Why do RPGs have rules?

[Micah Sweet]

As a follow up thought, what you describe is certainly what's preferred for trad play as defined in the Six Cultures thought-piece. GM is going to offer an engaging plot that will engender compelling play. It's really the selling point of that mode and a great deal turns on GM's ability to do so.

For what I would call fully immersionist play it's not like that. For me game texts such as RQ, Bushido, L5R, and Traveller all provide great opportunities for that mode. There may be stuff going on, but it's just not the case that anything must happen in one place in order for another thing to happen elsewhere. It's more - oh, so this happened here, what will be the ripples of that? It's not no-myth because a ton of stuff may exist that hasn't yet been said to the group, but it is no-plot.

Part of the trick is to not care if all the locations get visited. Characters don't visit Dykene? Doesn't matter. I feel like folk who enjoy world creation (as distinct from story-telling) will often enjoy GMing in immersionist mode. I'll read folk relating how they spent a pleasant few hours in solitary world development. The point being that one isn't attached to it appearing in play because one has enjoyed the work for its own sake.

Precisely. That's my ideal right there.

 

[pemerton]

Coordinating such hidden information between content creator, advisary and referee in a way the player do not learn about it can pose quite severe practical challenges

Isn't this part of the point of traditional dungeon/module design? Or, presumably, free kriegspiel or Braunstein scenario design?

The scenario author prepares the information, and then hands that dossier to the referee.

In this sort of play, there is no "adversary" distinct from just another player. (Which is to say, if all the players are on the same team, there is no "adversary". This is why classic dungeons are, at their heart, static.)

 

[pemerton]

That is the right question to ask. Were this occurring in the real world, then it can hardly be disputed that each possible Pia can tell their own story. However, in the game world what happens relies on a shared set of norms; existing in virtue of a common experience of life and of rules agreed between Jo and Pia that will say what is normal. (I'll cover ground here that I'm certain you're aware of, but hopefully serves a purpose in revealing thought processes.)

What you describe is not sufficient.

For instance, in real life Pia can judge the swell of the ocean, the depth of the water, the distance to the boat (that Pia is going to swim out to), the strength of the wind, etc.

In a shared fiction, someone has to author all that stuff. Which is not about norms that exist in virtue of a common experience of life - it's quite normal for swells to be low or high, for wind to be weak or strong, etc. It's about authority and purpose: who is entitled to author it, and to what end. And saying "keep it real" or "follow the fiction" isn't and end of any utility here, because - as just noted - reality encompasses a very wide range of possibilities.

It's not a coincidence that classic D&D happens in unrealistically austere environments ("dungeons") with a shared social understanding that architecture is salient but (say) height above sea level is not.

Thus, if what Jo means by "chair" is something that Pia also understands by "chair", the imagined upending of imaginary chairs goes as described.

Does it? Does it smash the plant pot sitting on the floor not far from the chair? Does the chair fall beside the pot? Does the chair have vertical slats in its back sufficiently far apart that the plant pot goes through them (like the Buster Keaton of plant pots)?

If, in real life, Pia upends a chair near a plant pot the answer to all those questions will be revealed, by way of a mundane physical process. In a shared fiction, if imaginary Pia upends an imaginary chair near an imaginary plant pot, any of the possibilities I've mentioned is within the range of the realistic. Who gets to choose which one happens?

It is only in view of possible differences in what is meant by "chair" (Jo - "that is a heavy chair, far too heavy for you to upend") that it becomes possible to talk in terms of Jo dictating Pia's acts, and then only to the extent of those differences.

Not at all. If Jo just declares "The upended chair smashes the plant pot" then Jo has dictated Pia's act - her act becomes (inter alia) one of smashing the plant pot by upending the chair.

Just so long as Jo and Pia have a common experience of life or rules agreed then - so far as those extend - it can't really be disputed that each Pia can tell their own story.

I dispute it, for the reasons just given, which in my experience affect nearly every moment of RPGing if the setting lacks the artificial austerity of the Gygaxian dungeon.

 

[pemerton]

@pemerton I'd like to lay out what I believe are our areas of agreement and contention, without preferencing any verdict

1) It's possible for a GM to function as a referee

Yes, there are games - some of which are RPG like, some of which are RPGs - in which the "GM"'s function is largely that of referee. Free kriegspiel, Braunstein and Tomb of Horrors would be examples.

There are marginal cases here, and Tomb of Horrors provides an example: in an original play report (from Alarums & Excursions?) the player complains about how the GM adjudicated the rule that elves can notice concealed doors without searching for them. This is an example of what happens when there is no such thing as expertise because the subject matter (here, the way that elves may or may not notice doors beneath a layer of plaster) is entirely fictional.

2) You contend that in some common modes of play (including trad and neo-trad) GM cannot function as referee

3) Among things that prevent GM functioning as referee by your lights are - a) when they establish truths about setting, b) when they act as a font of unnecessary obstacles, c) when they choose a resolution

4) You contend that 3a, 3b, 3c make GM functionally a player

I content that - to use Suits' terminology - that if a GM shares the prelusory goal of establishing and jointly imagining a shared fiction for amusement then they are, by definition, a player.

A free kriegspiel judge does not have this prelusory goal. Their goal is to provide as accurate as possible answers to questions about what would happen, were the modelled situation a real one. A Braunstein judge, as I understand it, has a similar goal. ToH, as I've said, is a marginal case but much of the time has something like this character.

To give a concrete example: a GM who decides that NPC X does such-and-such a thing because that seems a natural reaction to what the PC just said do them is not refereeing in any interesting sense. They are not adjudicating the application of a rule to a player. They are exercising their "ownership" of one element of the shared fiction - the NPC - to make a contribution to the shared fiction.

The difference from the free kriegspiel judge, who uses their knowledge of actual battles and terrain to decide how the fiction changes if a player (say) has their cavalry formation attempt to ford the river, strikes me as obvious. The judge is applying expert knowledge, to reach an informed opinion, with the purpose of instruction. If they are wrong in their estimation of how the cavalry would go fording the river, they are properly subject to criticism (by fellow judges, perhaps even by the players).

The GM, on the the other hand, is just making something up about the NPC. That it coheres with some other things they made up is neither here nor there for present purposes. It is not an expression of expert knowledge. It is not instructing anyone in anything. It is not subject to criticism as to its accuracy, by reference to an objective standard. I have no objection to nevertheless labelling the GM a referee as a purely conventional label (like Classic Traveller does). But the GM is not a referee in any substantive sense.

5) We agree that wielding rule-changing power may conflict with or disrupt the prelusory-goals/lusory-means/lusory-attitude (what I will call the lusory-fabric), that players must accept (perhaps on account of their being part of what it means to be a player)

6) You contend that wielding rule-changing power inevitably conflicts with or disrupts the lusory-fabric: there is no means of governing the wielding to keep it in compliance

Given that, by definition, adopting the lusory attitude means accepting the rules as constitutive of the activity to be undertaken, then rule-changing powers are a puzzle.

In the tradition that Suits is working in, there is a standard way of handling the puzzle.

For instance, is the power a chess player has to queen a pawn a rule-changing power? The standard treatment of it, rather, is to simply redescribe the rules that govern pawns and the rules that govern how the board is set with pieces to incorporate it as a rule - so there is a rule along the lines of if a pawn reaches the end of the board then its player must remove it from play, and place in the same square their choice of rook, knight, bishop or queen.

Hart takes a similar approach in setting out the game of "scorer's discretion*.

I don't know the card game Mao beyond @Enrahim2's description of it, but we could probably set out the "rule changing power" in similar terms: under the appropriate condition, a player gains the following power: to imagine a constraint, keep it secret, and then - if another player makes a play that violates the imagined constraint - to declare that play invalid (or whatever consequence follows from breaching the player-introduced rule in Mao).

What would rule zero look like, formulated similarly. At first blush, it looks like Under any conditions, this player may declare any other players move invalid; if pressed, they must either introduce a bit of fiction that explains the invalidity, or state a house rule or ruling that explains the invalidity. I contend that such a rule is not a lusory means in Suits's sense. Because in no sense does it establish a "less efficient" means.

9) I contend that 6) is false: that rule-changing authority can be made subject to the lusory-attitude through the proper principles and rules (and that on reflection, it will be seen that this is the only way games can function consistently at all)

No general proposition about "rule changing authority" seems warranted, because some of those can really be restated as rules that will count as lusory means. (See just above.)

I do not see how this can be true of "rule zero", however, as that is usually characterised.

 

[Enrahim2]

Given that, by definition, adopting the lusory attitude means accepting the rules as constitutive of the activity to be undertaken, then rule-changing powers are a puzzle.

In the tradition that Suits is working in, there is a standard way of handling the puzzle.

Ah! I think I see the issue here. Suits "rules" term is as far as I can see more aligned with what forge call "social contract" than what is commonly consider "rules" in an RPG context. I think no one would claim any RPG affords the GM unilateral power to modify the "social contract".

Any analysis of "Rule 0" hence need to be made in context of the RPG culture in question. And how it is to be understood is likely at least as context dependent as the boundaries of what is an acceptable prompt in the game "Simon says".

 

[pemerton]

Ah! I think I see the issue here. Suits "rules" term is as far as I can see more aligned with what forge call "social contract" than what is commonly consider "rules" in an RPG context. I think no one would claim any RPG affords the GM unilateral power to modify the "social contract".

I don't think this is correct. My reading (admittedly of a limited presentation of Suits's work!, but relying on a good knowledge of the relevant philosophical tradition) is that by "rules" he means the rules that govern the play of the game.

What the Forge calls "social contract" is the agreement to be bound by some or other rules. It (very roughly) corresponds to Suits "lusory attitude".

As I posted, the proper analysis of rule zero, in Suits's framework, is going to be as a rule that confers a power on the GM to do certain things. In my post above I set out what that might look like, and contrasted it with the rule in Mao (as I understand that game from your post about it).

 

[clearstream]

What would rule zero look like, formulated similarly. At first blush, it looks like Under any conditions, this player may declare any other players move invalid; if pressed, they must either introduce a bit of fiction that explains the invalidity, or state a house rule or ruling that explains the invalidity. I contend that such a rule is not a lusory means in Suits's sense. Because in no sense does it establish a "less efficient" means.

I'd like to look at this first as it seems that what kind of "rule zero" we're thinking about would be foundational. Further above I accepted @Aldarc's contention that rule forming and modifying is a preexisting capacity. I offered then a definition that rule zero was a regulatory rule assigning right to use that capacity (in the Game) to one participant. I had in mind further regulatory principles and rules, but have not so far spelled them out. Let's call my version thus far (and without those unspelt out principles and rules, of course) rule R.

You here give a far more particular kind of rule zero. Taken literally, it is triggered by another player's move. The right is one of a veto - "No, that move does not happen." A minor duty is attached to it - add some superficially explanatory fiction or reference a house rule (I think that refers to a rule noted at an earlier time by at least the participant wielding the rule zero authority.) Let's call this version rule 0!

There looks like quite a stretch of clear water between our definitions! I would like to propose reconsidering them on the following grounds

• many sources (posters, game texts, articles) refer to using some sort of rule zero power to fill in gaps in the rules, but 0! does not seem to offer that power
• many sources refer to using some sort of rule zero power to deliver a final verdict on rule interpretations, and 0! does not seem to offer that power (R does on the premise that the rule can always be made to conform to the wielder's verdict)
• many sources refer to using some sort of rule zero power to form new rules (i.e. house rules) and in fact that is the origin of rule "0.", but 0! does not seem to offer that power

When I read your version of 0! I picture rewriting it as a regulatory rule like this, in contrast with mine

• 0! = Participants shall submit their Game moves for veto by one participant being the holder of veto power; the veto-holder may offer any reason including no reason for exercising it
• R = One participant shall have exclusive right to form and modify rules in relation to the play of the Game

Note that I believe another rule is always in force, like this

• F = In relation to their preexisting capacity to form and modify rules, all players shall withhold from using that capacity except where expressly authorised by and in accord with the rules and principles governing the Game

For if F were not in force, I do not see how the game could be played at all. (Suits discusses this withholding from doing something well within the participants' power to do, in The Grasshopper, giving various examples.)

9) I contend that 6) is false: that rule-changing authority can be made subject to the lusory-attitude through the proper principles and rules (and that on reflection, it will be seen that this is the only way games can function consistently at all)

No general proposition about "rule changing authority" seems warranted, because some of those can really be restated as rules that will count as lusory means. (See just above.)

I do not see how this can be true of "rule zero", however, as that is usually characterised.

So as noted I would not call 0! the way "rule zero" is usually characterised. It seems more a description of how it might be experienced at some tables! If your meaning is more - this is the upshot of R as I see it - then would you say you therefore accept R?

Whether that is right or not, I feel that it's foundational to have a good grasp of what rule we're picturing. One option could be to just accept R and 0! as equally plausible, and run the arguments against both. Although there I will say in advance that if it turns out that 0! cannot be brought into harmony with the lusory fabric while R can, then R would seem to me to be the better rule. That is, I'm not here solely interested in the history of rule "0." but in current questions concerning GM / GM power. Most acutely, can they wield anything like my R - suitably governed by further rules and principles - without disrupting the lusory fabric? And what would such "suitable" further rules and principles need to look like?

EDIT Finally (and as you've likely noticed) I will at some point contend that if F is not in conflict with the lusory attitude then that rather suggests that R need not be. @Enrahim2 has already laid out some options for dissolving the feared conflicts.

 

[pemerton]

I'd like to look at this first as it seems that what kind of "rule zero" we're thinking about would be foundational. Further above I accepted @Aldarc's contention that rule forming and modifying is a preexisting capacity. I offered then a definition that rule zero was a regulatory rule assigning right to use that capacity (in the Game) to one participant. I had in mind further regulatory principles and rules, but have not so far spelled them out. Let's call my version thus far (and without those unspelt out principles and rules, of course) rule R.

You here give a far more particular kind of rule zero. Taken literally, it is triggered by another player's move. The right is one of a veto - "No, that move does not happen." A minor duty is attached to it - add some superficially explanatory fiction or reference a house rule (I think that refers to a rule noted at an earlier time by at least the participant wielding the rule zero authority.) Let's call this version rule 0!

There looks like quite a stretch of clear water between our definitions!

I don't see the stretch of water. I don't see how what I posted (what you have called Rule 0!) is not a particular instance of your general form R. It assigns a capacity (power) to a participant. That power is governed by regulatory principles/rules (such as the need, when pressed, to refer to rulings and/or fiction).

This is why, as I posted, I have not made any particular assertion about "rule-changing rules" (which I think should, within Suits' framework, be characterised as a form of power-conferring rule). Whether or not they are candidate lusory means is not content-independent.

 

[clearstream]

I don't see the stretch of water. I don't see how what I posted (what you have called Rule 0!) is not a particular instance of your general form R. It assigns a capacity (power) to a participant. That power is governed by regulatory principles/rules (such as the need, when pressed, to refer to rulings and/or fiction).

Is it right then to say that your experiences of this unsuitable wielding of R - one governed by rules and principles focused on invalidating the moves of other participants - lead you to believe that no suitable wielding is possible? For the proposition that R0! is an instance of R and can be wielded in just that way (including for instance the need, when pressed, to refer to rulings etc.) concedes that the wielder can indeed constrain themselves to obey the outlined regulations... including one that is less efficient than a simple "No."

On surface then, that seems like agreement that R can be made to submit to other rules and principles. Is that implication right to draw, or do you have something in mind that might forestall it?

This is why, as I posted, I have not made any particular assertion about "rule-changing rules" (which I think should, within Suits' framework, be characterised as a form of power-conferring rule). Whether or not they are candidate lusory means is not content-independent.

Unwinding the double-negative, I think you are saying that it is dependent on content whether a rule-changing rule is a candidate lusory means. Is that right? What sort of content do you have in mind?

 

[Enrahim2]

I don't think this is correct. My reading (admittedly of a limited presentation of Suits's work!, but relying on a good knowledge of the relevant philosophical tradition) is that by "rules" he means the rules that govern the play of the game.

What the Forge calls "social contract" is the agreement to be bound by some or other rules. It (very roughly) corresponds to Suits "lusory attitude".

As I posted, the proper analysis of rule zero, in Suits's framework, is going to be as a rule that confers a power on the GM to do certain things. In my post above I set out what that might look like, and contrasted it with the rule in Mao (as I understand that game from your post about it).

I think we agree. Comparing terminology in two completely diffrent paradigms are extremely hard. I agree that "social contract" appear to at least encompas lusory attitude according to my understanding as well. But my understanding of the term "social contract" do not only encompas the agreement to paricipate on the activity's terms, but also the (unwritten) agreed upon terms themselves. It is these (unwritten) terms I think might be corresponding to Suits' rules, while I think they are distinct from what we normally consider "rules" in an rpg setting.

But I think maybe I can try to explain my perspective a step better by bringing in yet another paradigm. In afairs of state, there are a well established distinction between constitution, law and executive orders. In a democracy changing the constitution tend to be possible, but usually require giving the entire population a chance to voice their opinion trough referendum or election. However changing the laws can be done by a legislative branch without broader involvement by the rest of the population. These laws further can empower the executive branch to issue executive orders that further elaborates the laws.

For most board games the rules correspond to the constitution. The rules can be changed, but that require common agreement. In my understanding this is what Suits is talking about when he refers to rules. Most games have only constitution, and no law on top (and no defined means in the constitution to add any laws beyond those found in the constitution). Turnament games might define a judical branch, in the shape of one or more referees, and the moves they define the players to allow to make might have some slight resemblance of defining an executive branch. However, anything resembling a legislative branch is exceedingly rare.

And I think this is the thing that rule 0 does, that makes the water so murky. It at least on the surface grant legislative powers to the GM, and does so as part of the "constitution", as it is explicitely stated in the game text. This causes a situation where in these RPGs it suddenly make sense to distinguish between "constitution" (processes of play that can only be altered trough participant consensus), and other "rules", that can be changed unilaterally by the GM. In most states the constitution is miniscule compared to the total body of the law.

I think Suits' analysis makes perfect sense if you read his "rules" as the legal "constitution". And for likely all the games within his intended scope of analysis this indeed covers all rules. However in terms of Rule 0, these are actually exactly describing the "rules" that is not subject to be changed - the exceptions to the rule. But I guess you would not hold it against anyone if they claim "lawmakers can change the laws" without every time adding "except the constitution" - that sort of go without saying? I think it is the same with "The GM can change the rules". It isnunderstood that this do not imply changing the social foundational assumptions for the shared activity, but rather the more arbitrary suggested structures buildt on top of those central assumptions.

The questions about what in a game text is constitution, and what is legislation is of course a tricky question I don't think I have seen any rule 0 game try to properly clarify. But it is hard to talk about rule 0 without acknowledging that rule 0 implies there to be such a distinction.

(I also hope this can help distinguish between the concept of establishing precedent trough ruling in cases where the written rules are unclear. This is a topic I see often are brought in when talking about rule 0, but I think actually is somewhat orthogonal. Filling in holes is a natural referee job, that can be done without rule 0. Rule 0 however allow for adding procedures beyond what would make sense for a referee, allowing the GM to do more active experience design)