If *I* say "in my experience, foo", then *I* should not necessarily take foo as plausible, either.
This is true, but it ignores that you can be a better judge of your experience than you can be of anyone else's. Your experience of foo may be faulty in some way -- "my experience" has limitations -- but it is a foolish man indeed who assumes that his experience is invalid simply because it might be invalid.
To take an obvious example, it is probably your experience that the world around you exists. Indeed, it is probably your overwhelming experience that the world around you exists. However, you have no way of knowing this to be the case (your experience could be illusory).
Now, were I to tell you that my experience is that the world is illusory....that I can do "Neo in the Matrix" things.....is it still probably plausible that my experience is foo? I would suggest that it is not. Moreover, I would suggest that it is not plausible for the simple reason that my statement doesn't have sufficient evidenciary value to overweigh your experience in the matter.
If everyone you knew made the same claim, even if they couldn't demonstrate it to you (perhaps you have to believe to see?), it still might not be enough evidence to convince you. Or it might; it depends upon the barrier of your skepticism. You would have to make some best guess at the odds that you are wrong in your experience/your interpretation of your experience.
The point is, though, that your skepticism
per se isn't irrational.
I've been trying to argue that if someone says "my experience is foo", then it is probably plausible that their experience is foo.
However, it is the relationship between one's own experience, and what one is being told is anothers' experience, that determines the amount of credence one gives that testimony.
Thus, if you tell me "I like Doritos", I am likely to accept that as true. (I.e., it is plausible that your experience is foo, and foo is plausible as well.)
If you tell me "I have seen bigfoot", I may believe that you believe this, but I am unlikely to believe that you are correct. (I.e., it may be plausible that your experience is foo. Taking foo in general as plausible is another issue.)
If you tell me "The ghost of Gary Gygax DMs games at my house", I am unlikely even to believe that you believe that. (I.e., not only is it not plausible that foo in general is plausible, it is not plausible that your experience is foo.)
In none of those case, though, do I know that my conclusions are correct. What I am estimating is how likely I believe my conclusion to be correct when I decide that I believe you, I believe you believe something you are mistaken about, or I believe that you are just making up some wackly BS.
RC