Thunderfoot
Hero
Well, Normandy specifically is where my area of expertise lies in WWII. SO I'll tackle this one and let others dovetail it. (or pick it apart).
There are Four major components to the "success"of the Allies on Normandy.
1) Misinformation about Overlord: All the information the Germans received about Overlord was dropped in their laps by the Allies. Hitler was sure of two things, that the attack would be at Pas de Calais and that the spearhead would be led by their best General, Patton. When Allied intelligence got a hold of this, they ran with it. They assigned Gen Patton control of the 1st U.S. Army Group (FUSAG) and Headquartered him in northern England. The army's total strength was 12 people plus one attached psychological ops company (about 42 men total). The 12 people were the radio operator, the cypher operator, his personal aide, his secretary, his driver, his cook, and the ancillary staff that make up an HQ detachment. Executive Officer, Senior NCO, etc.
If this were to have been uncovered by the Germans, then the entire landing would have been completely unraveled before it began.
2) Reserves were to be released only by Hitler. The Panzer Group West (which included the 6th SS Panzer Division) were held in reserves in case of a naval landing in Europe. These were only released when Der Fuhrer gave the order. On the night in question, a series of unrelated events ensured that this would not happen on time. Field Marshal Rommel was out of the area (attending a wedding I believe) and FM Von Runsteadt (the acting commander) could not react because, when he phoned to get the reserves released, an aide told him, "The Fuhrer has a headache and has gone to sleep, he cannot be disturbed until morning." and then hung up. This means the reserves that could have ended the attacks before they began sat in the rear and did nothing... for two days.
If the reserves had been allowed to roll on time, the outcome of the initial invasion might well have been turned into a route ala Dunkirk.
3) The deception at Pas de Calais: On the evening on June 5th, two RAF fighter bomber squadrons in conjunction with SAS troops staged two deceptive maneuvers that continued the ruse of PdC. The SAS and their air unit dropped dummy paratroopers all over the northern region of France to coincide with the Airborne drops at Normandy. The two RAF f/b squads then dropped foil paper "windows" (modern lang. chaff) that simulated small craft towing anti-air balloons on German radar. So the Germans saw a larger landing force in the North than the real invasion force in the South.
If Luftwaffe spotter planes had been allowed to fly overwatch flights when the initial "invasion force" was noted in the water, the "ghost fleet" would have been revealed for what it was; a ruse. (Part of the reason the Luftwaffe was not released was the extremely foul weather that had socked in the coast for the prior couple of weeks that may have blown back in during the time. The Allies gambled on it staying clear, the Nazis that it would stay stormy, the Allies gamble paid off.)
4) The unimproved breastworks of Normandy. When FM Rommel took over as commander OKW (over kommandier western armie group), the first thing he did was notice the allied pattern of naval landings, especially those that happened in Sicily and noticed what terrain was similar in France. He immediately had those areas reinforced with concrete bunkers, breastworks and naval defense guns. The bays were trapped with landing craft deterrents and the approaches broken up with debris, tanglefoot barbed wire and mines. However, his defense had to take in all of the French coast and his ability to get supplies to the south hampered by allied air raids on trainborne shipping. When the Allies got there they noticed the concrete gun emplacements for shore defense had the mounts installed but in most cases the guns had yet to be mounted.
If the full breastworks had been in place when the Allies began the assault, there would have been higher casualty rates as well as a good possibility of naval losses long before they got to the assigned drop-off areas. Naval casualties were nearly non-existent (a few Higgins boat drivers and some personnel strafed by a couple of Luftwaffe planes.), the loss of even two cruisers or one LCS could have changed the tide before the invasion even really got underway.
Another possibility but one that cannot truly be proven or disproved.
Another event that may have helped the Allies was the failed Airborne attack on the night of June 5th. I say failed because 0% of the paratroopers fell on their assigned drop zones. Instead the units were scattered to the four winds and linked up creating "mini units" taking out what they could until they would find their "real" units the next day. The effect this had was that the Germans thought the number of paratroopers dropped were far greater than the actual number, some estimates are up to 17x greater. If the airborne operation had gone off like planned, it is possible that they would have been less effective and more likely to have been contained ahead of the actual invasion.
Hope this gives you lots to think about.
There are Four major components to the "success"of the Allies on Normandy.
1) Misinformation about Overlord: All the information the Germans received about Overlord was dropped in their laps by the Allies. Hitler was sure of two things, that the attack would be at Pas de Calais and that the spearhead would be led by their best General, Patton. When Allied intelligence got a hold of this, they ran with it. They assigned Gen Patton control of the 1st U.S. Army Group (FUSAG) and Headquartered him in northern England. The army's total strength was 12 people plus one attached psychological ops company (about 42 men total). The 12 people were the radio operator, the cypher operator, his personal aide, his secretary, his driver, his cook, and the ancillary staff that make up an HQ detachment. Executive Officer, Senior NCO, etc.
If this were to have been uncovered by the Germans, then the entire landing would have been completely unraveled before it began.
2) Reserves were to be released only by Hitler. The Panzer Group West (which included the 6th SS Panzer Division) were held in reserves in case of a naval landing in Europe. These were only released when Der Fuhrer gave the order. On the night in question, a series of unrelated events ensured that this would not happen on time. Field Marshal Rommel was out of the area (attending a wedding I believe) and FM Von Runsteadt (the acting commander) could not react because, when he phoned to get the reserves released, an aide told him, "The Fuhrer has a headache and has gone to sleep, he cannot be disturbed until morning." and then hung up. This means the reserves that could have ended the attacks before they began sat in the rear and did nothing... for two days.
If the reserves had been allowed to roll on time, the outcome of the initial invasion might well have been turned into a route ala Dunkirk.
3) The deception at Pas de Calais: On the evening on June 5th, two RAF fighter bomber squadrons in conjunction with SAS troops staged two deceptive maneuvers that continued the ruse of PdC. The SAS and their air unit dropped dummy paratroopers all over the northern region of France to coincide with the Airborne drops at Normandy. The two RAF f/b squads then dropped foil paper "windows" (modern lang. chaff) that simulated small craft towing anti-air balloons on German radar. So the Germans saw a larger landing force in the North than the real invasion force in the South.
If Luftwaffe spotter planes had been allowed to fly overwatch flights when the initial "invasion force" was noted in the water, the "ghost fleet" would have been revealed for what it was; a ruse. (Part of the reason the Luftwaffe was not released was the extremely foul weather that had socked in the coast for the prior couple of weeks that may have blown back in during the time. The Allies gambled on it staying clear, the Nazis that it would stay stormy, the Allies gamble paid off.)
4) The unimproved breastworks of Normandy. When FM Rommel took over as commander OKW (over kommandier western armie group), the first thing he did was notice the allied pattern of naval landings, especially those that happened in Sicily and noticed what terrain was similar in France. He immediately had those areas reinforced with concrete bunkers, breastworks and naval defense guns. The bays were trapped with landing craft deterrents and the approaches broken up with debris, tanglefoot barbed wire and mines. However, his defense had to take in all of the French coast and his ability to get supplies to the south hampered by allied air raids on trainborne shipping. When the Allies got there they noticed the concrete gun emplacements for shore defense had the mounts installed but in most cases the guns had yet to be mounted.
If the full breastworks had been in place when the Allies began the assault, there would have been higher casualty rates as well as a good possibility of naval losses long before they got to the assigned drop-off areas. Naval casualties were nearly non-existent (a few Higgins boat drivers and some personnel strafed by a couple of Luftwaffe planes.), the loss of even two cruisers or one LCS could have changed the tide before the invasion even really got underway.
Another possibility but one that cannot truly be proven or disproved.
Another event that may have helped the Allies was the failed Airborne attack on the night of June 5th. I say failed because 0% of the paratroopers fell on their assigned drop zones. Instead the units were scattered to the four winds and linked up creating "mini units" taking out what they could until they would find their "real" units the next day. The effect this had was that the Germans thought the number of paratroopers dropped were far greater than the actual number, some estimates are up to 17x greater. If the airborne operation had gone off like planned, it is possible that they would have been less effective and more likely to have been contained ahead of the actual invasion.
Hope this gives you lots to think about.
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