@clearstream, you asked if it is "okay for posters to disfavour mechanics out of moral concerns" and did so in a fashion that suggests you believe that a moral concern is equivalent to a simple difference in taste where there is no moral component.
I responded to say that forming an opinion on a mechanic is based on moral concerns is, by definition, making moral judgements and thus it is something you should do carefully (especially if you want to voice the opinion that it's a matter of morality). I also indicated that I don't believe that moral judgements should be treated the same way as individual preferences with no meaningful moral component.
When you state that your grounds for disliking a mechanic are moral concerns, you are not merely sharing a preference. You are also suggesting that people who do not share your concerns, and who use the morally concerning mechanic, are behaving immorally.
You raise a couple of interesting, closely connected questions here that I'd like to tackle. I think they can be stated like this
it is accepted as possible for a player to have distaste for a game mechanic out of that player's moral concerns
to have distaste something out of moral concerns necessarily entails judging those who do not share that distaste to fall afoul of those concerns
given the above, where moral concerns inform a player's preferences, judgement of those who don't share those preferences necessarily accompanies them
Does that look roughly right to you? My response in a nutshell is that the preference is as to the choice to extend compunction into the magic circle of play on some matter, and not as to the immorality of that matter. I don't suppose that just because
@AnotherGuy enjoys including minion mechanics in their game, that they necessarily promote mass slaughter in their real life.
To attempt to precis this argument
suppose that X is something you and I agree is immoral in real life, and X' is its fictional representation in play
suppose that you and I agree that X' being fictional is not necessarily immoral
however, I additionally hold distaste for X' and prefer not to include it in my play
seeing as I have agreed that X' is not necessarily immoral, I am not bound to apply moral judgement to others who include X' in their play
I think your worry denies that knowing that
X' being fictional
isn't immoral doesn't allow one to suspend moral judgement (after all, it's not immoral). Folk here are saying that they can do exactly that: suspend moral judgement. The nature of my preference is thus better described as follows
when I pretend to do X', I can maintain some sort of separateness from doing X
that separateness can be leveraged for
inter alia irony, investigation (see
@Umbran's example of the Paradox Realm), and ignoring
how well I maintain that separateness and whatever it costs me is a personal matter
my preference appertains to that personal matter
I could as well judge myself for over-sensitivity as others for not sharing it, but that would not relieve me of having that sensitivity. What I suspect can happen here is that others notice my compunction and feel forced to reflect on
X which then may erode their playful separation from it when they include
X' in their fiction. But this is not about my judgement of them, it is about their judgement of themselves.