Whereas your earlier boldfaced argument focused on "exerting unauthorized control over property", here is Justice Blackmun saying exactly the opposite, that "the infringer of a copyright does not assume physical control over the copyright". If true for 18 U.S.C. 2314, then it's true for any law concerning theft.
"Only the 2314 counts concern us here." is from the first footnote to the majority opinion- thus you can only apply the logic Blackmun cites to that law. To do otherwise is to expand his ruling beyond his self-stated scope.
And 2314 only covers physical property.
As the majority also wrote:
Federal crimes, of course, "are solely creatures of statute."
And given (further on)
Nor does it matter that the item owes a major portion of its value to an intangible component. See, e. g., United States v. Seagraves, 265 F.2d 876 (CA3 1959) (geophysical maps identifying possible oil deposits); United States v. Greenwald, 479 F.2d 320 (CA6) (documents bearing secret chemical formulae), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 854 (1973). But these cases and others prosecuted under 2314 have always involved physical "goods, wares, [or] merchandise" that have themselves been "stolen, converted or taken by fraud." This basic element comports with the common-sense meaning of the statutory language: by requiring that the "goods, wares, [or] merchandise" be "the same" as those "stolen, converted or taken by fraud," the provision seems clearly to contemplate a physical identity between the items unlawfully obtained and those eventually transported, and hence some prior physical taking of the subject goods.
IOW- Blackmun is saying you can't apply 2314 to the
purely intangible, not that the intangible cannot be stolen.
In fact, stealing the intangible is a fairly common crime (besides copyright infringement) in the forms of theft called embezzlement and industrial espionage.
The vast majority of the money in the world exists only in an intangible form- more than 95% exists only as data in banking computers around the world.
As an example, suppose I use a variant of the scheme from Superman 3 (reiterated in Office Space) in which I redirect company funds into an account that I control. However, unlike in those movies, I introduce a further wrinkle- this account has a higher interest rate- say 12% as opposed to my company's 8%- and instead of keeping the whole amount, I merely keep 2% of the excess- the bulk is re-redirected back into the company's account (the extra 2% goes back to cover some lost interest due to some instant interest that would otherwise be lost).
No physical control is exerted over the property. The company is no worse off for my redirection- they still have the exact same amount of money at the end of the day as they would have- and I'm somewhat better off.
Despite this, I can still be convicted of embezzlement because I have excercised unauthorized control over my company's property. Why? Because the crime of embezzlement (like many forms of theft and other crimes) is complete once the intent is formed. (People v Parker, 235 Cal App. 2d 100, 108 (Cal App. 1965), including the telling language "intent to restore the money at some later time is of no avail.")
But enough of US law hijack- lets try to get back to the OP's concern.