I would appreciate that, yes, because I don't see how that premise doesn't apply to literally every possible interaction in a TTRPG.
No matter what you do, someone had to present someone with something. Otherwise we're just sitting there doing nothing, talking about nothing. The silent regard of slow things.
I don't need to post a longer explanation, as you've arrived at the core of it yourself!
All interactions between RPG participants take place in the real world, and are subject to the real social dynamics that operate between people who have agreed to play a game together.
And they therefore do not, generally, resemble the interactions that the game participants are imagining taking place.
Just as one example, talking to someone about how you (in imagination) are poking around a desk looking for stuff is
not the same as actually poking around a desk looking for stuff. When I actually poke around my desk looking for (say) my charging cord (which was a thing I did yesterday), maybe I don't find it because, being white, in the unlit room it camouflages against paper (for some of its length), while other bits of its length are under a book (this happened to me yesterday; I went and got a cord from somewhere else). But when I talk to you about poking around a desk looking for a charging cord, there is not light and shade and camouflage and obscuring by objects: there is only talking and imagining.
the core of my point was that we can (and some philosophers do!) talk about things like "Pegasus has feathers" as a meaningful statement about something, something with value and merit, even though Pegasus does not in fact exist.
I don't know what "value and merit" mean here.
To pick a famous example:
The present king of France is bald is of course perfectly meaningful. That doesn't meant that France is actually a monarchy!
How, then, do we deal with the "Pegasus has feathers" problem?
There is no problem, certainly not in the context of this discussion (which is not a logic or linguistics seminar).
I've already shown you one analysis: we treats "is Pegasus* as predicate, perhaps as synonymous with "the feathered-winged horse ridden by Bellerophon".
In general, it is not uncommon for people to talk about things that don't exist: consider
Napoleon's grand stature; or
the snow on the Saharan sand dunes. These are perfectly meaningful noun phrases, which no fluent English speaker will have trouble understanding. This doesn't mean they refer to anything real!
If you don't like red, how about "three"? There's a huge philosophical debate--I'm quite well aware of this one--about whether "three" exists or not. Is it just a name we invented? (Then why does it achieve results?) Is it somehow an existing abstract object? (What the hell would that even mean?) Is it a complete fiction, such that all mathematical statements are simply false? (Then why is it so intimately related with logic, and why does it achieve results?)
Are you among those who would deny that mathematical statements can be true? If so I don't think there's a whole lot more we're going to be able to talk about; that would mean we disagree on something so philosophically fundamental we don't really have much common ground for a discussion on this topic
Well,
three is taken by Russell to be the class of all triples (if I'm remembering correctly). And there are more contemporary set-theoretic treatments.
When it comes to philosophy of mathematics more generally, in this thread I've already pointed to four approaches: Hilbert's formalism, Platonism, Brouwer's intuitionism, and Wittgenstein's radical constructivism. My understanding, from the mathematicians I know, is that most assume some form of formalism to be true.
Anyway, it seems to me that the more that you regard
Narnia as having the same metaphysical or logical status as number, the closer you are to agreeing with me, that a shared fiction can yield inferences which are therefore not
created by those who draw them. This is how a lot of RPGing works.
And those constraints on inference - that follow from genre, trope, a shared sense among the group of what is salient, the way that things are presented in play, etc - operate as much on material introduced during the course of play as they do on material authored in advance of play.