I read it, perhaps I misunderstood the point, or missed something, but it still seemed to be saying you could copyright these elements we don't normally copyright because of how they come together (but that is still fundamentally allowing the groove and vibe to be copyrighted---again unless I am missing something here)
Okay- last post on this and we move on to the actual topic. First thing you need to understand is that it's an appellate opinion, with a three judge panel. Two judges were in the majority (affirming, well, mostly, the lower court) and one judge dissented.
Now, the majority opinion made the following points. I will provide pinpoint cites (page numbers from the reporter):
1. Recitation of the standard of law. 1163-66. This is all standard stuff.
2. Denial of Summary Judgment. 1166-67. This is the most important part, as the "Thicke Parties" (ahem) primarily based their appeal on this. But here's the thing; after a full trial on the merits, you don't get to appeal the denial of summary judgment.
3. Everything else. 1167-1178. It's basically just a recitation of "you're screwed because of the standard on appeal after a jury trial." Nothing interesting here, except the part where they overturn the vicarious liability finding.
What you need to read, and understand, is the majority section VIII ("You Can't Get There from Here"), 1178-82 and contrast that with the Dissent. It shows that the majority is dealing with this as a procedural issue- that the failure here was a litigation failure, a failure to correctly preserve issues (such as by making a rule 50(a) motion) so that the court
could rule on the merits.
What you're missing is that this opinion isn't about what the people on youtube are saying it is; instead, it's a procedural fight with one judge wanting to decide the case
despite the rules while the majority is following the appellate procedure.
Here's the part where they make it explicit-
Lastly, the dissent prophesies that our decision will shake the foundations of copyright law, imperil the music industry, and stifle creativity. It even suggests that the Gayes' victory will come back to haunt them, as the Gayes' musical compositions may now be found to infringe any number of famous songs preceding them. Respectfully, these conjectures are unfounded hyperbole. Our decision does not grant license to copyright a musical style or "groove." Nor does it upset the balance Congress struck between the freedom of artistic expression, on the one hand, and copyright protection of the fruits of that expression, on the other hand. Rather, our decision hinges on settled procedural principles and the limited nature of our appellate review, dictated by the particular posture of this case and controlling copyright law. Far from heralding the end of musical creativity as we know it, our decision, even construed broadly, reads more accurately as a cautionary tale for future trial counsel wishing to maximize their odds of success.
Williams v. Gaye isn't some apocalyptic tale of IP law. It is a cautionary tale of what can happen when attorneys ... well, don't maximize their odds of success. Now, in saying that, I will again reiterate that I don't agree with the underlying principle that even allowed the lawsuit to get that far, but people continue to misunderstand and misrepresent the case.
