Yes, I did read the case, and no, I am not misrepresenting it.
From the Agonisti majority's opinion
( https://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/96-552.ZO.html ):
Translation: in past cases, to see if the State was culpable, the Court examined programs' criteria to see if they used the aid to indoctrinate recipients. "Indoctrination" is the goal of the benefit provider, and not a characteristic of a beneficiary; IOW, the Court looked at distributors' motives. If and when the motive of indoctrination is present, the Court would then look to see to what degree- if any- the State's efforts enabled said indoctrination.
In addition, the criteria themselves may be examined to see if they inherently create incentives to conform to the religious principles of the service provider.
Here, the Court is saying it used the standard applied in the Witters and Zobrest cases- looking to see if the aid was distributed in a such way as to aid in indoctrination (again, examining the motives of the distributors)- to the case set before them in Agonisti. They didn't find it, so the plaintiffs lost on this fork of the test.
***
Mens rea IS a motivational concept. Intentional homicide- say, planned killing for insurance money- is different from negligent homicide- say, killing because you were speeding on rain-slicked streets- is different from justified intentional homicide- killing someone in the defense of another.
From the Agonisti majority's opinion
( https://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/96-552.ZO.html ):
Although we examined in Witters and Zobrest the criteria by which an aid program identifies its beneficiaries, we did so solely to assess whether any use of that aid to indoctrinate religion could be attributed to the State. A number of our Establishment Clause cases have found that the criteria used for identifying beneficiaries are relevant in a second respect, apart from enabling a court to evaluate whether the program subsidizes religion. Specifically, the criteria might themselves have the effect of advancing religion by creating a financial incentive to undertake religious indoctrination.
Translation: in past cases, to see if the State was culpable, the Court examined programs' criteria to see if they used the aid to indoctrinate recipients. "Indoctrination" is the goal of the benefit provider, and not a characteristic of a beneficiary; IOW, the Court looked at distributors' motives. If and when the motive of indoctrination is present, the Court would then look to see to what degree- if any- the State's efforts enabled said indoctrination.
In addition, the criteria themselves may be examined to see if they inherently create incentives to conform to the religious principles of the service provider.
Applying this reasoning to New York City's Title I program, it is clear that Title I services are allocated on the basis of criteria that neither favor nor disfavor religion...The Board's program does not, therefore, give aid recipients any incentive to modify their religious beliefs or practices in order to obtain those services.
Here, the Court is saying it used the standard applied in the Witters and Zobrest cases- looking to see if the aid was distributed in a such way as to aid in indoctrination (again, examining the motives of the distributors)- to the case set before them in Agonisti. They didn't find it, so the plaintiffs lost on this fork of the test.
***
Mens rea IS a motivational concept. Intentional homicide- say, planned killing for insurance money- is different from negligent homicide- say, killing because you were speeding on rain-slicked streets- is different from justified intentional homicide- killing someone in the defense of another.