Okay, so I did a quick dive into one issue because it was bugging me and I had noted it in the above essay.
In the district court's opinion, we see the following:
Finally, though the remaining factual statements have objective truth value and implicate LaNasa’s character at least to some degree, (see 2d Am. Compl. ¶ 22 (alleging {Tenkar} accused LaNasa of “not paying his employees” and trying to dox them and that {Tenkar} claimed LaNasa was kicked out of the military)), LaNasa still has not stated a claim with respect to those statements because he failed to plead that any of them is false. Under New York law, falsity is an element of defamation, not an affirmative defense to it. Tannerite Sports, LLC v. NBCUniversal News Grp., 864 F.3d 236, 246–47 (2d Cir. 2017). Thus, at the pleadings stage, the plaintiff has the burden to allege facts supporting a reasonable inference that an allegedly defamatory statement was false. Id. at 247. A bare assertion that a statement was “false” does not suffice without some factual explanation as to how the statement was false. Id. at 245; see Henry v. Fox News Network LLC, 629 F. Supp. 3d 136, 147 (S.D.N.Y. 2022) (dismissing defamation claim for failure to allege falsity where plaintiff failed to allege facts supporting reasonable inference that defendant’s internal investigation that led to his firing was a “sham”). Here, paragraph 22 of LaNasa’s Second Amended Complaint, the only paragraph arguably containing any falsifiable defamatory matter, simply begins with a boilerplate conclusory statement that {Tenkar} made “knowingly, malicious, and intentional and false defamatory statements” and then proceeds to list a litany of examples without any detail explaining how those statements are false. (See 2d Am. Compl. ¶ 22.) LaNasa’s pleading strategy evidently was to prioritize quantity over quality, throwing as many allegedly defamatory statements as he could at the wall to see what would stick. That strategy failed. He simply described some very nasty opinions and commentary by {Tenkar} that may or may not have been true.
Opinion pp. 23-25. This was the part I was worried about. This is addressed in the brief (pp. 46-48).
So I went ahead and looked at the cases cited. First thing I noticed- Lanasa is almost entirely citing state court cases, and some of them are just trial court opinions. Uh oh.
Then I actually went and looked at the major cite from the district court's opinion -
Tannerite Sports, LLC v. NBCUniversal News Grp., 864 F.3d 236, 246–47 (2d Cir. 2017). You can look at it as well, here-
scholar.google.com
So now we get back into that Erie issue- we are applying Federal procedure (pleading standards) to the New York law. Under New York law, falsity is an element that must be plead.
And if you file a complaint in federal court, you must plead sufficient facts for each element of the claim (this is valled the Iqbal/Twombly standard). So when you plead a New York defamation claim in federal court, you cannot just say that the statement is false, you ALSO have to provide factual allegations that would allow a reasonable person to think it is false.
"Because falsity is an element of New York's defamation tort, and "falsity" refers to material not substantially true, the complaint in this case must plead facts that, if proven, would establish that the defendant's statements were not substantially true."
Tanner Sports, 864 F. 3d at 247.
Now that I have seen this, I think that Lanasa really didn't understand the problem with the claim. Arguing state court cases is precisely the wrong way to do it. Because the problem is that you have to hit the federal pleading standard, which he didn't.
The more I look, the worse it is. IMO.