I think a lot of the thread has drifted (and I've contributed to that) from the fundamental point, at least as I'm interpreting the question in the OP. And that is fundamentally the philosophical question of the connection between moral/ethical responsibility and agency. So, I guess I'll just bite the hook and go into the real topic.
A lot of people are straight up assuming the consequentialist position. Well, I don't take that position (at least wholly). Consequentialism, or "the ends justifies the means" has historically been a pretty terrible way to run things. There is a
reason that deontological ethics, where the focus is on the act/choice itself, rather than the consequences, has been so popular historically. Basically, consequentialism only works reliably if you know everything and can accurately predict all the consequences. Deontological ethics have appeal because such ethics, when well-chosen, will, when followed, create a society with better overall consequences for its inhabitants. Deontological ethics actually do a better job creating desireable consequences than the consequentialist ethical position that is designed to do just that.
Unless you are are omniscient (and even D&D gods generally aren't) consequentialism can backfire spectacularly, such as when you murder a smaller number of people to prevent the deaths of a greater number of people--only to find out that you were lied to about the premise, and now the only people who are dead are the ones you murdered. And now you're a murderer: congratulations.
Deontological ethics can, of course, backfire, generally due to having a crappy set of rules or values on which to act. Fortunately, most real-life deontological systems have very similar sets of rules and values that tend to work when followed. There is also nothing about deontological ethics that requires one to act "lawful stupid", unless stupid choices are codified into the obligations. There can be rules, obligations, and virtues that included discretion about how to apply them, sometimes including a degree of consequentialism. The big difference is that those circumstantial decisions are about the little things, and they are based on the assumption of following the big rules. This allows you to make decisions with minimal chance of really messing something up.
There is also the virtue element that consistently making honorable choices makes you a more trustworthy and reliable person and increases social cohesion. I would much rather associate in dangerous situations with people who have a comprehensible deontological system of ethics that I can rely on them to attempt to follow, than with people who are making their ethical decisions based on their own confidence in their ability to predict the future, and might turn and murder me or anyone else if they truly believed it would lead to a greater good. In other words, better social bonds are created between people who follow deontological ethics. A great example might be soldiers. While there are a lot of tough decisions that need to be made, being able to reliably trust that there are things your comrades in arms will not do (such as stabbing you in the back when you have done nothing to violate your shared sense of honor) is basically required to function.
From a primarily deontological perspective, it makes sense that "willing" is about your choices--the only element of an equation over which you have actual control. The consequentialist arguments being made seem to be applying "willingly" to which outcome you want (will) to have happen, which has the drawbacks I mentioned, ie, you can't control the outcomes of your acts/choices, only your choices themselves.
And yet, even in thread, we're seeing
@Sword of Spirit saying that the paladin should commit suicide. Even when that suicide will gain nothing and is in direct contravention of some of the paladin's oaths, we're still expected to play paladins as Lawful Stupid.
I'm most definitely not saying that. (And I'll clarify that I don't think the paladin in the other thread was guilty of murder per se--though I do think they were guilty of a major transgression of a traditional paladin's oath.) I am saying that making a choice to do something noble which in many cases (though probably not this one) can lead to positive outcomes, despite believing that the likely outcome this time around is that someone will murder you, is a noble choice and act of
your will. The other person's choice to murder you in response to your noncompliance is not you committing suicide--it is them committing murder. This is a classic disagreement about whether your primary locus of control is your own actions or the actions that you think someone else may take because of them.
I include being forced under duress as falling under the auspices of an unwilling act.
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I do not consider being forced to do something as a willing act, and I find the notion preposterous.
I don't. Being under duress can be a mitigating factor in assessing the severity of someone's guilt--but "Hitler would have executed me if I didn't murder those Jews" did not "force" you to pull the trigger, and is hardly a justification for such a choice.
As far as being forced to do a willing act, I agree that it is preposterous. Where we disagree is in the nature of being "forced". Duress influences your choice. Influence isn't force.
Again, this is a form of victim blaming. You are literally arguing that if a woman is being forced under threat to take the least bad of a set of bad options, she is being a willing participant. That's just flat out wrong.
This is an important thing to address, because it's a serious allegation, and I don't think the conclusion follows the premise. I can understand how if that is someone's perception of the point of reference of the argument they would have a heated opposition to an opposing view, but that isn't the correct point of reference.
In that sort of situation, the assailant is the one choosing and perpetrating the crime. The victim has (inconsequential) choices, but none of those choices have any impact on that. Her available choices, such as they are, are more akin to a paladin inconsequential choice of whether to curse a dragon or sing to it while being consumed, than they are to a paladin choosing to step aside and let a dragon eat an innocent person. The latter scenario would be more like the potential victim telling the assailant he could murder her child if he promised not to victimize her.
The whole issue is simpler that what the poll makes it seem like, but it's not only about the character being in control of herself, there is also a matter of awareness: a Paladin might be deceived into breaking her code even when committing a willful act. Think for example a Paladin killing an innocent who was magically disguised to appear like the villain: it is a willful act but without awareness, and I don't think it counts for making the Paladin fall.
While this is a tangent, I agree that awareness of the truth of the situation, or context of intent, is relevant. I think it applies from either a consequentialist perspective (where intended result is the point) or from a deontological ethics perspective (where intended act/choice is the point).
If someone makes a deceived choice (where the situation is not as it appears) based on deontological ethics, and errs, the individual often feels some kind of responsibility, but other people don't instinctively blame them (unless, say, the person killed their family members thinking they were assassins sent to kill others). If someone makes a deceived choice based on consequentialist ethics and errs, other people generally do instinctively blame them, seeing their choice as the gamble that it was that didn't pay off. I believe that general tendency of non-philosophical people to blame or absolve others of an act stems from a shared sense of what is ethical or good (which either position is holding as its standard) in the first place. It isn't the complete picture, but if everyone instinctively blames someone for something, philosophical arguments in favor of it fall flat, and if no one instinctively blames someone for something, philosophical arguments against it lack persuasive appeal.
