I don't agree with this at all. Not only do I have some idea what the situation is - namely, it is two adventurers approaching a ruined/haunted fortresss via a cliff-side stairway - but the whole point of the picture, the book etc is to signal and reinforce that situation.
I want to reiterate that I was referring to the 4E PHB1 cover, rather than the DMG2 one, for reasons stated above.
That said (again, for the PHB picture) you're making presumptions about who the characters are and where they're going. Whether or not these are "reasonable" presumptions are a matter of personal interpretation. Are they approaching a place or leaving it? Are they adventurers, or are they enemy characters that the PCs will have to fight later?
Insofar as the "point" of the picture goes, I've mentioned earlier that the intent of the creator is exceptionally difficult to transmit through most artistic media; it's very easy for the reader to take away a message of their own choosing, as opposed to being able to flawlessly pick up on the message (if any) that the artist is trying to communicate. Saying that there's a meta-contextual element is, I think, a dicey proposition at best (e.g. the book is about "dungeons" so is an outdoor scene therefore going against the "point" of the book?).
Even suppose that, in the imagined story, she were to stumble and correct her footing, why has the artist shown us that moment? It's the fantasy illustration equivalent of post-Oscars "nipple slip" or "underwear seam" photographs.
I honestly don't think that the question is relevant. As I pointed out before, that's not a determining factor in trying to figure out the context (which is, in and of itself, not a factor in questioning the moral dimension of the artwork).
In the context of commercial production in a market economy, their decision should be influenced by the views of potential customers (incuding me, but more importanty including potential purchasers who were put off by the artwork).
This strikes me as a gross oversimplification, since it involves figuring out who their potential customers are, what their views are, if their views on the artwork would influence their purchasing intent (and if so, how much), etc.
It also doesn't mention that if some of these are give-and-take scenarios (e.g. something that makes group X more likely to purchase makes group Y less likely to purchase) then there needs to be some sort of determination made. While it would be virtuous if that determination was made on ethics, it would not be immoral if it was not.
To the extent that this is true, I don't believe that it's true of the illustration I mentioned. As bogmad indicated, this is not a depiction of a woman's sexuality.
Again, there are some caveats there. First, it is (as you indicated) your belief. I think that there's reasonable grounds for suggesting that others might have differing opinions in that regard. That's without even getting into issues of contextual characterization (e.g. if we assume that the person depicted is a fully-formed character, then there's a reason she's chosen to dress that way, and that's her business).
Who is saying that pictures of breasts, or thighs, are inherently immoral? The posts I've read are saying that sexualised depictions of women in the context of fantasy adventure RPG illustrations are politically/morally troubling.
I think you've answered your own question here. Politics aside, the idea that something is "morally troubling" is the idea that the "troubling" aspect of its moral dimension is that it might be immoral. I'm holding that it's not.
The nature of actions includes their results, at least where these are inherent or necessary (eg a killing necessarily thwarts another's interest in life; lying necessarily undermines rational communication).
Again, I disagree. The morality of an action is never determined by its results, as that makes the action a moral "question mark" until its ramifications are known.
I suspect, in this instance, that this is a difference in how you and I would define those actions and where we'd rank them on a deontological scale (e.g. the difference between "do not kill" and "do not murder").
In one standard contemporary account of duty-based ethics (Oxford Aristoteleanism a la Raz etc) duties are grounded in human interests. In Kantian versions, duties are grounded in the interests of rational beings (eg in participating in rational communication).
That's only relevant insofar as it requires that intent be present for something to rise to the level of an "action" in the first place.
To the best of my knowledge Kant does not assert that attempted murder is as serious as actual murder.
I'm not aware of any specific claims made in that regard, but I think that his general principle of ethics would support that.
And Kant derives the moral law via his universalisation principle, which asks whether a maxim of action is permissible in part by reference to the consequences of universalising that maxim.
A fair point, and this is one area where I disagree with Kant, as he's not the last word in deontological ethics.
You are confusing the claim that deontologists reject (namely, that contingent consequences of an action - particularly its effects on aggregate welfare - are all that matters to its morality) with a claim that they deny (namely, that the consequences of an action are never relevant to its value).
Incorrect; while it's true that deontological ethics does rule out that consequences are all that matter, it's wrong to say that there's no deontological philosophy that holds that consequences are a factor at all. In that regard you're dealing more with "Kantian ethics" than deontological ethics.
A month or so ago I was at a paper by John Tasioulas (Professor of Philosophy at UCL and a leading moral philosopher in the contemporary Aristotelean school) where he made this very point in response to a question.
Pics or it didn't happen.
But seriously, leaving aside the issue of appealing to authority with no backing (as well as the idea that you were "at" a paper), that's not a strictly deontological principle so much as it is an off-shoot school of thought.
I think that every contemporary theorist of the criminal law would take the view that the legal difference captures a moral one.
Wow, I think we're really going to have to agree to disagree here. Legal ethics are not at all held to be moral ethics; that's one of the first things that legal ethics teach!
Though there is no doubt that the phenomenon of "moral luck" is a curious one (eg the target of my shooting bends over at the last minute, so I miss and fail to kill him/her, and hence do something not as wrong as I might have).
Not as "wrong" there in a legal ethics sense, not insofar as moral philosophy goes. That's particularly true since your "intent" there follows the bullet, so if you accidentally kill the wrong person, it's still a premeditated crime.
I didn't assert that at all, nor imply it. I did imply that "portraying women in a sexualised way in contexts - such as fantasy adventure RPG illustrations - in which sexuality has little relevance is a breach of a duty owed to women not to wrong or demean them." This does not entail anything about other contexts, nor about what the parameters of permissible illustrations might be.
Again, everyone is free to develop their own code of morality, but I personally find that particular positive duty to be much too ambiguous in terms of what constitutes sexual objectification, what constitutes (an appropriate) context, and what constitutes or "demeaning" someone, to be of much use.
That also ignores the question of if there's a higher duty (e.g. a negative one) that says "do not suppress creative expression," since if there is, then it "wins out" over a positive duty.