genshou
First Post
Lord Pendragon, you have stated multiple times in this thread that the real world is a world of moral relativism–but isn't that a dogmatic statement? I would argue the strong sense of ethical objectivism (aka Absolutism)–yes, cultures and individuals may have differing moral outlooks, but good and evil and what constitutes moral rights and wrongs are immutable, unchaging, timeless; beyond human control. Our own interpretations of them, and a specific culture's desire to accept these absolutes, is what is relative. What Hitler did is morally wrong and evil no matter what any individual or culture chooses to state to the contrary. It seems you agree with me on this point about genocide as well as a few other widely recognized acts of the most insidious wickedness (rape, murder, esp. murder of children who cannot yet be truly accountable for their actions), which indicates to me that you follow a different school of thought than you state. Correct me if I'm wrong, but it seems to me that your beliefs adhere more to the weak sense of ethical objectivism than they do to either the strong or weak sense of moral relativism.Lord Pendragon said:Unless, of course, you are talking about the real world, in which everything is morally relative, since other cultures have different moral codes relative to ours (some of which, I suppose, may not view killing human children as evil. Aztecs maybe?)
Simply stating that the concept of moral relativism is the correct one is a philosophical no-no. Consider the words of Bertrand Russel, from The Problems of Philosophy, Chapter 15 (Oxford University Press, 1912):
Many philosophers, it is true, have held that philosophy could establish the truth of certain answers to such fundamental questions. They have supposed that what is of most importance in religious beliefs could be proved by strict demonstration to be true. In order to judge of such attempts, it is necessary to take a survey of human knowledge, and to form an opinion as to its methods and limitations. On such a subject it would be unwise to pronounce dogmatically; but if the investigations of our previous chapters have not led us astray, we shall be compelled to renounce the hope of finding philosophical proofs of religious beliefs. We cannot, therefore, include as part of the value of philosophy any definite set of answers to such questions. Hence, once more, the value of philosophy must not depend upon any supposed body of definitely ascertainable knowledge to be acquired by those who study it.