Okay, since my boss is working on a D20M book on nuclear weapons, test sites, and ways of using them in a game, I thought I'd get his insight on answering the question. Here's what he scribbled up:
While no one has actually bought or sold a nuke on the white, gray or black markets, there have been numerous instances since 1989 in which people have been caught trying to smuggle and sell sufficient radioactive material to create a critical mass. An nation with a stable of experienced weapon designers could produce a yield-producing nuclear weapon with less than 500g of nuclear material. States with small scale or retired nuclear weapons programs could probably produce a working device with a 4kg critical mass. Those nations just entering the nuclear arms race or still researching their first device would probably produce a weapon requiring a 20kg critical mass. Terrorists, not having the proper funding or equipment to build a properly designed device, would probably require 40-60kg for the critical mass.
April 2004, smugglers were caught trying to move 37kg of Uranium-238 from Russia to Kazakhstan. Fortunately, it turned out to be an alloy of depleted uranium and tungsten used for armor plating, rather than fissile material. Could be used for a dirty bomb.
February 2004, Ukrainian border guard arrested a man attempting to smuggle 400g of Uranium into Hungary. This would barely be enough for a low yield tactical nuke but such a weapon would be well beyond the expertise any terrorist group, as well as most nations seeking nukes.
September 2003, Polish Police broke up a gang attempting to sell two cannisters containing 300g of Cesium each, for 140K Euros per cannister. This would make a sizeable dirty bomb.
August 2003, a Swede was stopped while trying to smuggle 100kg of radioactive ore samples from Russia into Finland. This could make a dirty bomb or be sold to a rogue state that could refine it for a nuclear weapon.
June 2003, a Thai school principal was arrested attempting to sell 30kg of Cesium for $240,000. This would make a big dirty bomb, considering this is an amount comperable to the amount of radioactive cesium Chernobyl spewed into the atmosphere during its meltdown.
January 2003, it was revealed that as much as 1,000 metric tons of heavily irradiated and contaminated scrap metal from Chernobyl had been removed from the 30 km exclusion zone around the ruined nuclear power plant.
October 2002, Russian security seized a shipment of 27,681kg of pelletized enriched uranium. What was thought to be a smuggling operation turned out to be intentional clerical alterations of a Kazakhstani reactor fuel processor meant to defraud the governments of Russia and Kazakhstan of $12.5 million in customs fees.
September 2002, a truck was seized on the Kazakhstani-Chinese border, carrying 900kg of radioactive sand. A private firm in Russia was shipping to a private Chinese buyer radioactive waste in the form of contaminated soil.
March 2002, a Russian citizen was arrested attempting to smuggle 19 kg of Thorium-232 into Kazakhstan. Useful not only for a dirty bomb, but also used in breeder reactors in the fuel enrichment process that produces weapons grade plutonium.
December 2001, Georgian State Security (the former soviet state, not the state in the US) arrested a man trying to smuggle 300g of uranium to Turkey, where he was to be paid $7k for the material. Enough for a dirty bomb, you'd need more for a nuke.
July 2001, French police arrest three men in Paris for smuggling 5 grams of 80% U-235. A year later, a portuguese evangelical pastor was also arrested for his involvment with the smuggling ring.
August 2001, Indian police seize 225g of uranium in Western Bengal. The uranium originated in the USSR, originally processed in 1984. The urnaium was still in the original packaging it left the processing plant in.
January 2001, three metal disks containing plutonium were dug up in a Greek park during an investigation into cigarette smuggling. After intense investigation, it was discovered that the three plates were part of a far larger quantity of plates stolen from a warehouse in Sofia, Bulgaria in May 1999.
In 1994, German police siezed 62g of assorted radioactive materials in an apartment in Tengen, including 6g of purified plutonium-239. Investigation revealed the source was the Bulgarian state-operated trading company KINTEX, which was attempting to sell 100kg of weapons grade plutonium to the Iraqi government.
Also in 1994, German police seized 300g of 87% pure plutonium-239 on a Lufthansa flight from Moscow to Munich. Two spaniards and a columban were arrested for smuggling. Interestingly, Russian Deputy Atomic Energy Minister Viktor Sidorenko was also aboard the flight and conspiracy theorists suggest the three men arrested were his mules to transport the material to propsective buyers.
There has been one instance of a smuggler caught with a working nuclear weapon. In March 2001, Turkish police stopped a car near the Azerbaijan border. Inside was a nuclear artillery shell of Soviet origin.
As we can see, it is vastly easier to steal and smuggle the raw materials for a nuclear weapon or radiological dispersal device, and there has been a great deal of effort in doing so. We can also see that it isn't necessarily low level arms dealers or black marketeers making the effort, either. Various incidents have pointed to state agencies and high ranking government officials participating in these crimes. Another thing we can figure is a price. Buying enough nuclear material for a yield producing weapon will cost at least $6M, and you'll be stuck buying it in small quantities (dozens of buys at DC 20 to DC 28) and accumulating a dangerous and easily detectable stockpile over the course of a few years.
While no one has actually bought or sold a nuke on the white, gray or black markets, there have been numerous instances since 1989 in which people have been caught trying to smuggle and sell sufficient radioactive material to create a critical mass. An nation with a stable of experienced weapon designers could produce a yield-producing nuclear weapon with less than 500g of nuclear material. States with small scale or retired nuclear weapons programs could probably produce a working device with a 4kg critical mass. Those nations just entering the nuclear arms race or still researching their first device would probably produce a weapon requiring a 20kg critical mass. Terrorists, not having the proper funding or equipment to build a properly designed device, would probably require 40-60kg for the critical mass.
April 2004, smugglers were caught trying to move 37kg of Uranium-238 from Russia to Kazakhstan. Fortunately, it turned out to be an alloy of depleted uranium and tungsten used for armor plating, rather than fissile material. Could be used for a dirty bomb.
February 2004, Ukrainian border guard arrested a man attempting to smuggle 400g of Uranium into Hungary. This would barely be enough for a low yield tactical nuke but such a weapon would be well beyond the expertise any terrorist group, as well as most nations seeking nukes.
September 2003, Polish Police broke up a gang attempting to sell two cannisters containing 300g of Cesium each, for 140K Euros per cannister. This would make a sizeable dirty bomb.
August 2003, a Swede was stopped while trying to smuggle 100kg of radioactive ore samples from Russia into Finland. This could make a dirty bomb or be sold to a rogue state that could refine it for a nuclear weapon.
June 2003, a Thai school principal was arrested attempting to sell 30kg of Cesium for $240,000. This would make a big dirty bomb, considering this is an amount comperable to the amount of radioactive cesium Chernobyl spewed into the atmosphere during its meltdown.
January 2003, it was revealed that as much as 1,000 metric tons of heavily irradiated and contaminated scrap metal from Chernobyl had been removed from the 30 km exclusion zone around the ruined nuclear power plant.
October 2002, Russian security seized a shipment of 27,681kg of pelletized enriched uranium. What was thought to be a smuggling operation turned out to be intentional clerical alterations of a Kazakhstani reactor fuel processor meant to defraud the governments of Russia and Kazakhstan of $12.5 million in customs fees.
September 2002, a truck was seized on the Kazakhstani-Chinese border, carrying 900kg of radioactive sand. A private firm in Russia was shipping to a private Chinese buyer radioactive waste in the form of contaminated soil.
March 2002, a Russian citizen was arrested attempting to smuggle 19 kg of Thorium-232 into Kazakhstan. Useful not only for a dirty bomb, but also used in breeder reactors in the fuel enrichment process that produces weapons grade plutonium.
December 2001, Georgian State Security (the former soviet state, not the state in the US) arrested a man trying to smuggle 300g of uranium to Turkey, where he was to be paid $7k for the material. Enough for a dirty bomb, you'd need more for a nuke.
July 2001, French police arrest three men in Paris for smuggling 5 grams of 80% U-235. A year later, a portuguese evangelical pastor was also arrested for his involvment with the smuggling ring.
August 2001, Indian police seize 225g of uranium in Western Bengal. The uranium originated in the USSR, originally processed in 1984. The urnaium was still in the original packaging it left the processing plant in.
January 2001, three metal disks containing plutonium were dug up in a Greek park during an investigation into cigarette smuggling. After intense investigation, it was discovered that the three plates were part of a far larger quantity of plates stolen from a warehouse in Sofia, Bulgaria in May 1999.
In 1994, German police siezed 62g of assorted radioactive materials in an apartment in Tengen, including 6g of purified plutonium-239. Investigation revealed the source was the Bulgarian state-operated trading company KINTEX, which was attempting to sell 100kg of weapons grade plutonium to the Iraqi government.
Also in 1994, German police seized 300g of 87% pure plutonium-239 on a Lufthansa flight from Moscow to Munich. Two spaniards and a columban were arrested for smuggling. Interestingly, Russian Deputy Atomic Energy Minister Viktor Sidorenko was also aboard the flight and conspiracy theorists suggest the three men arrested were his mules to transport the material to propsective buyers.
There has been one instance of a smuggler caught with a working nuclear weapon. In March 2001, Turkish police stopped a car near the Azerbaijan border. Inside was a nuclear artillery shell of Soviet origin.
As we can see, it is vastly easier to steal and smuggle the raw materials for a nuclear weapon or radiological dispersal device, and there has been a great deal of effort in doing so. We can also see that it isn't necessarily low level arms dealers or black marketeers making the effort, either. Various incidents have pointed to state agencies and high ranking government officials participating in these crimes. Another thing we can figure is a price. Buying enough nuclear material for a yield producing weapon will cost at least $6M, and you'll be stuck buying it in small quantities (dozens of buys at DC 20 to DC 28) and accumulating a dangerous and easily detectable stockpile over the course of a few years.
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