Wait, so now we are treating Law as being instrumental? I thought you were against that notion. What's wrong with having both things--instrumental and whatever the not-instrumental side would be, because my brain is fried at 3 am--counting as "values"? You even use the word that way: "Its value." What if L/C is by its very nature an Instrumental axis?
I think that, as Gygax presents alignment in his AD&D books (DMG p 23f, PHB p 33f), the LG and the LE have a purely instrumental regard for law: the LG because they think that social order is a necessary underpinning of universal wellbeing, the LE because they think it will enable them to impose their yoke upon the world. The LN have a non-instrumental regard for law - they treat it as an end in itself - but this is obviously a moral failing on their part (within the framework presented) because
they are not good.
On the terminological point, I had hoped it was clear that in saying that the LG don't regard Law as a value in itself, I was reiterating that they regard it as having purely instrumental value.
it is Gygax's fault for presenting a standard that is incoherent. Hence why I'm not really big on using his definitions.
I am not seeing why it is incoherent to characterise the evil as scorning truth. One may not agree that a disregard for the truth is evil, but that doesn't show that it is incoherent.
How do we deal with that sort of situation--which is perfectly cromulent and crops up all the time in D&D fiction, especially now that the Warlock has been a core class for two editions running?
For me, these examples of devils et al bound by their own contracts set of two trains of thought.
The first is that Gygax does not distinguish between two sense of "lawfulness" - a concern with social structure (typical of paladins and samurai) and a concern with self-discipline (typical of monks and also of samurai). Some readings of self-discipline head in the direction of honour, which in turn head in the direction of truth. Push that thought too far and you end up with LE being oxymoronic - because the self-discipline of the notionally evil person ameliorates their evil.
I think the only easy way out here is to drop the equation of "lawful" with self-discipline (which crops up mostly in relation to monks and samurai, and also the rule that barbarians can't be lawful) and to treat "lawful" as referring to social organisation.
The second is that it seems to me there is no necessary connection between having a tendency to keep one's promises, and being lawful. On the CG side, I don't see why a classic Robin Hood type can't regard his/her word as his/her bond. And on the evil side, if a villain has a quirk that s/he keeps his/her word that suggests that s/he's not as evil as the other more treacherous villains, but it doesn't seem to me to particularly suggest his/her lawfulness.
3E takes a different view on this from what I have just expressed, though. Whereas Gygax equates truth and honour with goodness, 3E equates it with lawfulness. But, as I've already said, I think this is taking the first step on the path to LE as oxymoronic. The basic issue is that valuing truth and honour is having regard to something outside oneself, which is thereby failing to be maximally evil.