Ryan Dancey - D&D in a Death Spiral

Many of these symptoms were actually there by 3.5. Basically, WotC avoided the so-called "supplement treadmill" for perhaps 3 years (and given how line management works this was probably contemplated as early as 2002). The company dropped brown softcovers pretty damned quick and eventually took over the niches they'd left to third party publishers.

I remember hilarious complaints from WotC staff that publishers weren't using the OGL properly. Good companies apparently should have just done D&D adventures and settings that were PHB-centric, and were Bad for wanting to nurture independent identities. That tells you how well management thought the OGL was helping D&D sales.

DDI follows the pattern of promising more than the company can deliver on the electronic front, but we're talking about a project that was struck by some disasters (such as a murder-suicide) that can't be blamed on a poor strategy. Estimates based purely on salary aren't going to work because the IT infrastructure costs money too.

The truth is probably that the ideal of an evergreen set of core rules is foolish to pursue and fails to deal with the hobby games market's nature, and this was true even when 3e was launched -- it was just disguised by the fact that an overhaul of D&D was long overdue. Yes, greying geeks like the idea of an edition that will last forever, but a winning business model is more like to resemble WH40K's, with a regular cycle of iterative updates (which is better for us greying types since we can kludge things when the rules are very similar). Perhaps Essentials reflects this awareness, though it is a confusing execution.

So I would say that yes, sales are declining. I would also say that this was probably par for the course for 3e, too, because "reprint the PHB forever" was a failed plan in all incarnations.
 
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I find it... incomprehensible, to be honest.

Take your typical Full Time Employee (FTE). Let's think about their salary and benefits for one year, and find a round number for it - $100K for our "back of the envelope" consideration.

Spending $30 million would have been paying for 300 person-years of effort - that's like a team of 30 people working on it for a decade!

I do not believe it possible that WotC, which has otherwise shown some solid comprehension of economics, would spend such money on the online initiatives.

If they had... well, I think several upper management would have needed to be fired.
While I agree with the reasoning here I could still see them spending that kind of money but not all on software.
If they outfitted a datacenter and all that goes with it trhat would be a fair chunk of change. But mosty of that spending is still of value even if the specs are in excess of current requirements.

Of course if they did not build their own datacenter then I really do not see where that money would go.
 

I remember hilarious complaints from WotC staff that publishers weren't using the OGL properly by just writing D&D adventures and settings that were PHB-centric.

If so, that is a direct consequence of not making part of the new material OGC, and hence usable, by 3pp.

If more of the later materials had been made OGC, 3pp would have used that material, which would have essentially been advertisement for the WotC book it was from.


RC
 

I honestly haven't paid attention to exactly who was in what seats at WotC. Did they lose their CEO? If not, then they probably didn't throw away that kind of money.

August 2007 - WotC announces 4th Edition
March 2008 - Loren Greenwood steps down as CEO, Greg Leeds takes over
July 2008 - WotC announces Gleemax to be discontinued
December 2008 - Randy Buehler (VP of Digital Gaming) et al. let go by WotC

I do not remember exactly when Gleemax was announced or what (if any) relationship existed between what WotC was trying to do with Gleemax and what WotC was trying to do with M:tG Online or DDi. However, it seems that everyone, including top management, who were involved with Gleemax are no longer with the company.
 

While I agree with the reasoning here I could still see them spending that kind of money but not all on software.
If they outfitted a datacenter and all that goes with it trhat would be a fair chunk of change. But mosty of that spending is still of value even if the specs are in excess of current requirements.

Of course if they did not build their own datacenter then I really do not see where that money would go.

It is easier for money to disappear like that if they don't build their own datacenter - if they contract to some other organization for such, then they spend money but have no hardware to show for it in the end.

Mind you, hardware is cheap, by comparison to people. I've had occasion to work in MIT's IT shop - fully half their budget is simply salaries and employee benefits. The other half is everything else. Hardware costs are only one piece of that everything else.

August 2007 - WotC announces 4th Edition
March 2008 - Loren Greenwood steps down as CEO, Greg Leeds takes over
July 2008 - WotC announces Gleemax to be discontinued
December 2008 - Randy Buehler (VP of Digital Gaming) et al. let go by WotC

Okay, that is consistent with someone having screwed up royally. Color me somewhat less skeptical.
 

The truth is probably that the ideal of an evergreen set of core rules is foolish to pursue and fails to deal with the hobby games market's nature, and this was true even when 3e was launched -- it was just disguised by the fact that an overhaul of D&D was long overdue. Yes, greying geeks like the idea of an edition that will last forever, but a winning business model is more like to resemble WH40K's, with a regular cycle of iterative updates (which is better for us greying types since we can kludge things when the rules are very similar). Perhaps Essentials reflects this awareness, though it is a confusing execution.

Wasn't Games Workshop in pretty serious financial trouble a few years ago? Have they been able to pull themselves together?
 





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