This along with
@pemerton's Goldilocks thought experiment put in mind some additional thoughts that may evade the obstacles presented by our disparate theoretical underpinnings.
In the past, I have said something like the bolded part with respect to MC choice of hard and soft moves from prompts that at times seem to me too thin. One example was the 6- hard move from Hack and Slash. Other posters made the argument that the hard move is sufficiently well constrained. I'll assume, but I could be mistaken, that all agree that within such constraints a vast number of variations are possible so that were we to picture two groups proceeding from the identical situation, one MC might choose one hard move and a second a different hard move... distributed normally.
Deciding what comes next in the Goldilocks example is for many imaginers somewhat constrained. The fictional position isn't very detailed, but as to the details that are there it's not taxing to form intuitions. Such intuitions depend on some sort of internal model of bears, hydration, buckets, wells, etc. While there are vastly many variations possible, norms will apply i.e. those in the conversation will be able to form a consensus about outre and normal answers to "What happens next?"
In the real world, faced with that question one strategy is simply - wait and see. Dr Science with their model of the weather can make a prediction for Sunday, and when Sunday comes around they can see if their prediction is validated. This strategy is not available in imaginary worlds. What happens on Sunday is down to what we decide happens on Sunday. This revises the purpose of models in respect of imaginary worlds. The test that you and I have in our respective ways demanded, is that the game systems should prove normative.
That is why I suggested further above that rather than models or simulations, we should be thinking in terms of normative functions that map from A to B. I mean "functions" in a very open sense - any heuristic that the group can accept the results of will do... which can be made more often true if the group enter into social contracts to sustain an attitude of such acceptance.
If a participant whose turn it is to imagine what the bear does next says - "She dips the bucket in the well" - there is no waiting to see if that will be validated or not. The only test for its predictive accuracy is consent.