It seemed self evident to me that if something was clearly and specifically stated in the rule books as a good or evil act no arbitration was necessary for said action
The 1st ed DMG tells us that good characters respect human (creature) rights. That entails that a rights-violating action is either neutral or (more likely) evil. This inclues, presumably, the right to life. The significance of the right to life is emphasised by the remarks, under Assassins in the PHB, that killing for profit is evil.
Yet the most typical and mechanically fundamental unit of D&D play is combat, which by default is to the death. So straight away, the alignment rules in combination with gameplay require us to have a theory of justified, and therefore non-rights-violating, killing. Do we really need examples - dealing with orc children, or [MENTION=78357]Herschel[/MENTION]'s colonialism example, or [MENTION=6681948]N'raac[/MENTION]'s throat-torn baby - to drive home the point that there can be interpretive disagreements even over this "clearly and specifically stated" requirement? Let alone over what counts as being honest, or honourable, or altruistic, or any other descriptions used to state alignment requirements?
They call for you to judge the character's action against the fictional game universe's standards of good or evil, yes.
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if the characters puts themselves in the place of being beholden to a cosmological power, how is that different? The paladin, before game start, has made such an agreement
It's hard for me to address this within the confines of the board rules. As I'm replying to a moderator, I'll trust that if I step outside those boundaries you will let me know and/or edit my post appropriately.
For me, the paladin is very obviously modelled on an archetype that has roots much older than Poul Anderson and the D&D class writeup. As the very name of the class tells us, it is inspired by the example of the holy warrior. This has both historical and legendary/literary instances: Edward the Confessor, the crusading orders, Arthur and his knights, Roland et al, Aragorn etc.
These are not people who have "made an agreement" with some arbitrary power and thereby become beholden to that power. That a description of Faust, or in D&D terms a warlock or (perhaps, as in my 4e game) an acolyte of Vecna.
Rather, the paladin is called to the service of a being who exemplifies and demands virtue and right conduct. The paladin exemplifies goodness and honour. That is not to say that everyone who fails to live like a paladin is a wrongdoer - the life of the saint or the paladin is superogatory. But it is not a merely voluntary pact: it's a higher calling.
To be rejected by the being into whose service a paladin is called is not simply to have broken the terms of a contract: it is to be
condemned on moral grounds.
That is fundamentally different from Vecna inflicting retribution by striking out at the invoker's imp familiar. That is a punishment, but it's not a condemnation. The same applies to your example of an officer of a mundane hierarchy: a rulebreaker might be expelled, but to be expelled isn't to stand condemned. For instance, a person who is expelled from the military for (say) refusing to execute prisoners or murder civilians might well conceive of him-/herself as a hero unjustly treated. But a paladin who falls from grace has no framework from which to judge him-/herself a hero. To turn the verb into an adjective: s/he has fallen.
That's a bargain the player willingly makes going into the game. There's no "rewriting" involved if the player is properly informed heading into the situation.
Even with the military example, however, I still personally would preferthat should not be a unilateral GM decision if it's inherent to the character concept - if the player believed that his/her PC was not breaking the rules, for instance because of a difference of interpretation, I would be hesitant to unilaterally impose my interpretation where that is at odds with the player's good faith interpretation of a code that is more important to them - given the PC they are playing - than to me.
I think this is an echo of [MENTION=22779]Hussar[/MENTION]'s point: if the player doesn't believe s/he is violating the code, and the GM does, due to a difference of interpretation, why should the GM's interpretation be preferred? [MENTION=85555]Bedrockgames[/MENTION] has offered one answer to that question: because a key rationale for play is exploring the GM's world. [MENTION=6688277]Sadras[/MENTION] has offered another answer to that question: because complying with the GM's interpretatation is part of the challenge of play. But if neither of those reasons applies to a given game - for instance, because the game doesn't emphasise exploration of a GM's world, nor does it emphasis roleplaying as a
challenge (instead emphasising, perhaps, the creative or expressive dimension of playing a character) - then I don't think there is any reason to prefer the GM's interpretation.
It's not that the GM is the final arbiter of the "players' choices", but that they're the final arbiter of the game and the outcomes of the players' choices.
I don't think the GM is the final arbiter of
all the players' choices. I remember we discussed this in the long-running "fighters vs casters" thread, and I suggested that even some of Gygax's strong language to that effect was best understood as meaning that the GM is the final arbiter of the PCs' fictional positioning, but not necessarily of such things as whether or not the fighter player writing down "fighter" on his/her PC sheet means s/he has the class abilities of a fighter or the class abilities of a thief.
In the context of alignment, my conern is that if the GM is made the final arbiter of whether or not a player's choices for his/her PC are alignment-compliant, then either (i) alignment is no longer a model of what is proper, which makes the paladin archetype (in my view) impossible to play - a paladin is called to
proper behaviour, not to compliance with an arbitrary code - or else (ii) the player has to subordinate his/her evaluative judgement to that of the GM.
The first is what Imaro appears to suggest:
they require you to determine whether a character's actions are consistent with those a particular deity or cosmological force would deem to be in accordance with their concept of good or evil
This interpretation of alignment appears to entail that the following sentence is a candidate for truth: "I violated the requirements of that LG god, but in doing so I acted in accordance with the requirements of law and good, because I upheld the demans of honour, justice, fairness and human welfare."
I think the sentence only has to be written down for its oddness to be apparent. Under this approach, why do we even use the labels "good" and "evil" if they are no longer doing the work they do in ordinary English usage?
[MENTION=177]Umbran[/MENTION] suggests something similar to this with the idea that "good" and "evil" are relative in their meaning to the GM's conception of the gameworld's cosmology. But that creates the same sorts of problems. Now a player can of course leave their own evaluative baggage at the door - which then shifts us to a version of option (ii) above - but that is not what I am looking for when I play a paladin, or when I GM a paladin. When I play a paladin I want to find out what honour requires, not what the GM thinks honour requires: to put it another way, I want to undertake a moral and aesthetic exploration (of the demands of honour), not a psychological and biographical exploration (of my GM's beliefs about honour). And when I GM a paladin I want to find out what the player will put forward as his/her conception of honour: roughly speaking, I want to read the book the player writes, not write my own book which the player then reads back to me.
you still determine how this deity feels about a particular action... which is exactly what you are doing with alignment.
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I'm not understanding is how this is any different than determining whether a deity, cosmic force, or whatever determines you've made it angry by not following it's concepts of good or evil???
To my mind, deciding that Vecna is angry at you because you thwarted his chance at increasing his metaphysical power has basically nothing in common with deciding that a player had his/her PC act dishonourably, or wrongly in some other way. The first is a judgement about whether or not you thwarted a being's pretty simply interpreted desire. The second is a judgement about whether or not the PC, as played by the player, lived up to some standard or moral requirement.
You are suggsting that "Lawful Good" has no meaning other than "What LG gods require". Leaving aside the fact that not all LG gods want the same thing, this is a very contentious way of defining "good", both as a matter of general principle and within the context of D&D. For instance, neither Gygax nor 2nd ed AD&D nor 3E define "Lawful Good" in this way. They set out general moral requirements, and the implication is that these requirements govern LG gods rather than vice versa.
On this point, [MENTION=6701124]Cadence[/MENTION]: I know that Gyagx's DMG stipulates that LG peoples might be mortal enemies, but it also stipulates that 'Good' entails respect for human rights, and that 'Lawful" entails respect for beneficent systems of social organisation. In the theory of international justice and international morality, there is a popular theory of democratic peace (having its origins in Kant's essay on "Perpetual Peace") - the theory of democratic peace is the theory that countries that honour human rights at home and respect internatinal law abroad won't go to war with one another. Now whether or not the theory of democratic peace is true is a matter of some contention, and I won't express my views here. But it's truth isn't simply a matter of stipulation.
And just to cash it out a little bit: two LG nations at war means two nations whose soldiers are killing one another. Thus prima facie violating one another's rights to life. With what justification? Self-defence? So two LG nations can't agree over which is the aggressor. But if each is continuing to prosecute the war, rather than seek a negotiated peace, in what sense are they still LG rather than (say) Neutral or even Chaotic Evil, taking the view that might makes right and is justified even in circusmstances of uncertainy over the justice of their own cause, and doubt about whether the targets of their violence are legitimate targets.
As I said, these matters can't be settled just by stipulation. I mean, Gygax or Paizo or someone else could write a rulebook containing the sentence "In this game (i) geometry is Euclidean and (ii) the king's table is exactly 21 feet around and 7 feet across." But the fact that they state it doesn't make it coherent.