Guilt Puppy
First Post
Oif... Responded in fine detail (IC) to all of Bugbear/Rhynnon's points, but it appears to have been eaten by some elder god... Rather than spending two more hours of my dumb life retyping it (and trying to remember just how I made it appear logically justified to make the accusation that Rhynnon was in fact the one making a power play), I'm just going to rescind the offer for the accord and just vote to ban the frickin' spell. Anyway, it looks like this TEC Pact will accomplish the same objectives (binary division & mutually assured destruction... not because it benefits the Brotherhood particularly, but because it's fun 
)
I'll make the same argument regarding vague terms for retribution here, though:
In smaller alliances between two or three powers, it is reasonable to expect that terms such as "considered an attack against all of us" and "required to respond against the aggressor" can be interpreted in good faith as the need arises, and that any dispute over their interpretation can be resolved easily and quietly.
In larger alliances, however, such terminology grows into a larger and larger weakness: The non-specific term "response" gives no measure to the quality of response, allowing any power to commit an essentially insignificant amount of military might to any given act of retribution, without violating the treaty. This fact may be taken advantage of by foreign aggressors, who may target unpopular or remote nations under the assumption that the retaliatory response will be weak or apathetic. Indeed, foreign powers may even seek agreement beforehand from major powers in the alliance, that there will be no truly significant response to an attack against a specific ally. In all this, there is a looseness in interpretation which limits the security provided by the pact, and makes it overall less convincing as a deterrent.
For these reasons, the Brotherhood will not enter into this pact if it does not clearly state the obligations of its members, and likewise states the penalty for failure to meet these obligations.
As a starting point, we would like to propose a practice of multiple equal response: Which is to say, whatever attack is made upon a power in this pact, all members of the pact will respond with a retaliatory strike of equal force to that original attack. For instance, if a foreign power sends ten thousand men into a protected power, then every member of the pact would be obligated to commit ten thousand men of their own to an invasion of that foreign power, or some other equivalent response. In an alliance of ten powers, this would ensure that any attack would be met tenfold: A compelling deterrent, indeed.
This, of course, does not consider the possibility of exemption should a member lack the capacity to deliver such forces, nor does it consider what action should be taken should a power fail to respond. It is intended only as a basic example of the sort of specificity we speak.
)I'll make the same argument regarding vague terms for retribution here, though:
In smaller alliances between two or three powers, it is reasonable to expect that terms such as "considered an attack against all of us" and "required to respond against the aggressor" can be interpreted in good faith as the need arises, and that any dispute over their interpretation can be resolved easily and quietly.
In larger alliances, however, such terminology grows into a larger and larger weakness: The non-specific term "response" gives no measure to the quality of response, allowing any power to commit an essentially insignificant amount of military might to any given act of retribution, without violating the treaty. This fact may be taken advantage of by foreign aggressors, who may target unpopular or remote nations under the assumption that the retaliatory response will be weak or apathetic. Indeed, foreign powers may even seek agreement beforehand from major powers in the alliance, that there will be no truly significant response to an attack against a specific ally. In all this, there is a looseness in interpretation which limits the security provided by the pact, and makes it overall less convincing as a deterrent.
For these reasons, the Brotherhood will not enter into this pact if it does not clearly state the obligations of its members, and likewise states the penalty for failure to meet these obligations.
As a starting point, we would like to propose a practice of multiple equal response: Which is to say, whatever attack is made upon a power in this pact, all members of the pact will respond with a retaliatory strike of equal force to that original attack. For instance, if a foreign power sends ten thousand men into a protected power, then every member of the pact would be obligated to commit ten thousand men of their own to an invasion of that foreign power, or some other equivalent response. In an alliance of ten powers, this would ensure that any attack would be met tenfold: A compelling deterrent, indeed.
This, of course, does not consider the possibility of exemption should a member lack the capacity to deliver such forces, nor does it consider what action should be taken should a power fail to respond. It is intended only as a basic example of the sort of specificity we speak.
![:]](http://www.enworld.org/forum/images/smilies/devious.png "Devious :]")
