D&D General [rant]The conservatism of D&D fans is exhausting.

No idea! But I've seen things that certainly look a lot like it.


Yes, precisely! That's precisely what infuriates me about it. Like...you've just made the argument I've been making for...uh...~1700 posts now?


An excellent question.

My experience of discussing this with a number of people--as amply demonstrated by this thread--is that there are a number of what one might call "grandfathered" type-II facts that are simply accepted as if they were type-III facts without any explanation as to why, other than "well of course everyone knows THAT" (even when...they don't. Like genuinely they actually don't because these facts can be changed...and frequently are!)

Any other type-II facts are rejected as unacceptable because they don't conform to type-I facts. Type-III facts are often a subject of debate, with many (many...many...many) pixels spilled over whether any given fact is actually type-III and thus totally okay, or actually (non-grandfathered) type-II and thus totally unacceptable.
One notion I came up with after writing, is what I'm thinking of as doppelganger-like effects. That it should be less tolerable to see a human survive a 100' fall than a dragon. This is a kind of block on migrating type-III facts to type-II... it's harder to accept what looks like it belongs in our real world as having qualities that don't belong.
 

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One notion I came up with after writing, is what I'm thinking of as doppelganger-like effects. That it should be less tolerable to see a human survive a 100' fall than a dragon. This is a kind of block on migrating type-II facts to type-III... it's harder to accept what looks like it belongs in our real world as having qualities that don't belong.
I think we need to think of it as more like a collage then a system running on consistent rules.

There's certain overlapping circles - one in which real principles like the normal rules of gravity seem to apply - or something somewhat like them at least - and others in which they clearly don't = eg Dragons shouldn't be able to fly - Giants shouldn't support their own weight.

You could call these magic vs mundane but I think that's a bit of trap as it risks pretending there's some kind of coherent system whereas it's just an aesthetic collage.

So if I have a conception of certain things like human physicality fitting one sphere I might object if suddenly they seem be in a different aesthetic group.
 

@EzekielRaiden is this a good definition and ordering of the types, or can you see some additions or improvements

i) facts from our real world​
ii) fictional-facts that are unrealistic and can't be reasoned about​
iii) fictional-facts that are para-realistic (of a kind found in our real world) and can be reasoned about​
I do wonder if ii) and ii) shouldn't be swapped going forward, so that we go from realistic to unrealistic?
 

I think we need to think of it as more like a collage then a system running on consistent rules.

There's certain overlapping circles - one in which real principles like the normal rules of gravity seem to apply - or something somewhat like them at least - and others in which they clearly don't = eg Dragons shouldn't be able to fly - Giants shouldn't support their own weight.

You could call these magic vs mundane but I think that's a bit of trap as it risks pretending there's some kind of coherent system whereas it's just an aesthetic collage.

So if I have a conception of certain things like human physicality fitting one sphere I might object if suddenly they seem be in a different aesthetic group.
I think you are right in your previous about sword wielding mice being really multi-faceted. There's the type-II fictional-fact of the mouse wielding a sword, but then there is the type-III or possibly type-I fact of sword wielding. And it seems we agree about resistance to migration between the types.

(Note the types here are pre-agreement on reordering. They're per my #17,568.)
 

Or let's take the weaker demand, and insist that everything that is realistic in our world is realistic in the imaginary fantasy world, while allowing whatever additions are made for the sake of our fantasy. This seems to commit us to accepting all manner of inconsistencies (including frank paradoxes), or at least treating them as epiphenomenal (by which I mean, exempted from the effects of anything real in our world, such as gravity.)
It's only inconsistent if it's not a fantasy world that we are imagining. If we are imagining a fantasy world, then in addition to the real world realism, there is fantasy realism. Things that are established within the fiction as "real" for the fantasy world, like magic and dragons.

Once established, magic is "realistic" and is no longer inconsistent with say gravity when the fly spell or reverse gravity spells are cast. Rather they smoothly mesh with the simulated gravity.

So yes, if I were to run a game set in 1700 London and you saw someone flying, it would be a major inconsistency, but we don't have that issue in most fantasy RPGs.
 

Can a Dragon fly in an anti-magic sphere or a Giant walk?

I don't believe it it's that simple.

I would have at least 3 spheres, the mundane, the mundane weird, and the explicitly magical.

But I wouldn't have these as rules. I don't think you could make a rule to sort everything into these groups - those are just loose descriptions of D&D.

I think it's more about fit and feel and not everyone is going to put everything in the same place.
 

I've touched on most of this sprinkled through the response to your final paragraph, but I wanted to say that I, too, am rather used to scientific thinking (my primary training is in physics, especially quantum physics, I only pursued a minor in philosophy). As someone pretty well steeped in that field--where statistics, probabilities (or, more commonly, "probability amplitudes"), and uncertainty are baked into its very heart, even in my preferred interpretation!--the idea that an "expert" on a scientific discipline would be consistently superior to, say, Maxwell's equations or quantum field theory is...well, the word "poppycock" comes to mind. It's just not tenable. Scientific thinking, for good and (as we have been slowly learning over the past ~80 years, give or take) occasionally for ill, is all about the idea that humans are actually rotten garbage at a number of extremely important tasks, such as statistical thinking, data collection, and the specific types of geometric reasoning required for important scientific disciplines. (I will note, though, that uman "probability instinct" exists, and it is actually pretty decent when restricted to the kinds of probabilities our ancestors evolved to need to reason about; unfortunately, those instincts are very strong and don't suddenly go away when we move outside the assumptions baked into them, and thus they are very apt to lead us astray.)


Whereas I find myself with a (pretty significant) bias against it. Secret knowledge is inherently unexplored and untested. Intuition is a useful tool in many places, but much of what goes on in any kind of arithmetic or statistical structure cannot rely on intution, because intuition is often simultaneously very wrong and impossible to check. When your rulebook is invisible, it's impossible to check it for errors, more or less, and errors creeping in through an invisible rulebook cannot be isolated for testing and refinement.

Rules-systems, by being fixed things, necessarily cannot expand beyond their current definition unless we engage in design work. That is the nature of the beast. But by being a fixed public thing, a rule-system permits criticism. An invisible rulebook not only does not permit criticism, it inherently opposes criticism. You cannot critique what you cannot see.
This is interesting. We indeed have very common backgrounds. I absolutely see your point. It actually in a way strikes me as more humanity-optimistic than my own instincts. My major was in general relativity, but I got pretty deep in quantum mechanics as well. And I can see these theories as the absolute triumph they are in human kinds ability to cooperate to produce a simulation ruleset that produces results with an accuracy way beyond any expert intuition.

However one major thing that might be coloring my view in this matter was that I left academia much because I got disillusioned about the aplicability of said theories. We got a ruleset that in theory could simulate anything at micro scale, but where we even in my course about subatomic particles needed to use severe simplifications to produce any results at all.

I absolutely get your point about inviting critisism though! I shifted career to software engineering, and I am absolutely in love with the systems allowing/requiring other people to review any code before it get into the common codebase. Every time anyone are just accepting any code I have written without any points of critisism I get nervous they might have taken too lightly on the task. Mind you, this is after the code already have passed the formidable suite of automated rules based checks we have in place.

I think the two paragraphs above suggest is that while I also recognise keenly the fallibility of a human, I also have been personally burned by the limitation of (human-made) rules.
<snip things I think slightly misunderstood what I tried to convey, but is otherwise aligning with my views.>

Instead, my claim is as follows: "It is always possible to design a rules-system such that any given specific expert, without further training, would always produce equivalent SRs to that system." Speaking more broadly, given some minimum level of desired efficacy, I believe it is always possible to design a system which meets or exceeds that level. Call this the "weak designer hypothesis", if you like. If said expert subsequently goes out and refines their knowledge (perhaps, for example, by thoroughly learning said rules-system and finding as many places as possible where it goes wrong), then it is certainly possible for that expert to exceed any fixed rules-system, that seems blindingly obvious to me. But while a single rules-system can't adapt, designers can. The designer can pick that expert's brain, using their expertise as the basis for modifications to the original system--and since it must be public knowledge (that's the whole point of being a system, after all), it can be critiqued by many minds, not just the one expert's mind.
I really like this hypotesis! If I read it correctly this would if true explain why the K/FK conundrum is indeed seemingly unresolvable. If both expert and ruleset always can reach any desireable ceiling then there will not be any way to distinguish their optimal performance from a practical standpoint.

In one way this is a really neat resolution of the associated design conundrum. It appear to justify several schools of design as equivalent as far as SRs go. On one hand we have the fixed mechanics design as you point out. On the other hand we have the "educate the referee to expert status" school of design. And then we have the more hybrid: "Provide rules support to elevate referee performance" school.
 

One notion I came up with after writing, is what I'm thinking of as doppelganger-like effects. That it should be less tolerable to see a human survive a 100' fall than a dragon. This is a kind of block on migrating type-III facts to type-II... it's harder to accept what looks like it belongs in our real world as having qualities that don't belong.
Though this goes even further beyond what I've called "groundedness". It's now a biased preference for, for lack of a better term, "realistically unrealistic" elements and against "unrealistically realistic" elements--even when the "unrealistically realistic" ones actually are more like reality.

A great example would be how many (maaaaaany) people see Healing Surges as absolutely unacceptable, but use the name "cure wounds" to mean that the spell actually does cure physical wounding (what does it mean to "cure" a wound? Wounds aren't cured, they're treated.) Because Healing Surges actually are pretty realistic: they model, in a simple but quite effective way, that a living body can die, not from not having enough resources to survive, but from not using those resources fast enough to restore equilibrium (specifically, to restore homeostasis). Sometimes, a person cannot will herself to access the resources she does have, but an external trigger (such as another person's voice) can help them access those resources, if they are still present (no exhortation, no matter how great, can help if there's simply nothing left in the proverbial tank.)

Yet, conversely, we have not just an unrealistic thing (magic), but that unrealistic thing being presented in an unrealistic way ("curing" wounds, as if wounds were a thing subject to being cured). But the unrealistic presentation is not simply accepted at face value, it is specifically set as the bedrock from which some expect everyone, not just themselves, to base their reasoning. I.e., "Because the spell is called cure wounds, it must be actually healing physical wounds when it restores hit points. Hence, hit points always represent observable wounding or injury of some type."

The former, despite naturally being a type-III fact for anyone who looks into how actual paramedics handle life-saving efforts (or, for example, how officers can help their subordinates survive on the battlefield until they can get proper medical treatment), is thus held to be a type-II fact and rejected. The latter, despite naturally being a type-II fact (an unrealistic thing presented in an unrealistic way) is not only treated as a type-III fact, it is used as the basis for many, many arguments, as though its acceptability should be universally agreed by all.

Given this dichotomy, what does this tell us? It seems to be clear support for my assertion that we have a significant set of "grandfathered" type-II facts treated as though they were type-III, and further, evidence of a claim I've previously made elsewhere, that "magic" is the eternal universal excuse--which is doubly damning because "magic" as a system one can reason about is....really really not in actual D&D terms. It's not "reasonable" so much as "memorizable": these are the set exceptions, you can't reason from them to determine new exceptions, except in the rare places where you can. (It is, as is so often the case, consistently inconsistent.)
 

And then we have the more hybrid: "Provide rules support to elevate referee performance" school.
I don't have much to say to the rest of your post, but this stood out.

This is the school I belong to. You might (or might not) have seen previous posts of mine where I talk about this, about things I really do consider to be rules-as-tools.

Rules, in the TTRPG sense (though also in other senses), are inherently teleological; they are designed in order to achieve some end. (Laws, for example, are designed to achieve some set of required, favored, permitted, disliked, or forbidden behavior.) Hence, a good rule must have some particular definable end, even if that end is not something that terminates (e.g. the rules of writing don't terminate writing, they guide you in how to write better, however much you might write.) By having a definable end, we can test whether or not a given rule achieves its particular end with reasonable consistency; in the case of TTRPG rules, that usually means "up to the level of randomness introduced by the dice" or other probability-generators (cards, for example).

When the rules are not useful, they should not be used. This is not the same as saying that they should be broken. This is saying that they should be invoked when they are needed, and set aside when they are not. The simple example, which I'm pretty sure everyone here generally agrees with, is when a player proposes a course of action which simply should succeed (or should simply fail, but I prefer to pick the positive example here). The purpose of, for example, a skill check or an attack roll, is to determine a result when we don't know what the result should be. But in those cases where we already know that an action simply should succeed, flat, no questions asked, then....the rules for checks are therefore irrelevant in that moment. There is no need to invoke the associated rules; this is not breaking them, it is respecting that the situation at hand has not actually called for their use. Likewise, if it is very obvious that the party simply cannot lose a battle anymore, but it might take a dozen rounds to resolve by slowly whittling down the remaining stragglers, openly asking, "Should we just call this fight over?" is not breaking the rules of combat, it's saying, "We know what the rules will produce. Do we need to go through all the steps, or can we skip them?"

The place where this principle is most put to the test is, in my not-so-humble opinion, when the GM strongly feels that a certain result should (or should not) happen, but the rules have already been invoked and clearly produced that outcome...but only to the GM. That is the moment when "fudging" is a temptation. "Fudging", at least as I define it, is the act of secretly (the secrecy is extremely important) breaking the rules in order to disregard result A (the one the rules indicate) in order to create result B instead (the one the GM prefers, for whatever reason), and then concealing this fact from the players so they cannot find out that the rules were not actually followed.

If any of these three elements--the secrecy, the disregarding, or the concealment--are not actually done, then the action isn't "fudging" (as I define it). So, for example, a GM looking down at the die someone rolled and realizing they shouldn't have asked for a roll at all? If they just come clean and admit this, and propose an alternative, that's not fudging--it's admitting that the rules should never have been invoked, and thus weren't appropriate to begin with. Or, if the GM swallows their dislike and lets the result stand, obviously that's not fudging. Or, if the GM does change the result, even non-openly, but makes it practically possible for the players to learn that and how it happened (not merely theoretically; the players really could find out that something changed), then it is not fudging--it is instead inserting new diegetic elements which change the situation.

My standard examples for this are "the party kills a boss-creature 'too quick' and the GM wishes for the boss-creature to last longer" and "the party has TPK'd, especially in an utterly unforeseeable or ridiculous way, and the GM wants to do something about that". The former is not a positive for the PCs (a fight they "should have" won is not over yet) while the latter is (a fight which "should have" terminated them produces a different result). IMO, there are three alternatives to fudging in these situations which still achieve all of the results of fudging (and more!) without any of the downsides thereof. They are:

  • Simply admit the issue to the group and propose an alternative. This is generally not a great choice, but sometimes required if nothing else will suit, or if the group doesn't have time to do something else. More or less, it's an admission of "garbage in equals garbage out", that the GM screwed up in some way and things need to be put right again.
  • Prepare, in advance, diegetic solutions which address the problem. This is often the best option....if you've done the work to make it make sense. Its natural fault, of course, is that these sorts of situations are a lot more likely to happen when you haven't already done prep work to forestall them; can't really fix a problem via preparation if you didn't prepare for it.
  • Make clear within the world that something mysterious and weird has just happened: make the divergence from the rules' result diegetic. E.g., "The goblin-priestess took a lethal blow, you KNOW it was a lethal blow, she should be dead. But then she stood back up again, bleeding profusely from her sternum, eyes aglow in violet, babbling madness in Abyssal." Now it's a mystery--but, importantly, a mystery you as DM have time to build a good, well-constructed answer for.
 

No. Because the narration has to match the mechanics, meaning if someone falls while climbing, the narration can't be pixies. It has to directly relate to the climb. A loose rock. The rope breaks or is cut by a sharp edge. The climber slips. And so on.

The exception would if pixies actually showed up for other reasons and did something to cause him to fall. In that case, though, it wasn't a failed climb check.

If the narration and mechanics match, the simulation is intact.
See, that's the point. There's nothing in the mechanics that necessitates that.

I mean, how does a skill check make my rope break? What sharp edge? How did my skill check add a sharp edge to a rock that cut my rope? You have repeatedly stated that skill checks cannot add or change the game world.
 
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