I am not sure how a LG and LE person agreeing that, for example, having a society with a King on top and Peasants on the bottom is desirable but disagreeing on what kind of things goes on within that structure is incoherent.
Both of them do not want Peasant farmers wandering off their land and doing what ever they wanted to, but how they deal with the wandering Peasant differentiates a G(ood), N(eutral) or E(vil) character.
I don't think this is a really accurate description of what LG people want - or, at least, it is a very cynical redescription of it.
In utopia, as conceived of by LG, the peasants are not "at the bottom" in any literal or value-laden sense. They are in their place, fulfilling their duties and accruing the benefits to which they are entitled, just as a king is. Nor does a LG person just want to keep peasants on their land. In a LG utopia, peasants will want to stay on their land (unless misinformed or irrational) because they will recognise that this is how all wellbeing, including their own, is best secured.
The idea that a LG and a LE person might accord respect to
the very same kingdom or
the very same social structure strikes me as incoherent. Within the Gygaxian framework I referred to upthread, this can be set out fairly clearly: if the social structure is actually delivering the sort of wellbeing the LG person hopes and believes that it will, then the LE person is not able to use it to impose his/her yoke upon the world. Whereas if, in fact, a social structure has become a yoke then the LG hope that structure will produce universal wellbeing has been refuted!
Both the LE and the LG character believe that clearly-defined, principled restrictions are for the "good" (read: betterment, NOT righteousness) of society. But they have deep--fundamentally deep--disagreements about which restrictions there should be, and what specific principles those should follow.
<snip>
LG and LE think social groups fundamentally need to be organized in order to accomplish anything meaningful. That's a value agreement right there.
The only bit of this I agree with is that where you make the same point that I have just made in replay to Shasarak, namely, that a particular given social structure cannot (coherently) be the object of simultaneous admiration by a LG and a LE person.
But I don't think that LE people believe that social order is for the good/betterment. They believe it will suit them, helping them get what they want for themselves (ie to impose their yoke upon the world).
I also don't agree that a common belief that social organisation is a necessary tool constitutes any sort of value agreement. For both, the interest in social organisation is purely instrumental. (Within the Gygaxian AD&D framework I quoted above. I don't pretend to understand the approaches that do treat Law and Chaos as distinct values rather than instrumental considerations, but I agree with some other posters in this thread that they don't really make sense.)
The LE person genuinely believes that the Law is the best way to pursue Evil, and that Evil is the best (or at least the most natural) expression of the Law.
This seems to me to give rise to another confusion: namely, it presents
Evil as if it were a value to which the LE person is committed; and hence frames the conflict between Good and Evil as a conflict between two value-systems. Whereas it seems to me that the LE person
rejects values (per Gygax, s/he scorns beauty, truth, freedom, and the wellbeing of others). The LE person pursues only his/her own self-interest.
Using the language typical of moral philosophy, within the Gygaxian AD&D framework the LE, NE and CE are all amoralists. They reject the idea that any values beyond their own self-interest have any claim upon them. The disagreement between them is not in respect of value but in respect of social theory - they have conflicting view about whether social order or individual whim is the best way to realise their self-interest.
Doom's not really LE though. He rules because he is the strongest, not because he was chosen to rule by those he rules. Doom has no actual legitimate claim on rulership (other than perhaps Laterveria) and cares nothing for any sort of rules other than the ones that he, himself, imposes on others. He's very capricious, murdering underlings for failing one time and not another. He's the perfect example of a CE dictator.
For me, this is another illustration of the conceptual tension that is generated by treating Law as a distinct value to which the LE person is committed.
I think the more helpful way of approach Doom is this: does he believe that social structures are the best way for him to impose his yoke upon the world? Given that he seeks to impose his yoke by means of rulership of a small but technologically advanced Central/Eastern European country, I think the plausible answer is yes.
Whereas, if you take the view that to be LE means to treat Law as a value in itself, which means (for instance) not killing underlings on a whim, then you are back to the original idea that LE is oxymoronic, because in order to be Lawful you have to move towards Good (eg by not just killing on a whim).
Wait, why does an evil person care about the betterment of society besides how that betterment affects him?
I don't think he does...he's evil. I can see him supporting laws that benefit him, sure. Again, because he's evil. But what about laws that don't? Does he still support those? Or does he ignore them (even on the sly)? I can't see him supporting a rule of law that doesn't benefit him...he'd ignore it. Hence, NE.
For me, this is exhibit A for why LE is oxymoronic
once you set up Law as an independent and self-standing value. To reiterate Eric V's argument as I understand it:
* The LE person is E;
* Hence, the LE person cares for nothing but his/her own self-interest;
* Hence, the LE person acknowledges no other constraints on his/her action;
* Hence, the LE person doesn't acknowledge the law as any sort of external constraint;
* Hence, the LE person is NE;
* Hence, LE is oxymoronic.
Whereas the Gygaxian AD&D approach I'm describing, whatever it's limitations (eg it can't distinguish between Rawls and Bentham), doesn't have this particular problem. On that approach, the LE person is not
committed to law. Rather, s/he has a belief that order will let him/her impose his/her yoke upon the world. The "L" part of the LE alignment isn't a
value to which the LE person is committed. It is a marker that the person believes that social order will secure the person's self-interest (just as, for the LG person, it is a marker that the person believes that social order will secure G).