in his tub in the sun. Then: “I am Alexander the Great,” and “I am Diogenes the Cynic.” Alexander then asks what service he can render him, and Diogenes says “Stop blocking my sun.” When his troops laugh at the old philosopher, Alexander says “If I were not Alexander, I should wish to be Diogenes.”

The story, though, is not important to the argument. I was just saying that Diogenes wouldn’t bow to the emperor, even if it meant dying.

Originally posted by The Sigil

Paladins walk the hard line between justice and mercy - more specifically, their ideals of justice and mercy. The paladin upholds the law - but WHOSE law? If the laws of the land are unjust, is a paladin required to uphold them? I would say, "no." A paladin is beholden to the standard his deity sets for justice (law) and mercy (goodness) in such a case.

But you already said that in D&D good and evil, law and chaos are absolute. If that is the case then the mandates of the deity are irrelevant, because a Paladin couldn’t serve a deity that wasn’t a paragon of the good. Either the good is good because the gods say so, or the gods say so because it is so. If the former, then the good is arbitrarily assigned (or logically derived) by the gods, and is therefore not absolute, ruling that scenario out for standard D&D. If the latter, then the good exists as an absolute, independent of the gods, meaning a Paladin can only serve a god that is essentially synonymous with the good.

Originally posted by The Sigil

"Justice" might dictate that death is mandated - an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth. "Mercy" might dictate that death is not mandated - this man does not have full control of is actions or full ability to comprehend good and evil. It is this fight that every paladin must fight every day... when do I let justice prevail at the expense of mercy and vice versa.

Let’s say then that good in this world mandates mercy and reform for criminals. This is also what the law in this world is conducive to. Now, what does the person who takes the law into their own hands become? Although good is absolute, they still disagree with it, defy it openly. They do not consider themselves to be evil, but they do value what they do in itself, and since good in this world is absolute, what they are doing *is* evil. Characters aren’t prohibited from believing that good is wrong just because good is absolute in your D&D world. Belief and fact rarely coincide.

Originally posted by The Sigil

In the specific case above, I would tend to say that the above example is NOT the example of an anti-paladin... it could be the example of a paladin (justly) punishing a criminal who is being "let off" by (unjust) laws... i.e., the laws of the land have failed to live up to the standard of law he feels is acceptable.

It could be, but let’s assume it is how I phrased it above. Now what?

Originally posted by The Sigil

A lot of folks seem to fall into the trap of, "the paladin is just a deputy of the local law enforcement with some extra divine powers." The paladin is the deputy not of local law enforcement, but of deity - which in his mind ought to trump local law enforcement (unless one of the tenets of his deity is "uphold the laws of the land you are in" or something akin).

This depends on your campaign. In mine there is no absolute good; there are no gods in the standard D&D sense, no celestials or fiends or devils, and no random assortment of planes with names randomly picked from 20 different world mythologies. I try to play it a little more sophisticated than this. Hodgepodge fantasy just irks me.

Originally posted by The Sigil

You defuse your own argument with the phrase "however wrong you know it is, you have a burning need to do [so]." The character in question is not serving a "higher power" (as a paladin has dedicated himself to), he is merely gratifying his own needs. That he knows it is wrong (as you expressly opined) and winds up doing it anyway shows selfishness, not honor. You can't be honorable and just and then do something you know is "wrong" - that isn't honorable and/or just by definition! This seems like an exceedingly poor argument for someone with such extensive knowledge of logic as you have demonstrated.

He might be TEMPTED to do so - all characters are tempted to things not in line with their morality... but if you know something is unjust/dishonorable and SUCCUMB to the temptation, you cannot logically define yourself as just/honorable.

There are a few things wrong with this. When discussing the idea of an antipaladin, there are a lot of possibilities, including the possibility of a warrior who does the opposite of serving a higher power. It is perfectly plausible that the paladin serves a good god as an end in itself, while the antipaladin serves an evil god as a means to an end. That is what makes them opposite. You could argue the antipaladin serves no god at all as well, depending on how opposite, or what quality of opposite, you want to be.

Also, I would think that the crux of tragedy (from the Poetics) that Elder-Basilisk brought up would lead you to the conclusion that it is in fact entirely possible to be honorable and still have to do something you know is wrong. His example was what does Antigone do when her brother is killed as a traitor, since she has two conflicting duties, one to family and the other to country? Mine was what does Orestes do when his mother, Clytemnestra, murders his father, Agamemnon? Here there are again two conflicting duties, both to family this time.

I’m sorry you think this is a poor argument. Feel free to take it up with Aristotle. (In case you don’t see the relevance, if the Goodguy King kills your sister, you may find yourself with two conflicting duties: one to good and your King, another to your murdered sister. Both Antigone and Orestes chose the duty to family as the greater of the two).

Originally posted by The Sigil

Again, it makes no sense to me.

Premise 1: I am honorable/just.
Premise 2: If one is honorable/just, one does not commit dishonorable/unjust acts.
Premise 3: I commit dishonorable/unjust acts.

Premise 2 can be changed from the general to the specific case rather simply: If I am honorable/just, I do not commit dishonorable/unjust acts.

By Modus Tollens, Premise 3 and Premise 2 lead us to:
If I am honorable/just, I do not commit dishonorable/unjust acts.
I commit dishonorable/unjust acts.
Conclusion:
I am not honorable/just.

But our conclusion conflicts with Premise 1: I am honorable/just.

As any practicioner of logic will tell you, you have conflicting premises and can therefore prove anything... making your premises worthless.

To me, your example holds no water because of a logical analysis of it.

As any practitioner of logic will tell you, you should have correct premises before attempting to draw conclusions from them. The argument is still valid, but because a premise (2) is not, neither is the conclusion. The examples from tragedy show explicitly how wrong premise 2 is (and you don’t need premise 1 in there either). Also, we’re still operating under the assumption that an antipaladin just has to be honorable and just, while being all evily. I’m not sure this is the way to go though.

btw, that is an interesting way of denying the consequent with a double-negative. It took me a second to realize you weren’t actually affirming the consequent. Just for everybody else, in the argument ‘if p then q; p, so q’, p is the antecedent and q is the consequent. ‘If I hit you then it will hurt; it doesn’t hurt, so I didn’t hit you’ is denying the consequent (I *didn’t* hit you; in the example, ‘I do not not commit dishonorable acts).

Originally posted by The Sigil

Correct me if I'm wrong, but my understanding of the prevailing attitude in modern society is akin to:

1.) A dangerous creature is harassing the locals - e.g., a mountain lion showing up in someone's back yard - remove the creature to another habitat without violence if possible.

2.) A dangerous creature harms the locals - e.g., a mountain lion showing up in someone's back yard and mauling/killing that person's dog/cat/child/spouse - the creature has in fact harmed something and is considered dangerous/life-threatening and is killed in self defense.

While I myself think that this is perhaps somewhat inconsistent, as the difference between the two may be only opportunity to kill/maul, it illustrates an important point.

The prevailing attitude in Western Society is to judge you based on two things:

1.) What you are capable of doing.
2.) What you have actually done.

We are more lenient if you are capable of doing something and have not actually done it. Perhaps that's because "in the doing" of an act, you prove to us that you will do it, where as in the first instance, we have only a suspicion that you might - but we cannot be sure.

Sounds about right to me.

Originally posted by The Sigil

LOL - and I didn't intend to turn this into a logic discussion and yet I have done so as well.

Well, lucky for everyone else we aren’t debating logic itself (it is, after all, an evolving field, just like mathematics). We’re just trying to make sound arguments.

Originally posted by The Sigil

You have just put the crux of the problem any paladin would have out there... how do they determine the hierarchy of moral imperatives? Logic has a nasty tendency to fail here, as you wind up with conflicting premises... which is why the paladin needs absolute morality and a deity to rank them for him instead of logic. After all, if "the word of deity" ranks them, and your number one logical premise is, "my deity is correct," the problem is solved. Perhaps not satisfying for modern western thinkers, who like to believe their minds can be the ultimate authority, but for a religious person who has as a premise, "my mind is not capable of handling everything - no human's can," it's a nice security blanket. "Easy/cheap way out?" Perhaps. But no less valid - after all, how can we empirically prove whose assumptions are faulty?

Well, if good is absolute, then the hierarchy is set. And, if good is absolute, then the Paladin does not need a god to rank them, because they are beyond the gods’ sphere; he only needs his god to reveal their ranking.

I think of it this way though: if there is a hierarchy of moral imperatives, either they are arbitrary, or there are reasons for their ordering. If there are reasons for their ordering, then right reason can (re)discover that ordering, unless we say something like “the gods have their reasons, which reason does not know;” which, to a philosopher, is a copout, while to a religious person being a perfectly sensible view.

 

[Wayside]

RE: Elder-Basilisk

An absolute morality is perhaps further than I'd be willing to go. I think you could make a case for an objective morality on an impartial observer theory like Hume appears to espouse. That would require Hume to be right about human nature (and the sympathetic impulse) though and it would be undermined by the existence of other forms of rational life (orcs, goblins, troglodytes, etc). For that matter, it's not exactly clear how the presence of inherently (even if it were only an inherent predisposition) good races (elves and dwarves) or inherently evil races would effect Kantian a priori derivations of morality. Would it be obvious that it's wrong to use other persons as a means rather than an end in a world with races of Djinni, Efreet, orcs, Archons, and devils? (Real world religious metaphysical systems do sometimes include some of these things but usually in a distinctly different way than the default D&D cosmology seems to assume).

All good questions. I suppose we could write books on such things, but somehow I think both the philosophical and the role-playing communities would completely ignore them. Just imagine the wild moral codes someone like Kant, or especially Nietzsche, would come up with, if they lived in a world with tons of sentient races and omnipresent gods and fireballs. There never would’ve been a categorical imperative if Kant was from a D&D world, even if he served the loftiest of the lofty good gods.

In general, I think it becomes harder to justify non-divine morality, the more you change the world--just as it becomes harder to justify divinely anchored theories of morality the more you change God. But that shouldn't really surprise anyone. If morality is subjective then changing the situation obviously changes it. And if morality is objective, why should it be disconnected from the web of other objective facts? It should hardly be considered surprising that any real-world system of objective morality doesn't plausibly fit into a world that is dramatically dissimilar in morally significant ways.

For a fantasy world I get the feeling that a virtue-based morality might work the best. One of Hume’s innovations was to say look, an act in itself isn’t really evil, it’s peoples’ reasons for doing things that make the things we do good or bad. I think this sort of emphasis lends itself well to a virtue-oriented D&D world, where antipaladins could walk among paladins fighting the same fight, but for different reasons that made them wolves in sheepskins.

Tertullian's moral evaluation of Diogenes isn't what's in question though. The question is whether Diogenes values something that is evil for its own sake or whether Diogenes' misvaluation of something that is good has led him into evil.

Altering your example somewhat, if we suppose Diogenes murders a dozen innocents because the emperor threatened to kill him otherwise, he is an evil man. And his following of logic led him into that evil. But that doesn't mean Diogenes is engaged in a disinterested pursuit of evil. As it happens, he is actually engaged in the pursuit of something that is, prima facia, good: his own life. Tertullian doesn't need to say that valuing one's own life is evil in order to say that Diogenes has done evil and is, in fact, evil. He just needs to say that Diogenes prizes his own life too highly and that led Diogenes into evil.

No, of course you’re right. Diogenes is not engaged in the disinterested pursuit of evil. But that does not negate the possibility of being engaged in the disinterested pursuit of the good according to logic in a world where there is an absolute good that conflicts with logic. Diogenes could value his pursuit of the good according to logic, at the same time that Tertullian, being aware of the absolute good, knew Diogenes’ pursuits to lead him to evil ways. Diogenes values his logic, but in this hypothetical world the arbitrary absolute good conflicts with logic, making most logically deduced moral decisions evil.

Whether it is possible for a person to value evil for itself at all is not an argument we can really have though.

But as far as I know, the serial killer doesn't actually value murder for itself. See below for the continuation

That does sound like it'd be creepy to see. However, even your description of it doesn't make it sound like he valued evil as an abstract principle. According to your description, he murdered for two reasons: Fun and Money.

Now I don't think that either fun or money are inherently evil. I like fun and I like having fun and would say the same for money (although money is really a proxy for other things that I can get with it). As I see it, the Ice Man has a perverted idea of fun. Thus the particular kind of fun he values (presumably, the pleasure of killing people) is evil. However, he only values it because of its connection to something that is good (in this case, pleasure or fun).

Like I said, this isn’t an argument we can really have because it’s such a hazy area. I think I can sum up the positions though: The Paladin is not interested in good as a means to some other end, like wealth or power; he is interested in good as it is, for itself, because it is good. The opposite of the Paladin, the Antipaladin, then, you think ought to be interested in evil for its own sake, not for the sake of gaining wealth or power through it. So, the question is can a person be interested in evil purely for its own sake? Your answer is no, but I don’t discount the possibility. I am on the fence about this.

The conversation turns to professional matters and Taran makes a comment to the effect that "it's not right. You kill someone and you expect to be able to take their treasure. It's the natural order of things. . ." The bugbear commiserates. The conversation finishes with Taran asking "Do you have any treasure?"

That’s classic.