It's worth noting that the only reason I have for believing those reasons about antigens and the rapid test is that the doctor told me, and he is an authority. I have no independent access to the plausibility of those reasons.
That's nice, but not terribly relevant. Again, glad your daughter is well.
If a geographer tells me the world is round, and a flat-earther tells me that the earth is flat, there is a contention between two parties. But it has no bearing on whether or not I should take the geographer at his/her word, because of the two contending parties only one - the geographer - is an expert.
There isn't overwhelming evidence that philosophers and lawyers, much less published writers, have a relevance when deciding the absolute meaning of irrational.
That is an illustration of the point made on the Wikipedia page, that only controversy between experts casts doubt on the reliability of expert testimony as a guide to the truth.
It doesn't actually say that. It says that the presence of a consensus lends credence to the presumption of truth. Reveiwing your flat earth example, the word of an expert that the world is round paired with the existence of a consensus on that matter means that there is a presumption that the statement that the world is round is true. It shifts into fallacy the moment you insist that it must be true because of those things. You're insisting.
Perhaps [MENTION=23751]Maxperson[/MENTION] is also experienced in the use of the word "irrational" among those who have a reason to care about reasons and reasoning. But no such experience has been mentioned to date in this thread.
And he hasn't mentioned his credentials to lend weight to his arguments, either. This isn't about whether you or Maxperson is correct on the issue of the meaning of irrationality -- I"m not arguing that at all. I'm stating that you engaged in a argument from authority, and an fallacious one, but that, given it's an informal fallacy, that doesn't make your conclusion necessarily wrong. It just meant you mentioning your philosophy and law and writing backgrounds were a poor argument for you conclusion.
By the phrase word usage is empirical in nature do you mean knowledge of word usage is empirical in nature? Because I only talked about the second.
I don't understand your distinction.
I hope it is fairly clear that I am not talking about "prescriptive usage". I am talking about facts of usage. If someone wants to argue that fact of usage among academic philosophers and lawyers have no bearing on the permissible usage of "irrational", go to town! I haven't seen that argument yet, though.
It's not clear, as you're actually prescribing the definition of irrational to be what you say it is and not anything else. That's kinda exactly what prescriptivism is.
As for the usage among academics, sure, that can be relevant. You being a philosopher or lawyer isn't necessarily so, though, and that's what we're discussing. You didn't describe the usage among academics, you said that you were the only philosopher and lawyer published in the argument, so we should listen to you. Argument from authority.
As far as "descriptive" usage, knowledge of that - ie knowledge of facts of word usage - is acquired empirically (ie by observation - including testimony - and by inference from those observed facts), not by logical or mathematical demonstration.
Not necessarily, but I'm not going to go into that particular can of worms. Let's let it lie, as my arguments don't depend on it I'll even withdraw the statement.
Argument from authority isn't only invalid in deductive reasoning, that's just one of the areas where it's always invalid.
You misdescribe my argument.
I used the word "irrational" in a post. [MENTION=23751]Maxperson[/MENTION] queried my usage. I replied that my usage is consistent with the usage of a group of professionals (academic lawyers and philosophers) who have good reason to care, more than most, about the use of that word; and that I know this because I am a member of that group of professionals.
Here is a more formal statement of the argument that I have presented:
(1) Academic lawyers and philosophers have a particular reason (flowing from their professional concerns) to care about the use of the word "irrational".
Therefore,
(2) The usage among that group is a permissible - even, perhaps, a canonical - usage.
(3) I am an academic lawyer and philosopher.
Therefore,
(4) I am familiar with the usage, among that group, of the word "irrational".
Therefore, I am in a position to assert that
(5) My usage of that word in this thread is consistent with the usage among that group.
Therefore,
(6) My usage in this thread is permissible, and perhaps even an instance of a canonical usage.
I think that this argument is valid (though not deductively so, at least as I have presented it - eg the move from (1) to (2) rests on unstated premises about how permissibility of word use is established; the move from (3) to (4) rests on an empirical conjecture that membership of a group results in familiarity with its practices, including practices of word usage - but I have not seen anyone contest these unstated premises).
The only appeal to expertise is in relation to (5). That is, instead of instancing the usage of academic lawyers and philosphers and thereby indicating that my usage is consistent with it, I assert, on the basis of my familiarity with their usage, that my usage is consistent with it.[/quote]
I get that you want to slightly rewrite your argument, but that's not how it was presented. Intended, perhaps, but not presented.
If you, or Maxperson, or anyone else wants to rebut my reply, you need to attack either (2), (4) or (5). That is, you need to show (i) that there is no reason to have regard to the usage among the relevant group of professionals in determining the permissible use of the word, or (ii) that I am wrong about their usage, or (iii) that I am wrong in my assertion that my usage in this thread is consistent with their usage.
Um, no. If one can show any of that chain to be false, that's sufficient to call the result into doubt. You can't constrain your opponents into only attacking your argument along those paths you choose for them. Either it's all open or you're not presenting an honest argument.
Let me reorganize your argument a bit.
1) some authorities care about how a specific word is used.
2) that word has a commonly understood meaning within that authority
3) I am a member of the authority
4) I know the common use of that word within the authority
5) my use of that word is in agreement with that common use
therefore
6) my use of that word in a manner consistent with the common use within that authority is correct in this case, which is not within that authority.
This is an appeal to authority. You've established the authority, declared yourself a member, and then presented that since the authority, which you are a member of, does it this way, that way is correct. Or:
X holds that A is true. -- pemerton holds that his use of 'irrational' is correct.
X is an authority on the subject. -- pemerton is an authority on the use of 'irrational'
The consensus of authorities agrees with X. -- The consensus of pemerton's authority buddies agree with pemerton
There is a presumption that A is true.[11] -- Therefore pemerton is correct about the use of 'irrational'
You see the difference in that last line? You went from a presumption that your use of irrational is correct to a statement that your use must be correct. Hence the appeal to authority.
[But none of that would make me guilty of a fallacy. It would simply show that one or more of the premises is false. (And hence that the argument, while valid, is not sound.)
And that's what the
informal fallacy of appeal to authority means -- that the argument is unsound, not that the conclusion is necessarily incorrect. It's the formal fallacies that are both unsound and automatically incorrect. I'm not arguing that you were incorrect, I'm arguing that you used a bad argument.
There's no question begging. I simply affirm what, by Wikipedia, is the second premise in the standard form of the argument; and what, in my restatement of the argument, are premises (4) and (5). It's not question begging to reiterate the premises of my argument in circumstances where no on has offered any criticism of them.
You cited your confidence in your correctness as evidence that you were correct. Begging the question.
Are you intending to offer such criticism? Do you think I am mischaracterising the usage of "irrational" among academic lawyers and philosophers, or the consistency of my usage with theirs?
I don't rightly care. I'm in this because I clarified that an appeal to authority isn't a fallacy unless used in place of an argument supporting a conclusion. I further clarified that, even then, it's an informal fallacy and that means it's just a bad argument, not that the conclusion is automatically false. And yet, here we are, with you asking me if I think you were incorrect about 'irrational' because I noted that you made an appeal to authority, and it's happened because you responded to the very post I clarified the informal nature of the fallacy. Sheesh, irony abounds, and no good (and pedantic) deed goes unpunished.
