Mathematicians prove negatives all the time - for instance, that any system powerful enough to generate arithmetic will not be complete (ie will contain truths for which there is no proof).
In this particular case you are the one asserting the negative - namely, that there are no moral obligations or constraints that constrain illustration and publication. I would expect you to have some reasons that support this assertion.
The example you cited is not proving a negative, that's a proof of impossibility, which is simply called a "negative proof" as a shorthand. It's a positive proof of a problem that is unsolvable.
That said, that's also irrelevant, as we're not discussing mathematics. I've already stated the arguments in favor of why certain actions are amoral in nature (which is not a negative proof, since I'm saying what they
are, e.g. amoral). You're the one saying that that is not the case, which is an attempt to prove a negative.
And my point is that mere assertion is not argument.
And my point is that what you're labeling as an assertion is, in fact, an argument.
Anyway here is my counterarguent, also framed deontologically: it is wrong to demean others; some works of art are demeaning of others (eg as evidenced by their responses to them, some of which are found in this very thread); given that there is a general duty not to do what is wrong (everything else being equal), there is therefore a duty not to publish such works of art; for commercial publishers it is particularly likely that everything else will be equal, given that they have no countervailing interests of moral significance such as the need for personal authenticity.
Just to be clear, this is the same style of argument that I've made, yet you've labeled that as being a "mere" assertion.
That said, I disagree with this for reasons posted earlier in the thread. To recap, I prefer a greater degree of specificity of action so as to avoid ambiguity when trying to determine where a specific action would fall on the deontological tiers (e.g. is X demeaning?), particularly since you seem to be using consequences as a determinant (e.g. "evidenced by their responses"). This also ignores the negative duty not to suppress the creative expression of others for reasons of personal beliefs.
Of course, it's perfectly normal for people to have different value systems, and the subsequent discussions and debates.
Whether or not you (or anyone else) thinks this is a good argument, it clearly shows that deontology has no particular significance in this context.
Quite the contrary, it shows why it has great significance in this context, as that's how we can clearly delineate where we disagree.
My objection is pretty clear: that you grossly exaggerate the difficulty of interpreting art and intentions. I ascertain intentions and honesty everyday in ordinary conversation, in watching advertisements, in reading books. Your typical fantasy illustrator is not Picasso. The work is not very subtle. And your contention that the words on a book to which a picture is an illustration have no bearing on construing the picture is not very plausible. I suppose it's conceivable that the girl in the red cloak on the front of my kids' copy of Little Red Riding Hood is not really the titular character - but even if that's conceivable, it's very unlikely.
My objection is equally clear: that you grossly overestimate the importance of a person's intent (and your assumptions that your reading their intent is accurate) in determining the morality of the actions they take. You decide how subtle a work is or is not, and then pass judgment on them from that alone, which I strongly disagree with. You contend that meta-contextual information is somehow a label of accuracy of interpretation, which I find to be little more than excuse for saying why you feel more "correct" in your interpretation than someone else who perceives a differing message.
The issue is not about vagueness. The issue is that in each of those cases - running, jogging, hustling, walking - the action is individuated by the result it produces (in those cases, various forms of movement via the legs).
I strongly disagree; in no way is the action individuated by the results - you can't say that the results from running are in any way different than from jogging, except by the label (and definition) that you've arbitrarily applied to them.
Yet you claim that I can conceive of, and then evaluate, an action without reference to its result. All I'm asking is how, on this account, you individuate actions.
You can conceive of and evaluate an action without reference to its results. The fact that people do that all the time is proof enough of that. You individuate actions by the nature of the action itself; the disagreement comes when people disagree on what the action is, and (deontologically) where it ranks.
(I don't this literature as well as the moral philosophy literature, but the classic work I think of is Davidson's essays in the collection Essays on Actions and Events.)
Links or it didn't happen.
I am guessing that you have not heard of Duff or Gardner or Ashworth or Tasioulas or Pogge or Henry Shue until I posted their names in this thread. (I am assuming that you have heard before of Kant, Aquinas and Peter Singer - they are better known outside the field.)
There's nothing wrong with that - I don't expect non-philosophers to follow the field any more than I follow fields in which I don't work - but it makes your insistence on "evidence" a bit odd. I've given names. Google or Wikipedia will give you their writings. The chairs that they hold will show that they are eminent in their field.
You're confusing the proper methods of presenting evidence with not having heard of them. I'll give you the benefit of the doubt in presuming that that's an honest mistake on your part rather than an insinuation that I don't know those individuals' works.
Regardless, the proper method of presenting a supporting claim is to, quite simply, actually present it. Saying that supporting claims exist, and then saying that it's someone else's burden of proof to verify that, is suspicious at best, disingenuous at worst. This point was brought up
earlier in the thread:
TanithT said:
All true, but if you cite numbers and great confidence in them, it's generally on you to back that up. Suggesting that anyone who questions your assertions should just google it seems disingenuous.
pemerton said:
But if you want some more detail, here are some suggestions: on versions of consequentialism and deontology I suggest Pogge's Realizing Rawls, ch 1 - in which he articulates and defends what he takes to be Rawls' "contract consequentialism" - and then Pogge's later recantation of this view in World Poverty and Human Rights, ch 1, in which he defends a non-consequentialist theory of human rights as a minimal theory of justice. (Among other things, what this will make clear is that the contrast between consequentialist and non-consequentialist morality is not about whether or not consequences matter, but about whether anything matters other than the effect that an action has on aggregate welfare: consequentialists deny that anything else matters, whereas deontologists assert that some other things matter to the evaluation of action.)
For a classic presentation of the mainstream contemporary theory of the criminal justice system defended by Duff, Gardner, Tasioulas, Tadros etc you might read Duff's Trials and Punishments. For what I personally think is a powerful critique of this (but not one that entails morality has no bearing on law) you could read Scott Veitch's Law and Irresponsibility. (But Veitch's work is not, in my view, mainstream.)
See above. You're not citing the works of others here, you're just paraphrasing them and making unverified assertions (rather than arguments
) that they support your claims. The burden of proof, when invoking existing materials, is higher than that.
